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JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Joint and several liability presents itself in a variety of
situations where actors cause damage. Tort, antitrust, ERISA, environmental, and securities laws must all be applied
in instances where multiple parties cause an injury. Under
joint and several liability laws, an injured plaintiff may seek
damages from any or all of the defendants that cause the injury.' Whether a defendant who pays more than its share of
the damages has a right to seek contribution 2 from other
wrongdoers depends on the particular law or statute that has
been violated. Three rules which have been applied regarding a right to contribution include the no contribution rule,3
the contribution with claim reduction rule 4 and the contribution with settlement reduction rule.'
At common law there was no right to contribution among
joint tortfeasors for intentional torts.6 Many American jurisdictions applied this common law rule to negligent tort cases
1. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE

LAW OF TORTS § 47, at 324 (5th ed. 1984).
2. "Contribution refers to a cause of action whereby one who has discharged a common liability or obligation, typically by satisfying a judgment,
may recover from others who are jointly liable for their respective shares of that
liability or obligation." Contributionand Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation, 11 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. MONOGRAPH 4-5 (1986) [hireinafter Contribution and Claim Reduction] (paraphrasing the definition given in Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 199 A. 93 (Conn. 1938)). See generally
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 50, at 336-41.

3. Under the no contribution rule, if the plaintiff settles with a defendant,
then the amount of damages that the plaintiff can seek from the remaining nonsettled defendants is reduced by the settling defendant's settlement amount. A
defendant who pays more than its share of the liability cannot seek contribution
from other defendants.
4. Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, if the plaintiff settles
with a defendant, then the amount of damages that the plaintiff can seek from
the remaining non-settled defendants is reduced by the settling defendant's attributable share of the damages. A defendant who pays more than its share of
the liability can only seek contribution from defendants that have not previously settled. This rule has also been referred to as claim reduction.
5. Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, if the plaintiff
settles with a defendant, then the amount of damages that the plaintiff can
seek from the remaining non-settled defendants is reduced by the settling defendant's settlement amount. A defendant who pays more than its share of the
liability can seek contribution from all defendants, including those that have
previously settled. This rule has also been referred to simply as contribution.
6. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). For an analysis of this case see Theodore W. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176 (1898).
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as well.7 Currently, most states provide for some sort of con8
tribution among negligent, but not intentional, tortfeasors.
Most federal laws also allow for contribution.9 Some federal laws, however, do not provide for a right to contribu7. Reath noted the expandability of the no contribution rule, stating:
It is singularly unfortunate, and has led to misunderstanding, that
Merryweatherv. Nixan should have been continually treated as stating
the "general rule." As a matter of fact that case states not the rule, but
the exception. The general rule is that among persons jointly liable the
law implies an assumpsit either for indemnity or contribution, and the
exception is that no assumpsit, either express or implied, will be enforced among willful tort-feasors or wrongdoers.
Reath, supra note 6, at 177.
Prosser and Keeton, in discussing the application by American courts of
Merryweather v. Nixan, note that its holding was extended to negligent torts.
They explain:
The early American cases applied the rule against contribution to
cases of willful misconduct, but refused to recognize it where the tort
committed by the claimant was a matter of negligence or mistake. But
once the door was thrown open to joinder in one action of those who
had merely caused the same damage, the origin of the rule and the
reason for it were lost to sight. The great majority of our courts proceeded to apply it generally, and refused to permit contribution even
where independent, although concurrent, negligence had contributed
to a single result.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 50.
8. See Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation, supra
note 2, at 6 n.37. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 50; VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 251-92, Supp. 49-62 (2d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1990).
9. Federal environmental laws explicitly provide a right to contribution
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675, § 9613(f)(1) (West 1983 & Supp.
1994). The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1988), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1988), also explicitly permit
contribution.
The Supreme Court recently ruled that violators of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) have an implied right to
seek contribution. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113
S. Ct. 2085 (1993). In addition, federal courts have also upheld a right of contribution for admiralty cases, Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417
U.S. 106, 110-13 (1974); aviation collisions, Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Forth Corp. v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 421 U.S. 978 (1975); employment discrimination, Grogg v.
General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Blanton v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 49 F.R.D. 162, 162-64 (N.D. Ga. 1970); claims under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988), Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Minnesota Transfer Ry., 371 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying Minnesota law);
torts in the District of Columbia, Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 666 (D.C. Cir.
1949); and torts in the Virgin Islands, Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468
(3d Cir. 1967).

1994]

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

tion. 10 In several legislative and judicial contexts, the questions of whether a right of contribution should exist among
joint tortfeasors,' 1 and if so, whether claim reduction or settlement reduction is preferable, 12 remain unanswered.
This article will examine the three rules that have been
applied in joint and several liability situations: no contribution, contribution with claim reduction, and contribution with
settlement reduction. The rule selected affects a party's expected liability, and thus the level of deterrence a party faces
ex ante an activity. Moreover, after detection of the activity
has occurred, the rule affects the likelihood of settlement between parties.
This article focuses on conspiracies that cause joint
harm. Much of the analysis in the article applies to both conspiracy and non-conspiracy joint and several liability situations.' 3 Nevertheless, some analysis that is particular to conspiratorial acts by parties will be presented.' 4 Conspiracies
raise a special case of harm caused by multiple actors. Conspirators are likely to have information on the activities of
the other conspirators. This information may be of value to
10. Federal courts have refused to imply the right of contribution for violators of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988), Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981), and for antitrust
violators under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. 1994), or Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994), Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981).
11. For example, proposed legislation to change the antitrust laws to allow
contribution has been periodically debated. See, e.g., Contribution and Claim
Reduction in Antitrust Litigation,supra note 2, at 71-85; Edward D. Cavanagh,
Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble Damage Responsibility:
Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1314-22
(1987).
12. Many of the laws providing a right of contribution have not explicitly
stated whether claim reduction or settlement reduction should be applied.
Courts have not interpreted legislative silence on the issue consistently.
For example, the circuit courts are currently split as to whether claim reduction or settlement reduction should be used for securities violations. The
Ninth Circuit uses the claim reduction approach, whereas the Second Circuit
uses the settlement reduction rule. Compare Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884
F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying contribution with claim reduction), cert. denied sub nom. Franklin v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 498 U.S. 890 (1990) with
Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1024 (1990) (applying contribution with settlement reduction).
13. On the difference between joint torts and joint tortfeasors see KEETON
ET AL., supra note 1, § 46. In this article, the focus is on joint tortfeasors, where
multiple parties jointly perform the act.
14. See infra part VI.
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the plaintiff, and thus could be exchanged by a defendant for
a lower monetary settlement. Conspirators can also take into
account the different liability rules in negotiating a division
of the conspiracy's benefits. 15 Furthermore, the plaintiff's
likelihood of winning at trial against one conspirator will
often correlate with the likelihood of winning its case against
another conspirator.
Whether a right to contribution should exist in joint and
several liability situations for conspirators was analyzed in
the early 1980's by Professors Easterbrook, Landes and Posner, 16 and Professors Polinsky and Shavell. 1 7 They examined

conspiracies in the context of antitrust violations. Easterbrook, Landes and Posner concluded that the no contribution
rule would lead to more settlement and at least as much deterrence as the contribution rules." Polinsky and Shavell
showed that if an organization's decisionmaker is insulated
from the full amount of an organization's damages, then the
no contribution rules might lead to less deterrence than the
contribution rules.' 9
This article will build on previous analyses in examining
and settlement effects of the different contribudeterrent
the
tion rules. The above authors assumed symmetric information and beliefs in reaching their conclusions and recommendations. Yet it is often the case that conspirators will not
have symmetric information and beliefs.20 This article explores the effects of asymmetric information and beliefs on
the decisionmaking of the defendants and the plaintiff. When
the analysis is expanded to allow for asymmetric information,
previous conclusions do not always hold.
After providing a basic introduction to the rules and the
model's assumptions, this article examines the deterrent ef15. This contrasts with the case of a non-conspirator, whose participation in
a multiparty tort may result from some unfortunate event.
16. Frank H. Easterbrook, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. &
ECON. 331 (1980). See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and
Multiple Tortfeasors:An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 517 (1980).
17. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants:An Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447

(1981). See also STEVEN

SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW

67 (1987).
18. Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 344-53, 364.
19. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 453-55, 462.
20. See infra part III.B.
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fects of the different rules under asymmetric information. It
then shows that neither the no contribution rule nor the contribution rules always lead to more deterrence, even where
the decisionmaker is not insulated from the full amount of
damages. 2 '
The article then explores the conspiratorial defendants'
incentives to give and the plaintiff's incentives to accept information and evidence about the conspiracy in lieu of monetary compensation in settlements. 22 Because of the settlement-bar to contribution under the no contribution rule and
the contribution with claim reduction rule, a defendant will
be willing to provide the plaintiff with information about the
conspiracy at settlement. However, while the plaintiff will
have an incentive to accept information in lieu of monetary
compensation from any defendant under the no contribution
rule, under the contribution with claim reduction rule the
plaintiff will have a disincentive to cheaply settle with defendants who are liable for a high proportion of the damage.
Additionally, the article demonstrates that the defendants
that appear most culpable, in that they are aware of the
wrongfulness of their actions, are more likely to expend effort
collecting conspiracy information against others and hiding
conspiracy information about themselves. 23 As a consequence, these defendants may be likely to obtain a low monetary settlement by providing conspiracy information to the
24

plaintiff.

The article then focuses on settlement. First, the article
examines the disincentive for defendants to settle individually under the contribution with settlement reduction rule.25
21. See infra part III.B.
22. See Jong-Goo Yi, Essays in the Economics of Litigation with Multiple
Parties; Essay 3 Litigation with Multiple Defendants: How to Settle under Different Apportionment Rules 92-94 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University). I will extend his analysis of information exchange between the defendant and the plaintiff to include situations where a defendant
will not be willing to provide the plaintiff with information until after they
settle.
23. See infra part III.C.3.
24. Compare Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 360 (defining the most
culpable defendants as the defendants most likely to lose at trial) with Yi, supra
note 22, at 79 (defining the most culpable defendants as the defendants causing
the most damage).
25. This analysis is shown both by Easterbrook, Landes and Posner, and by
Polinsky and Shavell. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 362; Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 17, at 458-59.
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Then it demonstrates that, although the no contribution rule
may lead to more defendants settling with the plaintiff,
neither the no contribution rule, nor the contribution with
claim reduction rule always leads to an increased likelihood
settlement between all parties and the avoidance
of complete
26
trial.
of
The analysis does not give a clear cut choice for a best
rule, as the informational settings and types of defendants
will often determine outcomes under the different rules.
However, I recommend that the contribution with claim reduction rule be applied to conspiratorial joint and several liability situations because, while placing greater liability, and
thus deterrence, on defendants liable for larger proportions of
the damage, the rule will not discourage settlement. Since
the no contribution rule does not discourage settlement, it is
my second choice. The contribution with settlement reduction rule is the least desirable because it tends to discourage
settlement by furnishing a disincentive to the defendant to
provide the plaintiff with information at settlement, as the
defendant may have to pay contribution to later trial-losing
defendants.
The article also examines the apportionment of damages
under the contribution rules. Professors Kornhauser and
Revesz extensively analyzed the allocation of damages under
the contribution rules for joint and several liability. 28 However, they did not examine situations where bargaining by
the conspirators over the benefit of the conspiracy can occur
and situations where one party is able to control the actions
of another. This article examines these situations. It shows
that if conspirators are able to bargain about the division of
the conspiratorial benefit, then the per capita liability allocation rule may be more efficient than either the comparative
26. Yi showed that where the plaintiff and defendants have asymmetric information about the amount of damage the plaintiff has suffered, the different
contribution rules will affect settlement behavior and provide the above-mentioned result. See Yi, supra note 22, at 82-90. The article explores the case
where the defendants and the plaintiff disagree about the probability of the
plaintiff succeeding at trial and concludes that the results are the same.
27. An alternative would be to use the contribution with settlement reduction rule and allow Mary Carter agreements. Mary Carter agreements limit a
settling defendant's liability, and thus do not create a disincentive for the defendant to settle or to give information to the plaintiff. See infra part V.B.
28. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among
Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989).
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fault or comparative benefit liability allocation rules. However, the comparative fault liability allocation rule should be
applied in situations where one conspirator, through the use
of a "bad" threat, is able to coerce another conspirator into the
conspiracy. Other exceptions to the per capita liability allocation under the contribution rules are explored as well.
Finally, the article recommends that in most conspiratorial situations the contribution with claim reduction rule
should be applied where harm is caused by conspiracies; and
that liability be allocated per capita. The recommendations
are quite general, and apply to antitrust law in the same
manner as tort law.
The article proceeds as follows: Section II defines the
rules and gives numerical examples to show the differences
among the rules as well as assumptions used in the analysis;
Section III provides a basic introduction to the model and examines the deterrence effects of the different rules; Section IV
explores settlement effects of the different rules; Section V reexamines the model by lifting several of the assumptions and
provides additional extensions of the model; Section VI examines the allocation of liability under the contribution rules;
Section VII offers a conclusion; and Section VIII provides a
technical appendix and a formalized model.
II.

DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

This section provides definitions of the three rules being
examined as well as assumptions that will be used in the
analysis of these rules. These rules are: the no contribution
rule; the contribution with claim reduction rule; and the contribution with settlement reduction rule.
A.

Definitions of the Rules
1.

No ContributionRule2 9

If a defendant is found liable for damages and pays in
excess of the share of damages attributable to it, then the de29. One additional rule is similar to the no contribution rule, but allows
contribution against non-settled defendants. Under that rule, if a defendant is
found liable at trial for damages and pays in excess of its share of damages,
then the defendant can seek contribution only from non-prior-settling
wrongdoers for their share of this excess amount. If the plaintiff settles with a
defendant, then the total damages the plaintiff can seek against other
defendants is reduced by the settling defendant's settlement amount.
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fendant cannot obtain contribution from any other wrongdoer. If the plaintiff settles with a defendant, then the total
damages the plaintiff can seek against other defendants is reduced by the settling defendant's settlement amount. °
Contributionwith Claim Reduction Rule
If a defendant is found liable at trial for damages and
pays in excess of the share of damages attributable to it, then
the defendant can seek contribution only from non-prior-settling wrongdoers for their share of this excess amount. The
"with claim reduction" part of the rule means that if the
plaintiff settles with one defendant then the total damages
the plaintiff can seek against other defendants is reduced by
the settling defendant's attributable share of the damages.
2.

Contributionwith Settlement Reduction Rule
If a defendant is found liable at trial for damages and
pays in excess of the share of damages attributable to it, then
the defendant can seek contribution from any other wrongdoers, including prior-settling defendants, for their share of this
3.

The analysis of this rule, where probabilities of the defendants' loss at trial
are correlated, leads to the same results as the no contribution rule. See
Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 363.
This contribution among non-settling defendants rule, with slight
modifications such as judicial approval of settlements, has been proposed by the
American Law Institute for negligent tortfeasors. See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION
AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1968). As revised in 1955, section 4 of
the Uniform Act states:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is
given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury or the same wrongful death: (a) It does not discharge any
of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death
unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others
to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant,
or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the
greater; and (b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all
liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1955).
30. In antitrust cases the amount of a settlement is deducted from antitrust
judgments after the damages have been trebled. Thus, suppose there are two
defendants that caused $100 in damages to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff settles
with defendant A for $50 and then the plaintiff wins at trial against defendant
B, defendant B will have to pay the plaintiff $250 in damages. The $250 is
equal to the trebling of the damages of $100 less defendant A's settlement of
$50 ($250 = (3 x $100) - $50). This is known as the Flintkote rule in antitrust
cases. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfiord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 835 (1957).
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excess amount. The "with settlement reduction" part of the
rule means that if the plaintiff settles with one defendant
then the total damages the plaintiff can seek against other
defendants is reduced by the prior-settling defendant's settlement amount.
4. Examples
Two examples illustrate the differences among the three
rules. The first examines the case where one defendant settles before another defendant loses at trial. The second analyzes the case where one defendant loses at trial before any
settlement. For these examples, liability will be allocated
under the contribution rules by comparative fault.
For each example, assume that there are two defendants,
defendant A and defendant B, and a plaintiff. Assume defendant A caused 70% and defendant B caused 30% of the
total damages against the plaintiff; the total damages are
$100; and if contribution is allowed under the rule, then a
defendant is able to obtain contribution with certainty.
Example 1: Suppose the plaintiff settles with defendant
A for $10 and then the plaintiff wins at trial against defendant B.
Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff can sue defendant B for $90 in damages since $90 is the amount of damages for which the plaintiff has not yet been compensated. If
the plaintiff wins at trial against defendant B, and is
awarded $90 in damages, then defendant B must pay this full
amount and cannot seek any contribution from defendant A.
Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, the
plaintiff can sue defendant B for only $30 in damages because
the plaintiff's settlement with defendant A reduces the
amount that can be sought against defendant B by defendant
A's attributable share of the damages. In this example, defendant A caused 70% of the damages, which will make defendant A's attributable share $70. Thus, the amount of
damages that the plaintiff can seek against defendant B is
only $30. If the plaintiff wins at trial against defendant B for
$30 in damages, defendant B cannot seek contribution
against defendant A because defendant A settled prior to the
plaintiff's winning at trial against defendant B, even though
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defendant B is paying more in damages than defendant A
($30 vs. $10).31
Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule,
the amount for which the plaintiff can sue defendant B is reduced by defendant A's settlement amount. Thus, the plaintiff cannot sue defendant B for $100, but only for the settlement reduced amount of $90. If the plaintiff wins its lawsuit
against defendant B for $90 in damages, defendant B can
seek contribution from defendant A for $60, such that defendant A pays its attributable damage share of $70,32 and defendant B pays its attributable damage share of $30. 83
The following diagram shows the timeline of events, and
the table summarizes the differing results of the rules where:
(1) the plaintiff settles with defendant A before suing defendant B; (2) the plaintiff later wins a lawsuit against defendant
B; and, (3) when applicable under the rule, defendant B obtains contribution from defendant A.
n settles
with A A

[ c wins suit
-4 against , B

B can/cannot obtain
contribution from A A
A

--

Timeline of Events

31. Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, it is a defendant's
prior settlement that leads to a bar against contribution. Defendant B cannot
obtain contribution from defendant A because defendant A settled prior to defendant B's loss at trial, not because defendant B is only paying its attributable
share of damages. This difference is important, because it is the settlementcontribution bar that drives the incentive to settle under the contribution with
claim reduction rule.
For example, suppose there are 3 defendants (X, Y and Z), each causing an
equal proportion of the total damages of $90. Suppose defendant X settles with
the plaintiff prior to any trial for $10. Assume that after this settlement with
defendant X, that the plaintiff sues and wins at trial against defendant Y for
$60 in damages ($90 less defendant X's attributable share of $30). Because defendant X settled prior to defendant Y's loss at trial, even though defendant Y
has paid more than its attributable share of the damages ($60 > $30) and defendant X has paid less than its attributable share of the damages ($10 < $30),
defendant Y cannot seek contribution from defendant X. But defendant Y can
seek contribution from non-prior-settling defendant Z for defendant Z's attributable share of the damages of $30. If defendant Y is able to obtain contribution
from defendant Z for defendant Z's attributable share of $30, this will reduce
defendant Y's net payment to $30, which is defendant Y's attributable share of
the damages.
32. $70 = $10 + $60.
33. $30 = $90 - $60.
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Plaintiff
settles
with
defendant
A for

Plaintiff
sues and
wins
against
defendant
B damages
of

Defendant Defendant Defendant
B's total
B obtains A's total
damage
damage
contribupayment
payment
tion from
defendant
A of

Plaintiff's
total
award

No contribution

$10

$90

$0

$10

$90

$100

Contribution with
claim
reduction

$10

$30

$0

$10

$30

$40

Contribution with
settlement
reduction

$10

$90

$60

$70

$30

$100

Comparative Outcomes Under the Different Rules

Example 2: Suppose the plaintiff sues only defendant A
for damages of $100 and wins at trial. Under both the contribution with claim reduction rule and the contribution with
settlement reduction rule, defendant A will be able to seek
contribution from defendant B of $30. This will leave defendant A with a net payment of $70. Under the no contribution
rule, defendant A will be unable to seek contribution from defendant B, and thus defendant A will be burdened with paying the full $100 in damages.
The following diagram shows the timeline of events, and
the table summarizes the differing results of the rules where:
(1) the plaintiff wins at trial against defendant A for the total
damage award; and, (2) when applicable under the rule, defendant A obtains contribution from defendant B. In this example, contribution with claim reduction and contribution
with settlement reduction achieve the same result.
n wins suit

&A can/cannot obtain

against AA

contribution from A B
Timeline of Events
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Plaintiff sues
and wins
against
defendant A
damages of

Defendant A Defendant
obtains con- A's total
damage paytribution
from defend- ment
ant B of

Plaintiff's
Defendant
total award
B's total
damage payment

No contribution

$100

$0

$100

$0

$100

Contribution
with claim
reduction

$100

$30

$70

$30

$100

Contribution
with settlement reduction

$100

$30

$70

$30

$100

Comparative Outcomes Under the Different Rules

B. Assumptions

The model assumes that there are multiple conspiratorial defendants that cause harm to one plaintiff, and that the
defendants are jointly and severally liable for the damages
caused to the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff can settle or go to
trial against any or all of these defendants.
Initially quite a few assumptions will be explicitly made
to more easily show the differences among the rules. Most of
these assumptions are not essential to the conclusions, and
will be lifted in Section V.A.
The model is one in which the plaintiff is simultaneously
bargaining with all defendants. 34 It will be assumed that the
plaintiff, in entering negotiations with any particular defendant, cannot credibly commit to suing a particular defendant
first if a settlement is not reached.35 If the plaintiff fails to
settle with any or all of the defendants, it will be assumed
that the plaintiff will randomly choose one of the non-settling
defendants to sue.
34. Easterbrook, Landes and Posner developed the basic simultaneous bar-

gaining model. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 356-64.
35. In most cases, it seems that the plaintiff will be unable to commit ex

ante to negotiate and sue defendants in a particular order. Even if the plaintiff
is able to do this, it might choose not to if its probabilities of winning at trial are
perfectly correlated. However, in some situations, depending on the characteristics of the plaintiff and defendants, the plaintiff might be better off negotiating and suing defendants in a particular sequential order. See infra notes 51,

57.
In an extension of the model where the plaintiff's probabilities of winning
at trial against different defendants are uncorrelated, it will be shown that
under all of the rules, the plaintiff is able to credibly commit to negotiating with
the defendants sequentially in a particular order. See infra part V.A.2.

1994]

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

The deterrence and settlement differences between the
no contribution and contribution rules result from the party
negotiations following detection of the conspiracy. Thus, it
will be assumed that the plaintiff is able to detect the conspiracy, and that the uncertainty of the plaintiff collecting a damage award from a defendant is due solely to the uncertainty of
6
the plaintiff winning at trial after detection has occurred.
To the extent that uncertainty of detection exists, the different rules converge towards the same result in the analysis.
It will be assumed that the defendants are unable to
form, prior to entering into the conspiracy, an enforceable
sharing agreement regarding damage payments, or an agreement that no individual defendant will settle without all of
the defendants settling as a group.37 Such agreements would
change the multi-defendant analysis into one that is similar
to that of the single defendant case. 8 Thus, if there were an
enforceable sharing agreement, each of the rules would lead
to the same outcome.
It will be further assumed that if a defendant loses at
trial against the plaintiff, then under the contribution rules
the defendant is able to obtain contribution from the other
defendants with certainty.39
36. This is not an essential assumption. That detection has occurred seems
to be implicitly assumed in the analysis of the previous authors. However, the
assumption should be explicitly stated in examining the differences between
the two rules. See infra part V.. 1 (lifting the assumption that detection has
occurred and analyzing cases where detection is uncertain).
37. The defendants can still settle at the same time, it is just that they do
not have an enforceable agreement to do so ex ante the conspiracy. For an analysis of contingent and group agreements, see infra part IV.A.
An enforceable ex ante conspiracy agreement document might be used as
evidence to show that a conspiracy exists and thus, the conspirators might not
wish to sign it.
38. For an analysis in the two party case see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal
Conflicts, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 279, 285-86 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14J.L. & ECON. 61,66-69 (1971). For a survey article on
settlement in the single defendant case, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J.
ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989).
39. This is not an essential assumption. But note, even if the plaintiff has
different probabilities of winning against the various defendants, each defendant may be able to obtain contribution from the other defendants. This would
seem especially true in conspiracy cases, where defendants may have evidence
on each other, such as testimony of their recollections, that is not accessible to
the plaintiff. For an analysis of uncertain contribution, see infra part V.A.3.
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Finally, it will be assumed that the plaintiff's probabilities of winning at trial against different defendants are perfectly correlated. 40 Thus, suppose the plaintiff has probabilities of winning at trial against defendant A of 0.5 and
defendant B of 0.5. If the plaintiff sues both defendants in
the same trial, then the plaintiff's probability of winning will
still be 0.5. If the plaintiff loses at trial against defendant A,
and then sues defendant B, the plaintiff will also lose at trial
against defendant B. If the plaintiff wins at trial against defendant A, then the plaintiff would have won at trial against
defendant B.41
III. DETERRENCE
This section examines the deterrent effects of the different rules. The first subsection examines the situation where
the defendants have symmetric information and thus symmetric beliefs. To begin with, the case where defendants
have the same likelihood of loss at trial to the plaintiff and
are equally liable for the damage under the contribution rules
will be modeled. Then situations where the defendants are
not equally liable for damages or do not have the same likelihood of loss at trial are examined. The paper demonstrates
that if the defendants have symmetric information, some defendants may face less deterrence under the no contribution
rule than under the contribution rules, but at least one defendant will face greater deterrence under the no contribution rule.
The article then analyzes the case where defendants
have asymmetric information and different beliefs. The article shows that, where defendants have asymmetric information, neither the no contribution nor the contribution rules
always lead to more deterrence. However, even where all de40. This assumption is not essential. For an analysis of the case where the
plaintiff's probabilities of winning at trial against different defendants are uncorrelated, see infra part V.A.2.
41. If the defendants have different probabilities of loss at trial against the
plaintiff, then the correlation is shown by the following example. Suppose the
plaintiff has probabilities of winning at trial against defendant A of 0.5 and
defendant B of 0.2. If the plaintiff loses at trial against defendant A and then
sues defendant B, the plaintiff will lose with certainty, since 0.5 > 0.2. If the

plaintiff loses at trial against defendant B and then sues defendant A, the plaintiff's updated probability of winning at trial against defendant A will be 0.375 =
(0.5 - 0.2)1(1-0.2).
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fendants face less deterrence under the no contribution rule
than under the contribution rules, the no contribution rule
always leads the plaintiff to expect and receive a higher damage award.
For these two subsections, the focus will be on the deterrence caused by the expected damage payments of the defendants to the plaintiff and not on the deterrence caused by
litigation or risk costs. 42 We will assume that a defendant

will prefer to settle if its expected settlement payment is less
than or equal to its expected loss at trial.
Next the article analyzes defendants' incentives to give
information and the plaintiff's incentives to accept information in lieu of monetary compensation. Defendants will provide information under either the no contribution rule or the
contribution with claim reduction rule, as both rules have a
settlement contribution bar that keeps later trial-losing defendants from obtaining contribution from prior-settling defendants. However, under the contribution with claim reduction rule, the plaintiff has a disincentive to cheaply settle
with a defendant who is liable for a high proportion of the
damage.
We then examine the deterrent effects caused by risk
costs and litigation costs. Finally, the effect of decisionmaker
insulation on deterrence will be examined.
A.

Symmetric Information

In this subsection, it is assumed that the defendants
have symmetric information, and thus symmetric beliefs.43
Defendants have symmetric beliefs of each defendant's
probability of loss to the plaintiff and each defendant's alloca42. See infra part III.D (examining the deterrent effect of risk) and part
III.E (examining the deterrent effect of litigation costs).
43. For example, two defendants and a plaintiff could have information that
leads each to believe that the plaintiff will win at trial against defendant 1 with
probability 0.5 and against defendant 2 with probability 0.2. It is not necessary
under symmetric information that the defendants have the same probability of
loss to the plaintiff. It is only necessary that the defendants and the plaintiff
agree on the probabilities that each assigns to the different defendants losing at
trial.
It is also not necessary that the parties have symmetric information in order to have the same beliefs. But if the parties do have symmetric information,
then they will have the same beliefs.
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tion of liability for damages under the contribution rules.44 It
is also assumed that each defendant believes ex ante the conspiracy that the plaintiff will share its beliefs if detection of
the conspiracy occurs. 45 What is important with regard to deterrence is the ex ante conspiracy belief of a defendant regarding its expected damages.
This subsection begins with an analysis of cases where
the defendants are identical. This restriction is then lifted
and cases where defendants are liable for different proportions of the damage or face different probabilities of losing at
trial are analyzed.
1. Identical Defendants
Defendants are identical, for purposes of the model,
when they have caused the same proportion of damages
under the contribution rules, have the same probability of
losing at trial to the plaintiff and have the same information
and beliefs. The case of identical defendants with symmetric
information was thoroughly examined by Easterbrook,
Landes and Posner and will be used to demonstrate the
illustrates how the rules difmodel.46 The following example
47
process.
fer in the bargaining
44. Under the no contribution rule, liability is not allocated because each
defendant is potentially liable for all damages.
45. I will be assuming throughout the deterrence section of the article that
part of a defendant's ex ante conspiracy beliefs is that the plaintiff will share its
beliefs. Ex ante the conspiracy the plaintiff has no beliefs since the conspiracy
has not been entered into and thus not detected by the plaintiff. Thus, ex ante
the conspiracy, the defendants can only speculate as to what the plaintiff will
believe.
If a defendant believes that a plaintiff will disagree with the defendant's
beliefs, then the defendant will have to take into account how it expects the
plaintiff to behave in order to determine its expected damages. For example, if
the defendant believes that the plaintiff will settle with every defendant for one
cent, then the defendant will face little in the way of deterrence, regardless of
the defendant's belief of the plaintiff's probability of winning at trial, as the
defendant will plan on settling with the plaintiff for one cent. On the other
hand, if the defendant believes that the plaintiff will never settle with any defendant, then the defendant will have to determine how this strategy by the
plaintiff will affect the defendant's expected damage payment.
46. Easterbrook, Landes and Posner's paper focuses on settlement and the
bargaining process after detection has occurred. See Easterbrook et al., supra
note 16, at 345.
47. The example assumes detection has occurred and thus, follows the analysis of Easterbrook, Landes and Posner. See.id. at 353-64.
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Suppose there are two defendants which have each contributed equally to the damage of the plaintiff, and suppose
that the probability of each defendant losing at trial is 0.5
and the total damage amount is $100.
Under both of the contribution rules, each defendant will
face an expected liability payment of $25, and the plaintiff
will receive an expected total damage award of $50.48 First,
suppose that the plaintiff settles with neither defendant and
sues only defendant A. In that case, defendant A will have a
50% chance of losing at trial to the plaintiff and paying damages of $100. But if defendant A does pay $100 in damages to
the plaintiff, defendant A will be able to get $50 of that back
by suing defendant B for contribution. Thus, defendant A
will have a 50% chance of paying a net of $50 in damages for
an expected liability payment of $25. Defendant B will also
have an expected liability of payment of $25, as it will have to
pay $50 in contribution to defendant A whenever defendant A
loses at trial to the plaintiff, which will occur 50% of the time.
Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, a
defendant has a disincentive to settle individually, as a later
trial-losing defendant can obtain contribution from the priorsettling defendants. 49 Thus, unless there is a group or contingent settlement, there will be a trial and the result will be
as above.50
Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, a defendant will not have a disincentive to settle first. Suppose
that the plaintiff settles with defendant A for some amount
before suing defendant B. The plaintiff can then sue defendant B for $50, equal to the full damages of $100 less defendant A's attributable share of $50. Since defendant B will
have a 50% chance of losing at trial to the plaintiff, defendant
B will have an expected damage payment of $25. And because the plaintiff can obtain a damage payment of $50 if it
sues one (or both) of the defendants before settling with
48. Under the contribution rules, the expected damage payment of a defendant is equal to the (probability of loss at trial) x (% liable) x (total damage),
which in this example is $25 = (0.5) x (0.5) x ($100). The total expected damage
award is equal to the sum of the payments by the defendants, $50 = $25 + $25.
49. A defendant will not settle if contribution among defendants can be obtained with certainty. See infra part V.A. If contribution cannot be obtained
with certainty, then a defendant may settle even though it may later have to
pay additional damages through contribution. See infra part V.A.3.
50. See infra part IV.A (analyzing group and contingent settlements).
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either, the plaintiff will want to settle with defendant A for at
least $25. Defendant A will not be willing to settle for more
than $25, its expected damages at trial, and thus the initial
settlement between the plaintiff and defendant A will also be
for $25.51 The plaintiff's total expected damage award from
the settlements will be $50. Thus, under the contribution
with claim reduction rule, whether or not a trial occurs, each
defendant will have expected damages of $25.
Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff can obtain a
higher aggregate damage award through settlements than by
taking the defendants to trial jointly.52 The plaintiff can play
the two defendants against each other in settlement negotiations and thus the plaintiff will be able to receive a higher
expected payment than under the contribution rules.
51. The plaintiff would not be better off sequentially negotiating first with
defendant A, and then, with defendant B. Suppose the plaintiff first approached defendant A in the negotiations. The plaintiff will have an expected
damage award at trial of $50, but defendant A will only have an expected damage payment at trial of $25. This is because if defendant A lost at trial then it
could obtain $50 in contribution from defendant B. Thus, defendant A's net loss
from losing at trial would only be $50, and given that defendant A will only lose
at trial 50% of the time, defendant A has an expected damage award of $25.
Defendant A would not offer to settle with the plaintiff for more than $25. Suppose the plaintiff offered to settle for $30, defendant A would not be able to
obtain contribution from defendant B (since $30 is less than defendant A's attributable share of $50). Thus, defendant A would be better off with the trial.
The plaintiff will thus have an expected damage award of $50 at trial and will
not be better off by negotiating with the defendants sequentially.
52. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 356.
Suppose the plaintiff settles with neither defendant, then it will have an
expected award of $50, equal to the probability that it prevails at trial multiplied by the total damages. Now suppose defendant A offers to settle with the
plaintiff for only $1. The plaintiff will be better off accepting the $1 and suing
defendant B for the remainder of $99. This will give the plaintiff expected damages of $50.50 which is higher than the expected damages of $50 the plaintiff
will receive if it goes to trial against defendant A. Of course, defendant B will
now have expected damages of $49.50, and will bid against defendant A to settle first. Thus, we will be in a bidding war as described below.
Under a rule where contribution is only allowed among non-settled defendants, the result will be the same. In the analysis, the plaintiff will again wish to
settle with all but one of the defendants before trial, as the plaintiff gains nothing when there is more than one outstanding defendant and its probabilities of
winning at trial are correlated. Thus, there will remain only one non-settled
defendant if there is a trial. But as in the case of the no contribution rule,
under this modified contribution rule, if a defendant settles it cannot be sued
for contribution. Thus, there will be no non-settled defendants from whom a
trial-losing defendant can seek contribution. The result is the same as where
the no contribution rule had been in effect. See id. at 363.
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To see how the plaintiff is able to do this, consider the
following scenario. Suppose that the plaintiff is considering
settling with defendant A for $25, and then suing defendant
B for the remainder of its damages. If the plaintiff settles
with defendant A for $25, then the plaintiff can sue defendant
B for $75, equaling the total damages of $100, less defendant
A's settlement of $25. Since defendant B has a probability of
0.5 of losing at trial to the plaintiff, defendant B will face an
expected loss of $37.50. 5 3 Defendant B will be better off going
to the plaintiff and offering to settle for more than defendant
A's offer of $25 (before the plaintiff finalizes the settlement
with the defendant A). Suppose defendant B offers the plaintiff $30, then the plaintiff will prefer defendant B's offer to
defendant A's offer of $25. But if the plaintiff settles with defendant B for $30, then defendant A will face an expected loss
of $35.54 Thus, defendant A would be well-advised to make
an offer above $30.
This "bidding war" will continue to spiral upwards until
an equilibrium is reached where a defendant's offer to settle
first is equal to its expected loss if it does not settle first. In
this case, the equilibrium settlement offer will be $33.33,
where the first settlement 55is equal to the expected loss at trial
or the second settlement.
It is the defendant's preference of settlement over litigation that causes the upward spiraling of the settlement offers.
For example, let c be the cost of trial for a defendant. Both
defendants would be better off if neither settled and thus,
each faced a 50% chance of being taken to trial, giving each
an expected liability of $25.56 But since each defendant will
prefer settlement over litigation, a prisoners' dilemma type
situation exists. Each defendant will offer a settlement that
53. $37.50 = (0.5) x ($100 - $25).
54. $35 = (0.5) x ($100 - $30).
55. If defendant A settles for $33.33, then the expected damage payment of
defendant B is equal to (probability of loss at trial) x (total damages - defendant
A's settlement), which in this case is (0.5) x ($100 - $33.33) = $33.33. Defendant B will not want to bid higher than $33.33 to settle before defendant A. At
equilibrium, defendant A's initial settlement is equal to defendant B's later settlement (or expected loss at trial).
56. Each defendant will face a 50% chance of being chosen by the plaintiff to
be sued, and a 50% chance of losing at trial and paying the total damages of
$100. Thus, each defendant's expected damages will be $25 = (0.5) x (0.5) x
($100).
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is equal to its expected liability should it be taken to trial by
the plaintiff.
Expected Damages

Defendant B settles

Defendant B does not
settle

(AA, A B)
Defendant A settles

$33.33 , $33.33

$25 , $37.50 + c

Defendant A does not
settle

$37.50 + c, $25

$25 + c , $25 + c

No Contribution Rule: Expected Damages Settlement Pattern as a Prisoners'
Dilemma Situation

Unless the defendants act in concert during their negotiations, the plaintiff will be able to use the defendants' preference for settlement over litigation to create a wedge that induces each defendant to settle for the equilibrium amount of
$33.33.57
57. I am assuming that the plaintiff is unable to commit to negotiating with
the defendants sequentially in a particular order. While this assumption will
be valid for most situations, we will examine the rational behind it here.
Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff will have an incentive to settle
with all but one defendant before any trial occurs, as the plaintiff will gain
nothing by having more than one outstanding defendant in a trial. Both the
plaintiff and the defendants will know this. This knowledge will affect the bargaining. The following example will show why a plaintiff might be disadvantaged in sequential settlement negotiations.
Suppose that defendant A and defendant B cause $100 in total damages
and each has a 50% probability of losing at trial to the plaintiff. Suppose the
plaintiff wants to first sue defendant A and then sue defendant B. The plaintiff
and defendant A will agree that defendant A will have an expected payment of
$50 in damages if a trial occurs. The plaintiff will want to settle with defendant
A for defendant A's expected damages at trial of $50 and then sue defendant B
for the remaining $50. If the plaintiff and defendant A settle for $50, then the
plaintiff and defendant B would agree that the expected outcome at their trial
would lead to expected damages of $25 and thus, they would settle for $25. This
negotiating pattern will give the plaintiff an expected award of $75 from the
sequential bargaining, which is greater than the $66.66 likely received from the
simultaneous bargaining.
However, if the plaintiff commits to the sequential bargaining ex ante the
negotiations, then the plaintiff will be better off accepting any positive offer
from defendant A than risking a trial. For example, if defendant A offers the
plaintiff only $1 to settle, the plaintiff will be better off accepting the $1 and
suing defendant B for the remainder of $99. This will give the plaintiff expected
damages of $50.50, which is greater than the expected damages of $50 the
plaintiff could expect if it goes to trial against defendant A.
Thus, defendant A is better off settling for up to $50 than going to trial and
facing expected damages of $50 and trial costs. The plaintiff is in a better position if it settles for any positive amount, as opposed to going to trial against
defendant A. The actual bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and de-
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Since, under the no contribution rule, each defendant has
an expected payment of $33.33 while under the contribution
rules each defendant has an expected payment of only $25,
the deterrence faced by the defendants will be greater under
the no contribution rule. 58 A comparison of the rules in this

example gives us the following:
Belief of
damages
attributable to
defendant
A

Belief of
Belief of
Belief of
the plain- the plaindamages
attributa- tiff winning tiff winning
at trial
at trial
ble to
against
against
defendant
defendant defendant
B
B
A

Belief of its Belief of its
expected
expected
damages
damages
under the under the
no contri- contribubution rule tion rules

Defendant
A

$50

$50

0.5

0.5

$33.33

$25

Defendant
B

$50

$50

0.5

0.5

$33.33

$25

Expected Damages: Symmetric Information, Identical Defendants

Thus, for the case of identical defendants with symmetric
deterinformation, the no contribution rule leads to increased
59
rence and a higher expected reward for the plaintiff.
fendant A will be somewhere between.$0 and $50. Where the actual agreement
occurs depends on the parties risk preferences, time preferences for money and
possibly psychological factors. See generally Ariel Rubinstien, Perfect Equilibrium in a BargainingModel, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982); Ariel Rubinstien, A
Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences, 53
ECONOMETRICA 1151 (1985); DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY,

chs. 4.4, 4.6 and 10, at 113-17, 128-30, 397-428 (1991).
If the plaintiff can decide whether or not it wants to commit to sequential
bargaining, it will only do so if it leads to an expected total damage award
greater than the $66.66 it could obtain through simultaneous bargaining.
Thus, the plaintiff will have to believe before committing that it is in a strong
bargaining position with the first defendant in a sequential negotiation settlement pattern.
58. Easterbrook, Landes and Posner demonstrated that the no contribution
rule will lead to more deterrence under the assumptions of symmetric information and identical defendants. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 369.
59. The whipsaw bargaining of the no contribution rule may lead to some
curious results. In the model, even if the damage per conspirator is constant,
the expected damage payment of each defendant increases as the number of
conspirators in the conspiracy increase. See id. at 359.
We will compare two mythical states that use the no contribution rule to
show how the number of conspirators affects each conspirator's expected damage payment. In state A, there is one conspiracy composed of four members,
each conspirator is equally liable for the $200 in total damages. In state B,
there are two conspiracies of two conspirators each, each conspiracy causes
$100 in total damages and in each conspiracy, each conspirator is equally liable

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

2. DissimilarDefendants
This subsection examines two ways defendants can be
different in the model. First, the defendants may be liable for
different proportions of the plaintiff's damage. Second, the
defendants may have different probabilities of losing to the
plaintiff at trial. These differences will be examined separately below. Given that the parties have symmetric information, even if the defendants are different, the no contribution rule, as compared with the contribution rules, will lead
to an increased expected damage payment for at least one defendant and a higher aggregate expected damage award for
the plaintiff. We now examine the two ways defendants can
differ in the model.
for the damages. Thus, in both states, the total damages are $200 and the damage per conspirator is $50. Assume all conspirators are likely to lose to a plaintiff at trial with probability 0.5.
In state A, the total damage that the four conspirators cause is $200. In
equilibrium, each defendant will settle for the damages it would expect if it
were the last non-settled defendant and threatened with trial. In this case
under the no contribution rule, each conspirator will be willing to settle for s
equal to $40 in damages. $40 = (0.5) x ($200 - 3s) = (0.5) x ($200 - $120).
Under the contribution rules, each defendant will have expected damages of
$25. $25 = (0.5) x [(0.25) x ($200)].
In state B, the total damages that the four conspirators cause is also $200.
But in state B each conspiracy consists of only two members. Thus, as above in
the text, in equilibrium each conspirator will offer to settle for s equal to $33.33.
$33.33 = (0.5) x ($100 - s) = (0.5) x ($100 - $33.33). And under the contribution
rules each defendant will settle for $25. $25 = (0.5) x [(0.5) x ($100)].
In both states, conspiracies cause $200 in total damages, but because there
is only one conspiracy in state A, each defendant faces expected damages of $40
under the no contribution rule. However, in state B where there are 2 conspiracies, each conspirator faces expected damages of $33.33 under the no contribution rule. The effect of the no contribution rule on expected damages is not
consistent when the conspiracy size is varied. Conspirators must take into account the amount of damage caused along with the number of defendants. As
can be seen above, joining a conspiracy with twice as many members that
causes twice as much total damage leads to greater expected liability, even if
the benefit to each conspirator is the same in each conspiracy.
In the model, the no contribution rule provides greater deterrence for
larger conspiracies than for smaller conspiracies. For some situations, such as
price fixing, this seems contradictory from a policy point of view, as one would
expect larger conspiracies to be more likely to break down than smaller conspiracies. Thus, it would seem that smaller conspiracies are more significant to deter than larger ones. That the damages vary with conspiracy size will also
cause problems in trying to set the correct multiplier on damages, such as the
chosen multiplier of 3 for antitrust damage. The main point is that the no contribution rule adds the size of the conspiracy as a factor when determining the
expected damages through bargaining, which may lead to some odd results as
the examples in this footnote demonstrate.
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a. Different Liability Responsibility

First we examine the case where the defendants cause
different proportions of the damage. Under the contribution
rules, if liability is allocated by comparative fault, then the
defendants may be liable for different proportions of the damage. 6 0 The underlying assumption remains: each defendant
has the same probability of losing at trial; and the defendants
have symmetric information that leads them to the same beliefs of these probabilities and each defendant's proportion of
liability.
Under the no contribution rule, liability is not allocated.
The plaintiff can seek the entire amount of damages from any
defendant, regardless of the proportion of damage that defendant caused. Under the contribution rules, the expected
damage payment faced by each defendant is dependent on
the allocation of liability for the damages among the defendants. If liability is allocated by comparative fault, a defendant that has caused more damage will have a higher expected
damage payment than a defendant who has caused less damage. Under the contribution rules, the expected damage payment of each defendant is equal to the probability that the
plaintiff will win at trial multiplied by the amount of damage
for which the defendant is liable.
Since, under the no contribution rule, the expected damage payment of a defendant is independent of the proportion
of damages attributable to the defendant, while under the
contribution rules the expected damage payment of a defendant is directly proportional to the damages attributable to the
defendant, it should not be surprising that those defendants
causing a high proportion of damage may pay less under the
no contribution rule than under the contribution rules. 6 1 The
total damage award received by the plaintiff where defendants have caused different proportions of the damage will be
the same as where each defendant caused the same share of
60. Defendants could also be liable for different shares of the damage under
the comparative benefit liability allocation rule. See infra part VI (examining
the per capita, comparative fault and comparative benefit liability allocation
rules).
61. This is true when comparing the no contribution rule with the contribution rules where liability is allocated by comparative fault or comparative benefit. Under the contribution rules, if liability is allocated per capita then the
expected damage payment of a defendant is also independent of the proportion
of damages attributable to the defendant.
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the damage for both the no contribution rule and contribution
rules. Only the division of damages among the defendants
under the contribution rules changes. Slightly modifying the
numerical example of the previous section, by changing the
amount of the damage attributable to each defendant, shows
the effects of the defendants being liable for different shares
of the damages under the contribution rules.
Suppose two defendants each have a probability of losing
to the plaintiff at trial of 0.5, total damages are $100, defendant A is liable for 90% of the damages and defendant B is
liable for 10% of the damages. Under the no contribution
rule, each defendant has expected damages of $33.33, and the
total expected damage award to the plaintiff will be $66.66.62
Even though the defendants have caused greatly different
amounts of damage, the result is the same as where both defendants had caused an equal proportion of the damage. This
is because under the no contribution rule each defendant's expected damage payment is a function of the total damages
caused to the plaintiff, not a defendant's attributable share of
the damages.
Under the contribution rules, a defendant's expected
damage payment is equal to the probability of losing at trial
multiplied by the damages attributable to the defendant.
Thus, defendant A will have expected damages of $45,63 and
defendant B will have expected damages of $5.64 The total

expected damage award to the plaintiff is equal to the sum of
the defendants' expected damage payments, and is thus
$50.65 Under the contribution rules, the expected damage
payments are a function of the amount of damage caused by
each defendant, and, therefore, individual damage payments
are different than those where each defendant causes an
equal amount of the damage. However, the total damage
payment of $50 remains the same.
In this example, the no contribution rule, as compared to
the contribution rules, will lead to less deterrence for defendant A, given its expected damages ($33.33 vs. $45), while de62. The settlement under the no contribution rule is such that $33.33 =
(0.5) x ($100 - $33.33).
The plaintiff's total damage award under the no contribution rule is such
that $66.66 = $33.33 + $33.33.
63. $45 = (0.5) x (0.9) x ($100).
64. $5 = (0.5) x (0.1) x ($100).
65. $50 = $45 + $5.
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fendant B will face more deterrence under the no contribution rule given its expected damages ($33.33 vs. $5). The
total expected damages awarded to the plaintiff will be
greater under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules ($66.66 vs. $50), just as in the example of the
previous section where defendants caused an equal proportion of damage. A comparison of the rules in this example
gives us the following:
Belief of
damages
attributable to
defendant
A

Belief of Belief of its Belief of its
Belief of
Belief of
expected
expected
the plain- the plaindamages
damages
attributa- tiff winning tiff winning damages
under the under the
at trial
at trial
ble to
contribuno contriagainst
against
defendant
defendant defendant bution rule tion rules
B
B
A

Defendant
A

$90

$10

0.5

0.5

$33.33

$45

Defendant

$90

$10

0.5

0.5

$33.33

$5

B
Expected Damages: Symmetric Information, Different Liability

Yet, just because the defendant causing more damage
pays the same amount as the defendant causing less damage
under the no contribution rule, it does not follow that the former defendant is always paying less under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules. We can show
this by modifying the example above such that defendant A is
liable for 60% of the damages, while defendant B is liable for
40% of the damages. Defendant A and defendant B will,
again, both have expected damage payments of $33.33 under
the no contribution rule. Under the contribution rules, defendant A will have an expected damage payment of $30,66

while defendant B will have an expected damage payment of
$20.67 Under the no contribution rule, defendant A has the
same expected damage payment, of $33.33, as defendant B,
but defendant A still has a higher expected damage payment
under the no contribution rule than under the contribution
rules. A comparison of the rules in this example gives us the
following:
66. $30 = (0.5) x (0.6) x ($100).
67. $20 = (0.5) x (0.4) x ($100).
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Belief of Belief of its Belief of its
Belief of
Belief of
expected
expected
the plain- the plaindamages
damages
attributa- tiff winning tiff winning damages
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at trial
at trial
ble to
contribuno contriagainst
against
defendant
defendant defendant bution rule tion rules
B

A

B

Defendant
A

$60

$40

0.5

0.5

$33.33

$30

Defendant

$60

$40

0.5

0.5

$33.33

$20

B
Expected Damages: Symmetric Information, Different Liability

When parties have symmetric information, there are two
separate effects of the no contribution rule. First, the proportion of damages paid by any particular defendant is independent of the damages caused by that defendant. Thus,
the no contribution rule may lessen the expected damage
payment of a defendant that causes a high proportion of the
damages by shifting some of the liability to other defendants.
This was shown in the first example in this section. Second,
there are higher aggregate damages paid by all of the defendants because of the whipsaw bargaining under the no contribution rule. As shown in the second example, it is possible
that the increased penalty paid by all defendants outweighs
the shifting effect of who pays under the contribution rules.
Thus, all defendants may pay more under the no contribution
rule than under the contribution rules, even though some defendants have higher expected damages than others under
the contribution rules.
Although the no contribution rule will always lead to an
increased expected damage payment for the low damage
causing defendants, it is not true that the high damage causing defendants will always face less deterrence. But the
higher the proportion of damage a defendant has caused, the
more likely it will have a smaller expected damage payment
under the no contribution rule than under the contribution

rules.
b.

Different Probabilitiesof Loss at Trial

We will now examine the case where the defendants
have different probabilities of loss at trial. For this subsection, we will assume that each defendant has caused the
same proportion of damages and that the defendants have
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symmetric information that leads them to the same beliefs of
these probabilities and each defendant's proportion of
liability.
Suppose there are two defendants that are equally liable
for the plaintiff's total damages of $100. Assume the
probability of defendant A losing at trial to the plaintiff is 0.2,
and the probability of defendant B losing at trial to the plaintiff is 0.6. Under the no contribution rule, defendant A will
have expected damages of $9.09, and defendant B will have
expected damages of $54.55. 6 8 The total damage award to
the plaintiff will be $63.64.69 Under the contribution rules,
defendant A will have expected damages of $30,7 0 and defendant B will also have expected damages of $30. 7 1 The total damage award to the plaintiff will be $60.72
In this example, the no contribution rule, as compared
with the contribution rules, will lead to less deterrence for
defendant A as its expected damages will be less under the no
contribution rule than under the contribution rules ($9.09 vs.
$30). Likewise, the no contribution rule will lead to more deterrence for defendant B as its expected damages will be
more under the no contribution rule than under the contribu68. These settlements follow from the whipsaw bargaining of the no contribution rule. In equilibrium, each defendant will be willing to settle for its expected loss at trial. A defendant's expected loss at trial is equal to the defendant's probability of losing at trial multiplied by the damages the plaintiff can
seek against the defendant. Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff can
only seek damages against non-settled defendants that are reduced by prior
settling defendant's settlement amounts. Thus, each defendant when determining its expected damages (in order to decide what to settle for) will determine what it expects the other defendant to settle for and subtract that from
the total damages that the plaintiff could receive from it. This leads to equilibrium settlements as can be seen from the calculations below. See Easterbrook
et al., supra note 16, at 368-70.
Under the no contribution rule, defendant A's settlement will be $9.09 such
that $9.09 = (0.2) x ($100 - $54.55), while defendant B's settlement will be
$54.55 such that $54.55 = (0.6) x ($100 - $9.09).
69. $63.64 = $9.09 + $54.55.
70. We are assuming that defendant B will be able to obtain contribution
from defendant A with certainty. Under the contribution rules, the probability
that defendant A will have to pay damages is 0.6, which is equal to the plaintiff's probability of winning at trial against defendant B (which occurs with
probability 0.6) multiplied by the probability of defendant B obtaining contribution from defendant A (which occurs with certainty). As defendant A's share of
the total damages is $50, defendant A's expected damage will be $30 such that
$30 = (0.5) x (0.6) x ($100). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. $30 = (0.6) x (0.5) x ($100).
72. $60 = $30 + $30.
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tion rules ($54.55 vs. $30). The total expected damages
awarded to the plaintiff will be greater under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules ($63.64 vs. $60).
A comparison of the rules in this example gives us the
following:
Belief of
damages
attributable to
defendant
A

Belief of Belief of its Belief of its
Belief of
Belief of
expected
expected
the plain- the plaindamages
damages
attributa- tiff winning tiff winning damages
under the under the
at trial
at trial
ble to
contribuno contriagainst
against
defendant
defendant defendant bution rule tion rules
B
B
A

Defendant
A

$50

$50

0.2

0.6

$9.09

$30

Defendant
B

$50

$50

0.2

0.6

$54.55

$30

Expected Damages: Symmetric Information, Different Probabilities of Loss at Trial

Thus, where defendants have symmetric information, for
some defendants the no contribution rule may lead to less deterrence than the contribution rules. However, it should be
noted that for at least one defendant the deterrence will be
greater under the no contribution rule. We now examine defendants having asymmetric information and asymmetric beliefs, where the variety of possible outcomes is greater.
B. Asymmetric Information
In the real world, individuals and firms often have different information that can lead to different beliefs.7" Thus, ex73. Professor Easterbrook in his testimony before the Senate judiciary committee used a roulette wheel, a game of symmetric information, to describe the
no contribution rule as a lottery of outcomes. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement
Act: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate,
97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 183 (1981-82) (statement of Frank H. Easterbrook,
Professor of Law, University of Chicago).
If played by individuals who have a variety of knowledge and skill, poker
can be seen as an example of an asymmetric information game. I will compare
the two games to show the differences between symmetric and asymmetric
information.
A bet based on a roulette wheel is a game of symmetric information. Suppose that two players decide to play a game in which if the ball lands on black,
player 1 wins and if the ball lands of red, player 2 wins (assume that 0 and 00 or
green leads to a re-spin of the wheel and ball). Before we send the ball onto the

wheel, both players can agree on the likelihood of each party winning as each
party has the same information, namely that 50% of the slots are red and 50%

of the slots are black.
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amining cases where asymmetric information exists among
the actors is a necessary addition to the model. This subsection will show that asymmetric information may lead to less
deterrence for all of the defendants under the no contribution
rule as compared with the contribution rules in some informational settings.74
Poker on the other hand is a game of asymmetric information. Before the
card hand is dealt, each player will have private information regarding its skill
in the game of poker. This private information can lead to different beliefs.
Suppose that player 1 and player 2 both majored in English at college, that very
few English majors understand probability theory, and that both players know
that the other player was also an English major. In addition, suppose that both
player 1 and player 2 took probability courses in college for the sole purpose of
playing poker, but that neither player knows that the other player took the
probability courses. In this case, the players will have asymmetric information.
Player 1 will be placing its bet with the knowledge that it, player 1, has
taken probability courses, while believing that it is unlikely that player 2 has
much knowledge of probability (as player 1 knows that player 2 majored in English). Similarly player 2 will be placing its bet with the knowledge that it,
player 2, has taken probability courses, while assuming that it is unlikely that
player 1 has much knowledge of probability (as player 2 also knows that player
1 majored in English).
In this case, each player might be rather confident that it will do well (win
with a probability greater than 50%) in a poker match, even though only one
player can win. The players, each expecting to win and the other to lose, have
inconsistent beliefs. That the beliefs are inconsistent should be obvious because
both defendants cannot have a probability of over 50% of winning in a two
player zero sum game. The players have these different beliefs because of their
private information. It is not necessary for beliefs to be consistent as between
players.
In the real world, all of the information will not be known by all parties,
and in many cases, such as in the game of poker, each party will have private
information unavailable to the other party. It is possible that each party has
the belief that it will win the game, whether that game is poker, football or
settling cheaply in an antitrust conspiracy trial. While Professor Easterbrook's
roulette wheel example does explain what a lottery is, it is not as useful in
describing the situation faced by antitrust or other conspirators, who are playing a game more like the game of poker.
74. Professors Easterbrook, Landes and Posner note that parties may have
asymmetric information and beliefs and that this may effect deterrence under
the different rules. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 350-51 & n.48. But
most of their analysis and their conclusions assume symmetric information and
beliefs. They seem to assume that in most situations conspirators will have
symmetric information, for example on market share or as to whom the plaintiff
will sue. They do not search for situations where the defendants might have
asymmetric information. Their conclusions and recommendations are based on
symmetric information. See id. at 364-68.
Where I expect defendants are most likely to have differing beliefs (even in
antitrust cases) is in their belief that each defendant will settle cheaply with
the plaintiff by giving the plaintiff information to be used against other defendants. It is entirely plausible that each defendant believes that it will be the first
to settle cheaply. In fact, under the no contribution rule and contribution with
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To see how asymmetric information can affect deterrence, and why the symmetric information model is unsatisfactory in many situations, we reexamine an example used by
Professors Easterbrook, Landes and Posner.7"
Professors Easterbrook, Landes and Posner set up their
example as follows. Suppose that three firms, firm A, firm B
and firm C are considering a plan to fix prices that will raise
the price of a good, giving the firms a total profit of one billion
dollars. Assume that firm A, firm B and firm C have 50%,
30% and 20% of the market respectively, and that profits
from the conspiracy will be split according to market share.
If detected, the conspiracy will have to pay total antitrust
damages of three billion dollars.76 Further, assume that if
there is a lawsuit, the consumers will have a 50% chance of
prevailing at trial. Finally, suppose that firm A and firm B
believe that if there is a lawsuit, consumers will sue firm C
for the entire amount.
Given these assumptions, we must now determine
whether a conspiracy will take place. Professors Easterbrook, Landes and Posner assert that a conspiracy will not
take place because firm C will never enter into the conspiracy
as its expected profit of $200 million is less than its expected
liability of $1.5 billion.77
claim reduction rule, the strategy of a conspirator who enters into a conspiracy
should be to settle quickly and cheaply as soon as the conspiracy is detected,
and if necessary to provide the plaintiff with information on the other conspirators in order to obtain a cheap settlement. See infra part III.C where I examine
the defendants' and plaintiff's incentives to provide and accept information in
lieu of monetary settlement and the defendants incentives to gather and hide
information.
The defendants may have private information regarding their risk preferences, the ability of their legal resources, their ability to collect and hide damaging information, their liability under the contribution rules, or other factors
that could lead them to have asymmetric information before entering into a
conspiracy.
75. E.g., Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 345.
76. Total antitrust damages will actually be more than the illicit profits
made by the conspirators, as there will be some dead weight loss due to the
raising of prices above the competitive market price. However, for purposes of
simplicity, assume that the consumers' damages are equal to the conspirators'
illicit profits. Id. at 346 n.43.
77. Firm C has 20% of the sales, and in the absence of side payments and
assuming similar production costs, firm C will receive 20% of the $1 billion in
profits, which is $200 million. But if the plaintiff only sues firm C, then firm C
will have an expected liability of $1.5 billion equal to its probability of loss at
trial, 0.5, multiplied by the total damages, $3 billion. Thus, firm C will not
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But, Professors Easterbrook, Landes and Posner have assumed that firm C also believes that the consumers will sue
only firm C for their damages.7" Firm C, however, could have
different beliefs than firms A and B. Suppose firm C expects
the consumers to sue only firm A for all of their damages, in
which case firm C will face $0 in expected liability, and will
gladly join the price-fixing conspiracy with firms A and B.
Just because firms A and B believe that firm C faces a high
risk of liability in damages, this does not necessarily imply
that firm C will also believe that it faces the same high risk of
liability. It is firm C's belief about its liability (not firm A's or
firm B's beliefs) that is critical to firm C when it decides
whether to enter into a conspiracy.
Of course, if firm C believes that the consumers will sue
only firm A, while firm A and firm B believe the consumers
will sue only firm C, then the firms disagree as to whom the
consumers will sue. But the firms can still enter into a pricefixing conspiracy while disagreeing as to whom the consumers will sue. In a price-fixing conspiracy, it is only necessary
that the firms agree on the price.
When asymmetric information is added to the model, one
can see that it is possible for the no contribution rule to lead
to less deterrence for all defendants than either of the contribution rules. It is quite possible that different parties could
enter into a conspiracy under the no contribution rule with a
plan to settle quickly and cheaply with the plaintiff should
the conspiracy be detected. Thus, the agreeing parties would
face little in the way of deterrence and expect the other party
to be sued for the larger proportion of the damages by the
want to enter the conspiracy because its expected liability is greater than its
expected benefit from the conspiracy. See id. at 345.
78. Professors Easterbrook, Landes and Posner have assumed symmetric
information and beliefs for this example and for their conclusions. See id. at
345, 364-65.
They do note that if each defendant believes that it is unlikely to be sued by
the plaintiff, each defendant will then be likely to enter into the conspiracy
under the no contribution rule. The example is modified to take into account
the belief that a firm is unlikely to be sued. See id. at 350-51 & n.48 (indicating
that such a situation would arise infrequently because participants generally
have similar information leading to symmetric beliefs).
I believe such assymetric beliefs among defendants might occur more frequently than Easterbrook, Landes and Posner suggest because defendants may
hide information relevant to forming symmetric beliefs and/or defendants may
collect data leading to asymmetric beliefs. See infra part III.C; see also infra
note 74.
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plaintiff. Of course, if each party believes it will be sued by
consumers for all of the damages, then they could all face
more deterrence under the no contribution rule than under
the contribution rules. The point is that neither the no contribution, nor the contribution rules leads to more deterrence
under all information scenarios. Although not using an economic model, Judge Hanson, in his dissent in Professional
Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.,7 9 came
to the same conclusion regarding the ambiguous nature of deterrence provided by the different rules when he stated:
The majority concludes that "tlo deny contribution would
be to dilute the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws, since
a participant in an antitrust violation could escape all responsibility for its wrongdoing."... [Ilt could well be argued that potential antitrust violators would be more
likely to refrain from anticompetitive activities if they
know that any injured party may impose the full burden
of a treble damage recovery on them even though, for instance, the violator played a relatively minor part in a
conspiracy to monopolize .... To me the arguments on
either side of the deterrence question are inconclusive.8 0
In the model, asymmetric information will be reflected by
allowing the defendants to have different beliefs about either
the proportion of damages that each defendant has caused or
the probabilities that each defendant will lose at trial. The
defendants' beliefs about these two factors will affect the defendants' beliefs of their expected liabilities if the conspiracy
isdetected.
Defendants may also have asymmetric information of the
probability of detection, the conspirators' relationships with
the potential plaintiff, the total amount of damage caused
and many other factors. In addition, the collecting and hiding of information can lead to asymmetric information and
1
asymmetric beliefs among defendants .
In the section above, it was shown that given symmetric
information, and thus symmetric beliefs, it is possible that
the expected damage payment and deterrence of a particular
defendant can be less under the no contribution rule than
79. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594
F.2d 1179, 1189 (8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. See infra part III.C.
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under the contribution rules.8 2 Now, if each defendant holds
the belief that it will be held responsible for relatively little,
then all defendants will be more likely to enter into a conspiracy under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules. Because the defendants have different information, it may lead them to divergent beliefs and, in turn,
diminished deterrence. Modifying the symmetric information
numerical examples will show that neither the no contribution rule nor the contribution rules always leads to more
deterrence.
1. Different Beliefs of Liability Responsibility
It could be the case that each defendant believes that it is
liable for a small portion of the damage under the contribution rules.8 3 In such a case, the conspiracy will be more likely
to take place under the contribution rules than under the no
contribution rule.8 4 For example, suppose each defendant believes that it is liable for 10% of the damage and the other
defendant is liable for 90% of the damage. Under the no contribution rule, each defendant will have expected damages of
$33.33.85 Under the contribution rules, each defendant will
have expected damages of $5,86 while each defendant will believe that the other defendant will have expected damages of
$45.87 However, it is the defendant's own beliefs, not those of
another defendant, that determine deterrence. Thus, each
82. See supra part III.A.2.
83. Conspirators do not have to foresee the damages caused by other consevspirators in order to be held responsible for such damages under joint and

eral liability. Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950). Under the no
contribution rule, it does not matter how the damages among the defendants

are allocated, as each defendant is potentially liable for all of the damages regardless of fault or the number of defendants. However, under the contribution
rules, how the damages are allocated will affect the expected damages of conspirators contemplating entering into a conspiracy.
84. For example, a conspirator may not know the "fault" of each conspirator
all
in the conspiracy. An actor may become a co-conspirator without knowing

activities undertaken pursuant to the conspiracy. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971).

Defendants are more likely to have asymmetric information on damage al-

location under the contribution rules when damages are allocated by either
comparative fault or comparative benefit methods. Defendants are less likely to
disagree on the damage allocation when damages are allocated per capita under
the contribution rules.
85. $33.33 = (0.5) x ($100 - $33.33).

86. $5 = (0.5) x (0.1) x ($100).
87. $45 = (0.5) x (0.9) x ($100).
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defendant will face less deterrence under the contribution
rules than under the no contribution rule. A comparison of
the rules in this example gives us the following:
Belief of
damages
attributable to
defendant
A
Defendant
A

$10

Defendant
B

$90

Belief of
Belief of
Belief of
damages
the plain- the plainattributa- tiff winning tiff winning
ble to
at trial
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defendant
against
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B
defendant defendant
A
B
$90
0.5
0.5
$10

0.5

0.5

Belief of its Belief of its
expected
expected
damages
damages
under the under the
no contricontribubution rule tion rules
$33.33

$5

$33.33

$5

Expected Damages: Asymmetric Information of Liability

Of course, if each defendant believes it has caused most
of the damages, then the defendants will face more deterrence under the contribution rules than under the no contribution rule. For example, suppose each defendant believes
that it will be liable for 90% of the damages under the contribution rules. As the no contribution rule reaches the same
outcome regardless of the allocation of damages, each defendant will again face expected damages of $33.33.88 Under the

contribution rules, each defendant will face expected damages of $45,89 while each defendant will believe that the other
defendant will have expected damages of $5.90 Again, it is

the defendant's own beliefs, not those of another defendant,
that determine deterrence. In this case, each defendant will
face more deterrence under the contribution rules than under
the no contribution rule. A comparison of the rules in this
example gives us the following:
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Defendant
A
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$90
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$10
0.5
0.5
$33.33
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$90

0.5

0.5

$33.33

B
Expected Damages: Asymmetric Information of Liability
88. $33.33 = (0.5) x ($100 - $33.33).

89. $45 = (0.5) x (0.9) x ($100).
90. $5 = (0.5) x (0.1) x ($100).

$45
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2. Different Beliefs of Probabilitiesof Loss at Trial
We now examine the case where the defendants have different beliefs as to their chances of losing to the plaintiff at
trial. The beliefs about the probabilities of loss at trial may
be different because a defendant is planning to supply the
plaintiff with information to be used against the other91defendants, while unaware of others' plans to do likewise.
In this section, the assumption is that the defendants
have different beliefs about their probabilities of losing at
trial, but the same beliefs about the proportion of damages
that are caused by each defendant. Some numerical examples show how asymmetric information may affect
deterrence.
Suppose there are two defendants, each defendant is
equally liable for the plaintiff's damages, and the total damages are $100. Suppose defendant A believes that the
probability of it losing at trial is 0.2 and the probability of
defendant B losing at trial is 0.6. Then, under the no contribution rule, defendant A will believe that it will have an expected damage payment of $9.09.92 Under the contribution

rules, defendant A will believe it has an expected damage
payment of $30. 9 3 Thus, defendant A will believe it faces less
in expected damages, and thus less deterrence under the no
contribution rule than under the contribution rules.
Now if defendant B believes that its probability of losing
at trial is 0.2 and the probability of defendant A losing at trial
is 0.6, then defendant B will also believe that it will have an
expected damage payment of $9.09 under the no contribution
5
rule, 94 and $30 under the rules of contribution. Thus, de91. See infra part III.C.
92. See supra part III.A.2.b.
Defendant A will believe that it has expected damages of $9.09, such that,
has
$9.09 = (0.2) . ($100 - $54.55). Defendant A will believe that defendant B
$9.09).
($100
x
(0.6)
=
$54.55
that
such
$54.55,
of
expected damages
93. Recall we are assuming that defendant B will be able to obtain contribution from defendant A with certainty. See supra note 39 and accompanying
detext; see also supra note 64. Thus, the plaintiff can collect damages from
x
(0.6)
x
(0.5)
=
$30
0.6.
probability
with
B
fendant A "through" defendant
($100).
94. Defendant B will believe that it has expected damages of $9.09, such
defendthat $9.09 = (0.2) x ($100 - $54.55). Defendant B will also believe that
$9.09).
($100
x
(0.6)
=
$54.55
as
$54.55,
of
ant A has expected damages
95. Defendant B's settlement of $30 under the contribution rules is such
that $30 = (0.5) x (0.6) x ($100).
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fendant B will also face less deterrence under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules. These results
are summarized below. A comparison of the rules in this example gives us the following:
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$50

0.6

0.2

$9.09

$30

B
Expected Damages: Asymmetric Information of Probabilities of Loss at Trial

In the example above, defendant A expects defendant B
to face $54.55 in damages, and defendant B expects defendant A to face $54.55 in damages. But again, what is important to defendant A is what it believes it faces in damages
($9.09). Likewise, what is important for defendant B is its
own beliefs as to the damages it faces. Therefore, both defendants have beliefs that will increase the likelihood of them
entering into a conspiracy under the no contribution rule
than under the contribution rule.
Of course, more deterrence for all defendants is also possible under the no contribution rule. In the example above, if
each defendant believes that it has a probability of losing at
trial of 0.6 and that the other defendant has a probability of
losing at trial of 0.2, then each defendant will believe that it
faces more deterrence under the no contribution rules than
under the contribution rules, as $54.55 > $30.96 These results are summarized below. A comparison of the rules in
this example gives us the following:

96. Each will believe that it has expected damages of $54.55, such that,
$54.55 = (0.6) x ($100 - $9.09). Each defendant will believe that the other defendant has expected damages of $9.09, such that $9.09 = (0.2) x ($100 $54.55).
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Expected Damages: Asymmetric Information of Probabilities of Loss at Trial

Thus, we have seen situations where the no contribution
rule and the contribution rules have each led to more deterrence for all defendants. There could also be a conspiracy
where some conspirators are deterred more by the no contribution rule and others are deterred more by the contribution
rules.

97

One might think that, in cases where both defendants
face less deterrence under the no contribution rule than
under the contribution rules, the plaintiff's total damage
award will also be less. However, regardless of the beliefs of
the defendants, the no contribution rule will always lead the
plaintiff to expect and receive a higher total damage award
than that which could be obtained under the contribution
rules. When defendants have asymmetric beliefs, they cannot both be correct; one or both must be wrong about the outcome. There will be only one actual outcome, and the results
that occur will be consistent. One might think of this actual
outcome as imposing consistent ex post beliefs on all of the
parties involved. As can be noted from the examples in the
symmetric information section, where the beliefs of the outcome are consistent, the plaintiff will always receive more in
damages. 98 Thus, if compensating the plaintiff is a high pri97. See supra part III.A.2 (providing examples where one defendant was
more deterred by the no contribution rule and one defendant was more deterred
by the contribution rules).
98. See supra part III.A.2.
One can also notice in the above asymmetric information examples that
even when each defendant believes that it faces lower expected damages under
the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules, each defendant still
believes that the plaintiff will receive a higher total damage award. Since the
total
actual outcome itself must be consistent, the plaintiff will receive a higher
contribution
the
under
than
rule
damage award under the no contribution
rules.
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ority in the choice of the rule, then the no contribution rule
may be favored over the contribution rules. Of course, one
could always place a multiplier on damages under the contribution rules in order to obtain the same higher damage
award that the plaintiff could have received under the no contribution rule without a multiplier.
C. Information Exchange in Settlements
In conspiracy situations, it is frequently the case that
earlier settling defendants settle for less than later settling
defendants. 99 This is often because settling with one defendant improves the plaintiff's chances of winning at trial
against the remaining defendants. Thus, an early settlement
is more valuable to the plaintiff than just the monetary
amount received from the defendant. A defendant settling
early may provide the plaintiff with information about the
conspiracy that can be used against the other defendants. 100
The initial settlement money itself may improve the plaintiff's prospects against the other defendants by allowing the
plaintiff to continue with a case that might otherwise have to
be dropped for lack of resources. 10 1 Additionally, the plaintiff
may settle either to break up a united front among defend99. See Contribution and Claim Reduction, supra note 2, at 14-19.
100. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,114, at 76,691 (S.D. Tex. 1981). In the CorrugatedContainerAntitrust Litigation, the plaintiffs' first settlement was with St. Regis Paper Company for $1.7 million, a relatively small amount as compared with other
amounts paid by defendants who later settled. Id. at 76,704. In addition to the
monetary payment, St. Regis agreed to provide documents, made no objection to
the surrender of their grand jury transcripts by St. Regis employees who testified during the government investigation, made available confidential information filed with the Cost of Living Council to the plaintiffs, provided extensive
informal discovery and provided basic industry and market data. Id. at 76,705.
The information provided was of great value to the class in organizing discovery against the other defendants, as the court noted:
This settlement was advantageous to the class. It did not detract from
the class' chances of prevailing for the entire range of damages; in fact,
through discovery benefits and the streamlining of the class' case
against defendants, it enhanced them ....
[Tihe court finds the St.
Regis settlement to make up in that respect for whatever it lacks in
hard dollars.
Id. at 76,705-06.
101. Funds from early settlements can allow an asset constrained plaintiff to
continue its lawsuit against others. Thus, to the plaintiff a dollar in an early
settlement may be of greater value than a dollar from a later settlement. The
added value from an early dollar settlement comes from increasing the plaintiffs' negotiating position against the other defendants.
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ants, 10 2 or to remove a defendant that caused minor portion
10 3
of the damages from the trial or could negatively affect the
10 4
plaintiff's case at trial.
As noted above, one reason that a defendant may have
low expected damages when entering into a conspiracy is that
the defendant has a belief that it will be able to settle with
the plaintiff cheaply by supplying the plaintiff with information to be used against other defendants (while discounting
the likelihood that the other defendants will do the same).
each believe that
Different defendants in a conspiracy may
10 5
cheaply.
they will be the first to settle
In the CorrugatedContainerAntitrust Litigation, the plaintiffs' second settlement was with International Paper Company for $8.3 million. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,114, at 76,706
(S.D. Tex. 1981). This provided the class with substantial funds to prosecute
the case against the remaining defendants. Id.
102. In the Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, the plaintiffs' third
settlement was with the Union Camp Corporation for $7.4 million. Id. This
settlement served a strategic purpose in breaking up a negotiating block organization of unindicted defendants. Id. at 76,707.
103. In the Corrugated ContainerAntitrust Litigation, the plaintiffs' fourth
settlement was with Dura-Containers, Inc. for $750,000. Id. at 76,709. Regarding this settlement the court explained:
[T]he expense to the class to engage in discovery and to litigate against
Dura would be out of proportion to the amount it could hope to recover.
The presence of "clean" companies such as Dura in a mass trial would
'beprejudicial to the class' chances of recovering against even the more
culpable defendants.
Id.
104. In one case, a plaintiff settled with a defendant to keep the settling defendant from helping the other defendant at trial. See Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981). Thus, the defendant's settlement effectively prevented the other defendant from gaining access to potentially useful information. See id. In Commercial Union, the plaintiff sued Ford Motor and one of its dealers for personal
injuries. Ford settled with the plaintiff and was dismissed from the suit. The
plaintiff then received a large judgment against the defendant dealer at trial.
The insurer of the dealer sought indemnity against Ford, but the trial court
dismissed the action under California's contribution statute (CAL.CIV. PRoc.
removal of the
CODE § 877). Id. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
deep-pocket defendant deprived the remaining dealer defendant of the advantage of the experts and skilled counsel which Ford could afford to employ. Id.
105. For example, suppose that defendant A is contemplating entering into a
conspiracy with defendant B. Defendant A might rationalize that if the conspiracy is detected, then it will make a quick settlement with the plaintiff for a low
deamount by giving the plaintiff information to use against defendant B. If
fendant A's expected settlement amount is low, then defendant A will be likely
to enter into the conspiracy. Now, if defendant B believes it will settle cheaply
first by supplying information against defendant A, then defendant B may also
be likely to enter into the conspiracy.
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However, the different rules give the defendants different incentives to provide this information, and give the plaintiff different incentives to accept the information, in lieu of
monetary compensation. These different incentives can influence the conspirators' beliefs of their expected liability before
entering into the conspiracy.
The defendants will be willing to supply the plaintiff with
information under both the no contribution and contribution
with claim reduction rules because of the settlement-bar to
contribution from later trial-losing defendants. But, under
the contribution with claim reduction rule, the plaintiff will
have a disincentive to settle cheaply with a defendant who is
liable for a high proportion of the damage.
Under both the no contribution and contribution with
claim reduction rules, a defendant who knows the culpability
of its act may be able to settle for less than ignorant defendants because, ex ante the conspiracy, the culpable defendant
will have a greater incentive to collect information that can
be supplied to the plaintiff in the event that the conspiracy is
detected.
We now proceed by more formally analyzing certain disparate effects of the rules: the defendants' incentives to provide information; the plaintiff's willingness to offer financial
incentives to obtain the information; and the defendants' incentives to collect and hide the information to be given to the
plaintiff. Finally, we integrate the above in attempting to determine which rule will be better for deterrence.
1. Defendants' Incentives to Provide Information
The defendants will be willing to supply the plaintiff with
information under both the no contribution and contribution
with claim reduction rules because of the settlement-bar to
contribution from later trial-losing defendants. The defendants will not be willing to provide information under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, as there is no settlement-bar to contribution. The plaintiff, under the
contribution with claim reduction rule, will have to provide
the defendant with an incentive to reveal information, such
as a lower monetary settlement amount. However, the plaintiff will not have to provide an incentive under the no contribution rule.
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The defendant's willingness to supply the plaintiff with
information can lead to a prisoners' dilemma situation among
the defendants."16 However, often the information that a defendant might provide could be used against it. Thus, before
providing the plaintiff with the information, a defendant will
want a settlement agreement. Therefore, the plaintiff may be
unable to effectuate the ideal prisoners' dilemma situation of
using each defendant's information against the other to improve its strategic position. The following examples illustrate
the incentives for defendants to provide information.
Suppose there are two defendants, each defendant
equally liable for the damage of the plaintiff. The probability
of each defendant losing at trial is 0.2 if no information is
given, and 0.8 if information is given. The total damage
caused is $100. Each defendant can either disclose or not disclose information to the plaintiff. This gives us four cases for
which we can compute the expected damage payments depending on whether none, one or both of the defendants provides the plaintiff with information. The four cases are
shown below.
Defendant B does disclose
information

Defendant B does not
disclose information

Defendant A does disclose
information

0.8, 0.8

0.2, 0.8

Defendant A does not
disclose information

0.8, 0.2

0.2, 0.2

Defendants' Probabilities
of Loss at Trial to the
Plaintiff (PAPB)

Probabilities of Loss at Trial Depending Upon Disclosure of Information

a. No ContributionRule
First, we examine the settlement outcomes under the no
contribution rule. Initially, assume that the information
which a defendant provides the plaintiff cannot be used
against the information-providing defendant. If neither discloses information, then each defendant will have a
probability of loss at trial of 0.2, and each will have expected
damages of $16.67.1°7
106. Yi, supra note 22, at 92-95.
107. $16.67 = (0.2) x ($100 - $16.67).
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If only defendant A discloses information, then defendant
B will have a probability of losing at trial of 0.8, while defendant A will have a probability of losing at trial of 0.2. The resulting expected damage payments will be $4.76 for defendant A and $76.19 for defendant B.108 Likewise, if only
defendant B discloses information, then the resulting expected damage payments will be $76.19 for defendant A and
$4.76 for defendant B.
If defendant A and defendant B each disclose information, then both will have a probability of 0.8 of losing at trial
to the plaintiff, and both will have expected damages of
$44.44.109

Examining the decision to disclose information leads to
the following normal form game where the strictly dominant
strategy is to disclose the information. This is a prisoners'
dilemma situation in which both defendants will be better off
if they can agree not to provide information. Absent such an
agreement, each has an incentive to supply information.
Defendants' Expected
Damage Payments
(A, AB)

Defendant B does disclose
information

Defendant B does not
disclose information

Defendant A does disclose
information

$44.44, $44.44

$4.76, $76.19

Defendant A does not
disclose information

$76.19, $4.76

$16.67, $16.67

No Contribution Rule Expected Damages: Depending Upon Disclosure of
Information Prisoner's Dilemma Type Situation

Under the no contribution rule, defendant A is better off
if the plaintiff can collect a high damage amount from defendant B (and vice versa). If the plaintiff can collect a high damage amount from defendant B, then the plaintiff will not be
able to sue defendant A for as much as it could have if it had
collected a low damage amount from defendant B. This is because any suit against defendant A would be reduced by defendant B's settlement amount. Thus, increased expected
damages for defendant B will lead to defendant A having
lower expected damages.
108. $4.76 = (0.2) x ($100 - $76.19).
$76.19 = (0.8) x ($100 - $4.76).
109. $44.44 = (0.8) x ($100 - $44.44).
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If defendant A can be sure that the information it gives
the plaintiff can only be used against defendant B, and not be
used against itself, then defendant A will freely give the
plaintiff the information. Defendant A is better off if the
probability of defendant B losing at trial is higher. The lower
expected damage payment for defendant A will not come
through an incentive offer by the plaintiff to obtain the information, but will be due to defendant B's higher expected
damage payment (and thus, higher settlement payment) and
the corresponding reduced damages that can be sought from
defendant A. The lower expected damage payment is not necessarily an enticement from the plaintiff to disclose the information but merely the outcome of the new equilibrium settlement pattern. 110
Information exchange often occurs during or after settlement to prevent the information from being used against the
defendant who supplies it. In many situations, it is unlikely
the plaintiff will be able to get both defendants to reveal information against the other defendant before either defendant has settled. 1 '
However, it may not be necessary for the plaintiff to have
the actual information in order to obtain the higher settlement. The plaintiff may be able to create a bidding war
110. By enticement, I mean that the plaintiff is willing to settle for less than
the equilibrium amount. Thus, even though giving information may reduce a
defendant's settlement amount from $16.67 to $4.76, this is not because the
plaintiff offers to settle for a reduced amount in order to obtain the information.
Instead, the plaintiff will now be able to collect more from the other defendant,
and the information-providing defendant would face lower expected damages
were it to be sued by the plaintiff. This is the new equilibrium settlement that
occurs after the information is given to the plaintiff.
111. The problem is as follows. Suppose the plaintiff wants to obtain the
information from defendant A to use against defendant B. To obtain the information, the plaintiff will have to settle with defendant A. Defendant A will not
be willing to give the information to the plaintiff without a settlement since the
plaintiff could use the information against defendant A itself. So, in order to
use information from defendant A against defendant B, the plaintiff will have to
settle with defendant A.
Now suppose the same is true regarding information that the plaintiff
wishes to acquire from defendant B to be used against defendant A. The plaintiff will have to settle with defendant B to obtain its information.
The plaintiff must decide which defendant to settle with first since the information loses its value if both settle at the same time. Thus, if the plaintiff
needs to settle to obtain and convey the value of the information, then the plaintiff will only be able to obtain the information from one defendant for use
against the other defendant.
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among the defendants to be the first defendant to provide information. In that case, where the parties agree on the value
of the information, the plaintiff will secure the prisoners' dilemma equilibrium amount. The plaintiff, before it has any
information, can ask each defendant how much it will be willing to settle for, on the condition of providing information.
Suppose defendant A offers to settle for $4.76 and to provide information against defendant B. Defendant B will then
face expected damages of $76.19. Thus, defendant B will offer to pay more than $4.76, say $20. But then defendant A
will face expected damages of $64,112 and will want to raise
its settlement offer above defendant B's settlement offer of
$20. This will continue until each defendant offers to settle
for $44.44, which is the equilibrium settlement under the no
contribution rule where both defendants provide information.
If the plaintiff and the defendants are unable to agree on
the value of the information, then the plaintiff will settle with
the defendant that gives the plaintiff the highest expected
value of the lawsuit. The plaintiff will have to weigh both the
value of the information and the monetary value of the settlement in deciding with whom to settle first.
b.

Contributionwith Claim Reduction Rule

We now examine the settlement outcomes under the contribution with claim reduction rule. If neither defendant discloses information, then each defendant will have a
probability of loss at trial of 0.2, and each will have expected
damages of $10.113 If only defendant A discloses information,

then defendant B will have a probability of losing at trial of
0.8, while defendant A will have a probability of losing at
trial of 0.2. The resulting expected damage payments will be
$10 for defendant A and $40 for defendant B. 1 14 Likewise, if
only defendant B discloses information, then the resulting expected damage payments will be $40 for defendant A and $10
for defendant B. If defendant A and defendant B each disclose information, then both will have a probability of 0.8 of
112. If the plaintiff settles with defendant B for $20, it can sue defendant A
for the remaining $80. With defendant B's information, the plaintiff will have a
0.8 probability of winning against defendantA. Thus, defendant A will have an
expected loss of $64 = (0.8) x ($80).
113. $10 = (0.2) x (0.5) x ($100).
114. $40 = (0.8) x (0.5) x ($100).
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losing to the plaintiff at trial and both will have expected
damages of $40.
Examining the decision to disclose information leads to
the following normal form game where neither player has a
dominant strategy to disclose the information. This is not a
prisoners' dilemma situation, as each defendant is indifferent
as to whether it reveals or withholds information.
Defendants' Expected
Damage Payments
(A A, A B)

Defendant B does disclose
information

Defendant B does not
disclose information

Defendant A does disclose
information

$40, $40

$10, $40

Defendant A does not
disclose information

$40, $10

$10, $10

Contribution with Claim Reduction Rule Without Incentives Expected Damages:
Depending Upon Disclosure of Information

However, the plaintiff can make this situation a prisoners' dilemma case by giving each defendant a small monetary
1 15
If we let this incenincentive for disclosing information.
tive be e, then we will have the following normal form game
which will be a prisoners' dilemma.
Defendants' Expected
Damage Payments

Defendant B does disclose
information

Defendant B does not
disclose information

Defendant A does disclose

$40 - e, $40 - e

$10 - e, $40

$40, $10 - e

$10, $10

(AA, A B)

information
Defendant A does not
disclose information

Contribution with Claim Reduction Rule with Incentives Expected Damages:
Depending Upon Disclosure of Information Prisoner's Dilemma Type Situation

With the incentive e, each defendant now has a dominant
strategy to disclose information. This incentive can, theoreti115. It should be noted that giving a defendant a small incentive to provide
information should be cheaper for the plaintiff than threatening those defendants that do not provide information with trial. The cost to the plaintiff to carry
out a threat of trial is likely to be more than the cost of the small incentive e,
that may be sufficient, despite its small size, to obtain information. Also, since
under the contribution with claim reduction rule neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant has a disincentive to settle, the threat of a trial may not be credible
when both the plaintiff and the defendant agree on the expected outcome.
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cally, be very small. Thus, the plaintiff should be able to receive nearly the expected damage award it could obtain if it
1 16
had all of the information.
As is the case under the no contribution rule, under the
contribution with claim reduction rule, the plaintiff will want
to use the information of each defendant against the other.
The plaintiff may need to settle with a defendant in order to
obtain the information and, thereafter, convey the information's value to the other defendant. But if the value of the
information is known to the plaintiff and the defendants
before the plaintiff obtains it, then the plaintiff may use a bidding war between the defendants in order to achieve the prisoners' dilemma amount.
2.

Plaintiff's Willingness to Accept Information in Lieu
of a Monetary Settlement

Above, we showed that if the plaintiff and the defendants
agree on the value of the information that the defendants can
provide, then the plaintiff will be able to use this to start a
bidding war between the defendants and achieve the prisoners' dilemma maximum. But it may be the case that the
plaintiff does not know the value of the information or is unable to convey the value of the information to defendants
without actually having the information. In such a case, the
plaintiff might have to settle with one defendant first to be
able to use the information in a suit against the other defendant. 117 If such is the case, the plaintiff will have different incentives as to which defendant it settles with first under the
116. Of course, the incentive will have to take into account additional costs
for the defendant of providing the information, such as document production
costs.
117. See Jones v. Hurst, 459 A.2d 219 (Md. Ct. App. 1983). This case involved an automobile accident. The plaintiff, Jones, sued the driver, Zachary
Hurst, and the owner of the vehicle, Henry Hurst. Zachary Hurst contended
that the cause of the accident was brake failure. The plaintiff, Jones, then
brought a separate suit against the manufacturer of the automobile, General
Motors. The cases were consolidated for trial. In a settlement with General
Motors, the plaintiff accepted a release reciting consideration for a nominal
amount of $10. The plaintiff's primary reason for settling with General Motors
was the offer of technical assistance at the trial against the driver. The release,
however, failed to include a denial of liability by General Motors and thus,
when the plaintiff won suit against the driver of the car, the award the plaintiff
received was reduced under the contribution with claim reduction rule. Id. See
generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1994).
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no contribution rule as compared with contribution with
claim reduction rule.
Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff will be indifferent as to how much damage is caused by the defendant it
settles with because the amount of damages that the plaintiff
can seek from the other defendant is only reduced by the settlement amount.118 Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, the plaintiff will have a disincentive to settle
cheaply with a defendant that is liable for a large proportion
of the total damage, as the amount it can seek against other
defendants will be reduced by the settling defendant's high
proportion of the damages. 119 The following numerical examples show the differences between the two rules.

118. Thus, the no contribution rule allows for more flexibility in the plaintiff's negotiating strategy. This is noted in the CorrugatedContainerAntitrust
Litigation, where under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff settled cheaply
with some defendants that could have been found liable for much more if the
contribution rules were being used. The court explained:
Perhaps a word should be said here about the class attorneys' technique of offering discounts to early settlers. These first three settlements, and especially the first two, were negotiated at dollar amounts
which in themselves do not closely correlate to the three defendants'
potential liability. Nevertheless, as will be seen as we progress
through the history of this litigation, this strategy was designed to
achieve a maximum aggregate recovery for the class and the fact that
the later settlements were at considerably higher rates tends to show
that the strategy was successful.
[Tihe court... finds that this strategy was not only reasonable but
[T]he court [finds] that the strategic benefits of
also successful ....
these three early settlements were of great ultimate importance to the
class.
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,114,
at 76,708-76,709 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
119. That those defendants who cause a large proportion of the damage will
not likely be able to settle cheaply with the plaintiff under the contribution with
claim reduction rule has also been noted by Senator Thurmond. 132 CONG.
REC. S2280 (1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
[Under contribution with claim reduction rule], plaintiffs will no longer
have any incentive to release the most culpable [high proportion damage causing] persons for nominal amounts. Since the amounts the
plaintiff can recover from the remaining defendants will be reduced by
the share of the plaintiff's claim attributable to settling persons' conduct, the amount a plaintiff would accept from a person being released
from liability will be correlated to that person's culpability. Larger,
more culpable persons will be less likely to receive early and attractive
settlements with claim reduction than under the current system.
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a. No ContributionRule
Suppose we have the same situation as above, but that
defendant A has caused 90% of the damages and defendant B
has caused 10% of the damages. Assume that the plaintiff
needs to settle with a defendant in order to obtain that defendant's information, which can then be used against a nonsettling defendant. Under the no contribution rule, we would
have the following payoff matrix.
Defendants' Expected
Damage Payments
(A A, A B)

Defendant B does disclose
information

Defendant B does not
disclose information

Defendant A does disclose
information

not reachable

$4.76, $76.19

Defendant A does not
disclose information

$76.19, $4.76

$16.67, $16.67

No Contribution Rule Expected Damages: Depending Upon Disclosure of
Information Settlement Required for Information Exchange

Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff is indifferent
as to whether it settles first with defendant A or defendant B.
In each case, the plaintiff will have an expected damage
award of $80.95.12°
Plaintiff Settles First with defendant A Plaintiff Settles First with defendant B
$80.95

$80.95

No Contribution Rule Plaintiff's Expected Total Damage Award

b. Contribution with Claim Reduction Rule
As noted in the previous section, under the contribution
with claim reduction rule the plaintiff will need to provide
each defendant with an incentive e, in the form of a reduced
monetary payment, to induce the defendants to provide information. If liability is allocated by comparative fault under
the contribution with claim reduction rule, then the plaintiff
will not be indifferent as to which defendant it settles with
first and receives its information from.
If the plaintiff settles first with defendant A for $18 - e,
then the plaintiff can only sue defendant B for $10, as defend120. $80.95 = $4.76 + $76.19.
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ant A's attributable share of the damages is $90.121 Thus,

even if defendant A gives the plaintiff information that improves the plaintiff's probability of winning at trial against
defendant B from 0.2 to 0.8, the expected trial award against
defendant B is only increased from $2 to $8.
If the plaintiff settles first with defendant B for $2 - e,
then the plaintiff can sue defendant A for $90, as defendant
B's attributable share of the damages is only $10.122 If defendant B gives the plaintiff information that improves the
plaintiff's probability of winning at trial against defendant A
from 0.2 to 0.8, the expected trial award against defendant A
is increased from $18 to $72.
Assuming that a defendant will not provide information
until it has settled, we will have the following payoff matrix
under the contribution with claim reduction rule.
Defendants' Expected
Damage Payments
(6A, AB)

Defendant B does disclose
information

Defendant B does not
disclose information

Defendant A does disclose
information

not reachable

$18 - e, $8

Defendant A does not
disclose information

$72, $2 - e

$18, $2

Contribution with Claim Reduction Rule with Incentives Expected Damages:
Depending Upon Disclosure of Information Settlement Required for
Information Exchange

If the plaintiff cannot obtain a defendant's information to
use against another defendant without settling with the defendant, and each defendant can provide the same quality of
information, then the plaintiff will prefer to settle first with
those defendants that cause less damage. In this case, the
plaintiff will wish to settle with defendant B before settling
with defendant A because it will give the plaintiff a greater
aggregate damage award.
121. The plaintiff will settle with defendant A for $18 - e = [(0.2) x ($90)] - e.
That is the probability that defendant A will lose at trial, when the plaintiff
does not have information from a defendant, multiplied by the damages defendant A is liable for, $90, less an incentive e.
122. The plaintiff will settle with defendant B for $2 - e = [(0.2) x ($10)] - e.
That is the probability that defendant B will lose at trial, when the plaintiff
does not have information from a defendant, multiplied by the damages defendant B is liable for, $10, less an incentive e.
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Plaintiff Settles First with defendant A Plaintiff Settles First with defendant B
$26 - e

$74 - e

Contribution with Claim Reduction Rule with Incentives Plaintiff's Expected
Total Damage Award

To the extent that it is necessary to deter those conspirators that cause, and are liable for, large proportions of the
damage, the contribution with claim reduction rule will make
it less likely that these conspirators believe that they can settle cheaply. For they will know that the plaintiff has a disincentive to settle cheaply with them. In some situations, we
will want to deter conspirators that are liable for larger proportions of the damage more than conspirators liable for
smaller proportions of the damage. For instance, we will
want to increase deterrence for a larger conspirator that coerces other smaller actors into the conspiracy. In such cases,
the smaller actors may be unable to avoid entering into the
conspiracy without being punished by the large damage causing actor.' 23 In these situations, it will be the large damage
causing actor that should be deterred in order to stop the
conspiracy.

124

In addition, it may be a defendant that caused a large
proportion of damage that is in the best position to frustrate a
conspiracy's objectives. For example, in a price-fixing conspiracy, a non-participating large firm would be in a superior
position to a non-participating small firm to undercut a conspiracy's output restraint that is needed for the success of the
conspiracy. A non-participating small firm might not be able
to increase output quickly enough to undercut the conspiracy's ability to inflict damage on consumers. 125 Thus, deter123. An unlawful conspiracy exists when a distributor is forced, by penalty of
sanction, to comply with the demands of its supplier to restrict competition in
some way. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
142 (1968); see also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968); Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation, supra note 2, at 13.
124. See infra part VI (analyzing the allocation of damages under the contribution rules). Where one party is able to control the actions of another party by
coercive threat (other than a legal threat such as price competition), I recommend that the damages be allocated by the comparative fault liability allocation
rule. The controlling party in such a case would be more at fault than a controlled party.
125. This argument was made by Assistant Attorney General William Baxter. House Monopolies Subcommittee's Staff Report on ContributionBill in 97th
Congress-ProposedLegislation to Allocate DamagesAmong Defendants in Pri-
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ring a large firm from entering into the conspiracy may have
a greater effect on thwarting the conspiracy's objectives than
deterring a small firm.
3. Defendants' Incentives to Collect and Hide
Information
Under both the no contribution rule and the contribution
with claim reduction rule, defendants may wish to provide
the plaintiff with information in order to lower their monetary settlement amount. How much a defendant can save on
its monetary settlement will, to some degree, depend upon
the quality of the information and evidence it can provide to
the plaintiff. We might not expect each defendant to have the
same quality of information to be used against other defendants. One reason for the divergent quality of information is
that the defendants may have different incentives to collect
the information.
A pessimistic defendant that enters a conspiracy believing that the probability of detection is high, and that it is
likely to be found liable to the plaintiff, will have a strong
incentive to collect information that can be used against the
other defendants. A pessimistic defendant's strategy will be
to enter into the conspiracy, collect information and, if detected, provide the information to the plaintiff in exchange for
a lower monetary settlement. The pessimistic defendant will
also try to hide information that can be used against it.
On the other hand, an optimistic defendant that enters a
conspiracy believing it unlikely that the conspiracy will be detected, or that, should detection occur, it is unlikely liability
will be imposed, will have less incentive to collect information
to be used against other defendants. In addition, an optimistic defendant will not try as hard as a pessimistic defendant
to hide the information that can be used against it.
Whether a conspirator is optimistic or pessimistic will depend upon many factors. One such factor is the conspirator's
knowledge of the illegality of its action. Conspirators that believe that their actions are legal are likely to be optimistic as
to the outcome of the conspiracy, as they will believe that if a
trial takes place they will be victorious. Conspirators that bevate Antitrust Litigation, 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1101, at
280, 289 (February 10, 1983) (citing letter from Asst. Att'y Gen. William F. Baxter to Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., at 9 (May 24, 1982)).
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lieve their actions are clearly illegal are likely to be pessimistic. However, in a conspiracy between optimistic and pessimistic conspirators, the pessimistic conspirators are likely to
be the ones that have the best information to be used against
others and to have hidden the information that can be used
against themselves. Thus, the pessimistic conspirators may
be able to reach a cheaper settlement with the plaintiff than
optimistic conspirators.

126

It may seem unjust that the conspirators who know the
wrongness of their actions are able to settle for a cheaper
amount than conspirators that seem less culpable. 127 But
this will provide an incentive to actors to determine the legality of their action ex ante the conspiracy. Whether this is a
proper incentive depends on whether we believe that parties
already spend enough in resources trying to determine the
legality of their potential actions. It is doubtful that we want
actors to have to contact lawyers before they perform any action, but in some areas of activity, it is desirable that these
actors become better informed than they currently are.
Both the no contribution rule and the contribution with
claim reduction rule, because they may lead to situations
where defendants provide information that is adverse to
other defendants, will lead to situations where culpable defendants are able to settle for less than non-culpable defendants. Neither rule will be fair in the sense that the most culpable defendant is forced to pay more than less culpable
defendants. Of course, a jury may find the most reprehensible defendants liable for more damages because of their cul126. Of course, if the optimistic defendants are correct in their beliefs and
the plaintiff has no cause of action, then the pessimistic defendants may have
wasted resources collecting information against others and hiding information
against themselves.
127. Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) stated such views on legislation to
change the antitrust laws to allow for contribution with claim reduction:
[Tihe most culpable defendants will necessarily settle a case firstsince they know they cannot go to trial-at amounts far less than their
share of damages. Less culpable and innocent defendants are faced
with rapidly escalating potential damage exposure based upon the
sales of settling defendants. Class action plaintiffs' lawyers have taken
advantage of this situation by demanding enormous sums from each
successive company without regard to culpability. Often, the most culpable pay the least; the least culpable pay the most. This is wrong.
Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S995, "AntitrustEqual Enforcement
Act," with Additional Views, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1062, at
934 (April 29, 1982) (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
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pability, but in many situations, it may be culpable defendants who appear the cleanest.
As for differences among the rules, the contribution with
claim reduction rule will make it more likely that a defendant
liable for a large proportion of the plaintiff's damage will face
more deterrence. To the extent that one believes that such
defendants are also more culpable, possibly because they
have more resources to determine the legality of their actions, there will be more deterrence for the more culpable defendants under the contribution with claim reduction rule.
However, in situations where the more culpable defendant is
liable for only a small proportion of the damages, then the
contribution with claim reduction rule favors the more culpable defendant.
D.

The Effect of Risk Aversion on Deterrence

The no contribution rule, as compared with the contribution rules, imposes additional risk costs on risk averse defendants. 12 8 In addition to the risk a defendant faces of winning or losing at trial, the no contribution rule leads to
additional risk by causing uncertainty as to the amount of
damages that a defendant may be forced to pay. While these
higher risk costs increase the deterrence faced by the defendant ex ante the conspiracy, should there be a conspiracy, the
risk costs themselves are a social waste. There is a trade-off
between the benefit of increased deterrence when a conspir128. A risk averse actor prefers the expected value of a gamble over actually
taking the risk. Thus, a risk averse actor will prefer $50 to a lottery where
there is a 50% chance of winning $100 and a 50% chance of winning $0. See
DAVID M. KREps, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 81-86 (1990).
Regarding risk preference in the multi-defendant case we are examining
here, see Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 353, and Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 17, at 452-53, 466-67.
Individuals who commit torts that cause a great amount of damage are
likely to be risk averse concerning the possible damage payments that might
have to be made to the plaintiff. However, for firms there is a question as to
whether they are risk averse. Some have argued that stockholders can diversify any risk by holding a diversified portfolio, and the firm itself should not be
involved in diversifying the risk. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 452
n. 18. It could also be that the decisionmakers of the firm and the shareholders
are risk seeking because of their limited liability or because they are risking
bondholders' capital. Professor Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Finance Course
Notes, Harvard Law School Fall 1991 (unpublished course notes, on file with
author).
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acy does not form and the social waste of the risk costs when
a conspiracy does form.' 29
We can avoid these risk costs by setting liability damages
under either of the contribution rules such that the same ex
ante deterrence is achieved as under the no contribution
rule.13° The plaintiff will then receive a greater expected
damage award, instead of the risk costs vanishing as a social
waste when a conspiracy does occur.
E.

The Effect of Litigation Costs on Deterrence

The contribution rules both require that the liability be
allocated among the defendants, while the no contribution
rule does not require a division of damages. Thus, the contribution rules may cause additional expenditures of legal re13
sources to determine the allocation of damages. ' These additional litigation costs under the contribution rules can be
minimized by using a per capita liability allocation rule as
opposed to the comparative fault or comparative benefit lia1 32
bility allocation rules.

The contribution rules may also lead to greater litigation
costs because there may be more outstanding defendants if a
129. These additional risk costs on defendants are imposed by the possibility
of a defendant having to pay a large proportion of the total conspiratorial liability alone. Thus, this assumes that the conspirators do not also reach an agreement on the sharing of liability if the conspiracy is detected. See A. MITCHELL
1989); A.
POLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 79-86 (2d.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the
Probabilityand Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979).
In addition, to the extent that risk costs raise the cost of going to trial,
there may be more settlement and, thus, a savings in litigation costs. Risk
averse defendants will be willing to settle for more than their expected value of
the lawsuit while risk averse plaintiffs will be willing to settle for less than
their expected value of the lawsuit. Of course, there is still the possibility that
the defendant and the plaintiff will be unable to reach a settlement. But higher
risk costs, as do higher litigation costs, generally increase the likelihood of
settlement.
130. But see infra part III.E. (noting that the contribution rules may lead to
more litigation costs which are also a social waste). Thus, there may be a tradeoff between the two rules regarding the waste of risk costs and the waste of
litigation costs.
131. It is generally believed that the contribution rules will lead to increased
litigation costs because the allocation of liability damages must be determined.
See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 28 (1981-82) (statement of William Baxter, Asst. Att'y Gen.).
132. See infra parts VIA-C.
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trial occurs. 1 3 3 Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff
34
will always want to settle with all but one defendant.
Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, defendants will have an incentive not to settle individually.
Thus, there may be many defendants if a trial takes place.
The contribution with claim reduction rule falls between
these two rules, as the defendants will not have a disincentive to settle individually, but the plaintiff will not have an
incentive to settle with all but one of the defendants. Thus, it
would seem that the contribution with settlement reduction
rule would lead to more total litigation costs than the contribution with claim reduction rule, which would lead13 5to more
total litigation costs than the no contribution rule.
Just as risk costs are a social waste, the same may be
said of litigation costs. Although higher legal costs will increase the amount of deterrence faced by the defendants, as
in the case of risk costs, a balance exists between the benefit
the litigation costs bring as a deterrent to the activity and the
waste that occurs when there is a trial. 3 6 However, unlike
the waste of risk costs which do not affect risk-neutral defendants, litigation expenses raise the costs of risk-neutral as
well as risk-averse defendants.
We seem to have a trade off between wasteful litigation
costs under the contribution rules and wasteful risk costs
under the no contribution rule (for risk-averse defendants).
Which rule leads to less total waste is an empirical question
that may be different depending on which law is being examined. If we knew which type of costs dominated, we could
133. See infra part IV.
134. This assumes that the probabilities of the plaintiff winning at trial are
perfectly correlated. The plaintiff may also settle with the last outstanding defendant. It is just that it has an incentive to always settle with other defendants for small monetary amounts. See infra part V.A 2. See also supra note 52.
135. But see infra part LV.B. (showing that complete settlement may be more
likely under the contribution with claim reduction rule in some situations).
These situations would likely be cases involving a few number of conspirators
where liability is apportioned per capita (or apportioned in nearly equal
shares).
136. Professors Polinsky and Rubinfeld show that costly trials may increase
deterrence and thus, may increase social welfare as compared with less costly
trials. They do not, however, advocate trials be made more costly to increase
deterrence. Instead, they suggest other options superior to increased trial
costs, such as raising the level of liability. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials, 8 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 109 (1988).
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apply the rule that minimized those costs and set the liability
level to achieve the appropriate amount of deterrence. The
least wasteful way to increase deterrence is to increase the
liability of the defendants.
F.

Insulation of Decisionmakers

Decisionmakers of an organization found liable for damages may be insulated from the full extent of the liability
since they do not pay the organization's total damages. 13 7 A
decisionmaker may be indifferent as to whether the organization faces a large or small punishment. In such a situation,
an organization may be deterred more if each of the organizations is liable for some of the damages, rather than one organization being liable for all of the damages. In such cases,
the contribution rules would be favored. 138This has been formally analyzed by Polinsky and Shavell.
Easterbrook, Landes and Posner note that if there is
some minimal level of liability that the organization must
face in order for the decisionmaker to be punished, then the
no contribution rule may lead to more deterrence. 13 9 In some
situations, the minimum level of organizational liability that
leads to decisionmaker deterrence may be achieved if an organization would pay all the conspiracy's damages under the
no contribution rule. But that level would not be reached
where the organization pays only its share under the contribution rules.
If the damage amount caused by each defendant is large,
then the contribution rules will likely lead to more deterrence
for decisionmakers. If there is a minimum threshold of damage payment resulting in adverse consequences for the decisionmaker, and the conspiracy's damages are low, then the no
contribution rule may lead to more deterrence. The problem
of decisionmaker insulation could be addressed by changing
the rule used, depending on the expected amount of total liability (or liability per firm). One could use a contribution rule
where damages are large, and thus ensure that all deci137. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 454 n.22 (citing Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1540 at n.6 at 1545-46 &
n.30 (1980) (citing Richard k Whiting, Antitrust and the CorporateExecutive
11, 48 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 n.22 (1962))).
138. Id. at 453-55.
139. Id. at 455 n.26 (referring to comments from Easterbrook, Landes and
Posner).
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sionmakers face some deterrence. Where total damages are
small, the no contribution rule could be applied to ensure that
at least one decisionmaker is punished. Additionally, if there
is a limited amount of punishment an organization can impose on a decisionmaker, it may be better for society to im-0
pose fines or imprisonment on the decisionmaker directly.14
IV.

SErrLEMENT

This section analyzes how the different rules affect the
likelihood of settlement. We first examine the disincentive
for defendants to settle individually under the contribution
with settlement reduction rule. This disincentive to settle occurs even when the defendants and the plaintiff have the
14 1 However, this dissame beliefs as to the outcome at trial.
incentive to settle does not exist if all defendants settle at
once or condition their settlement on others settling. The
conclusion of this subsection was originally shown by Easter14 2 and by Polinsky and Shavell. 143
brook, Landes and Posner,
Next, the article shows that when the plaintiff and defendants have asymmetric information and beliefs, it is unclear as to whether the contribution with claim reduction rule
or the no contribution rule will be more likely to lead to complete settlement. The analysis will focus on situations where
the defendants and the plaintiff have different beliefs as to
their likelihood of winning at trial. Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff will settle with all but one defendant.
But the last outstanding defendant may be less likely to settle under the no contribution rule than a similar defendant
under the contribution with claim reduction rule. Yi also
140. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to
Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT'L.
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1993).
141. That there is no settlement at all assumes that defendants are able to
obtain contribution from each other with certainty. Under the contribution

with settlement reduction rule, if defendants are unable to obtain contribution
with certainty, a defendant will be willing to settle with the plaintiff, even

though it will still face possible liability if the second defendant loses at trial
and seeks contribution from it. A defendant by settling will no longer face the
possibility of having to pay most of the plaintiff's damages while possibly failing
to obtain contribution from others (assuming contribution is uncertain). The
case where contribution cannot be obtained with certainty is further examined
below. See infra part V.A 3.

142. Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 362.
143. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 17, at 458-59.
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showed that neither rule would always lead to more complete
settlement. 144 He demonstrated this conclusion with the case
where the plaintiff had private information regarding its injury. Although the analysis of this subsection is different
from Yi's analysis, the conclusion is the same.
A. Defendants' Disincentive to Settle Under the
Contribution with Settlement Reduction Rule
The contribution with settlement reduction rule will give
defendants a disincentive to settle individually even if the defendants and the plaintiff have symmetric information and
beliefs. 14 5 If a defendant and the plaintiff agree on the expected outcome of a trial, one would normally expect them to
settle and thus save litigation costs. But under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, a settling defendant
might still have to pay contribution to another defendant that
later loses at trial. 146 Without a settlement-bar to contribution, a defendant that settles will have higher expected damages than simply its settlement amount. In fact, where contribution can be obtained with certainty, a defendant will
be unwilling to settle with the plaintiff for any positive
amount.' 4 7 This can be seen by examining a numerical
example.
144. Yi, supra note 22, at 82-90. For an outline of Yi's analysis see infra note
156.
145. This analysis is shown both by Easterbrook, Landes and Posner, and by
Polinsky and Shavell. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 362; Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 17, at 458-59.
If Mary Carter agreements are allowed between the defendants and plaintiff, then the defendants will not have a disincentive to settle under the contribution with settlement reduction rule. See infra part V.B.
146. Under either the contribution with claim reduction rule or the no contribution rule, a defendant will have an incentive to settle because under each rule
there is a settlement-bar to contribution from later trial-losing defendants.
147. Some courts have argued that the contribution with settlement reduction rule will completely stop settlement. One court stated:
[A] "no-bar" rule... would quite clearly inhibit the policy of encouraging settlements. A defendant has nothing to gain by entering into a
settlement that does not effectively terminate, or for that matter even
reduce, further financial exposure.... Indeed, a defendant has everything to lose by so doing. Even in the strongest of actions, there is
always the possibility of a defense verdict and, thus, a required payout
of zero. At the very least, by remaining in the action a defendant can
defend himself and attempt to reduce his proportionate share of liability. Since the upper-end risk is not reduced in the slightest by a partial
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Suppose that two equally liable defendants cause total
damages of $100, and the defendants and the plaintiff believe
that each defendant will lose at trial to the plaintiff with
probability 0.5. Given symmetric information, under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, the expected damage payment of each defendant is $25.148 We can now show
the defendant's disincentive to settle under the contribution
with settlement reduction rule.
First, suppose that defendant A settles with the plaintiff
for $25, defendant A's expected damages if the plaintiff sues
defendant A.' 49 The plaintiff will bring suit against defendant B for the remaining $75 in damages, and the plaintiff's
expected damage award payment from the trial will be
$37.50. However, defendant B will not be willing to settle
with the plaintiff for $37.50. If defendant B settles with the
plaintiff for $37.50, then defendant B will be unable to seek
contribution from defendant A, as $37.50 is less than defendant B's share of the damages of $50.150 But if defendant B
loses at trial to the plaintiff, and pays the plaintiff $75 in
settlement, a rational defendant may as well "roll the dice," pursuing
the matter to trial and hoping for a favorable verdict.
Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1334 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (citation omitted).
148. $25 = (0.5) x (0.5) x ($100).
149. If the plaintiff sues defendantA and wins, then defendantA will have to
pay the plaintiff $100 in damage. However, defendant A will be able to obtain
contribution from defendant B of $50. Thus, defendant A will have a net loss of
$50 if it loses at trial, and since defendant A will only lose at trial with
probability 0.5, defendant A's expected damages are $25.
150. Contribution is allowed for settlements under some laws. For example,
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act states:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for
the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor
in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of
what was reasonable.
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT § l(d), 12 U.L.A 63 (1955).
But, if a defendant settles for an reasonable amount that is more than its
share of the damages, then it will be able to seek contribution from other defendants. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1(d) cmt., 12 U.L.A.
65 (1955). However, even if a defendant is allowed to seek contribution when it
settled for more than its share of the damages, the defendant will still have a
disincentive to settle, because if the defendant loses at trial, it will be able to
seek more in contribution from other defendants than if it settles for the expected damages at trial.
For example, suppose defendant A is liable for 90% and defendant B is liable for 10% of total damages of $100, and that each defendant has a probability
of losing at trial to the plaintiff of 0.5. Suppose that the plaintiff brings suit
against defendant B for the total damages of $100.
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damages, defendant B will seek contribution from defendant
A of $25. This will leave defendant B with a net damage payment of $50 if it loses at trial. Thus, defendant B has an expected damage payment before trial of $25 as there is only a
50% chance the plaintiff will prevail at trial. However, defendant A will have an expected damage payment of $37.50.
This is equal to the $25 from the initial settlement plus a 50%
chance of having to pay defendant B contribution of $25.151
Now suppose that neither defendant A nor defendant B
settles with the plaintiff. The plaintiff has a 50% chance of
winning at trial, and thus each defendant will have a 50%
chance of having to pay its share of the damages of $50. Each
defendant will have an expected damage payment of $25. Because $25 is less than $37.50, which is defendant A's expected
total damage payment if defendant A initially settled for $25,
defendant A is better off not settling first individually. Similarly, defendant B is better off going to trial than settling first
individually.
In fact, defendant A will not be willing to settle with the
plaintiff for any positive amount under the contribution with
settlement reduction rule. 152 Suppose defendant A settled
with the plaintiff for $1. By paying the plaintiff $1 in an early
settlement, defendant A only reduces its expected liability by
50¢. The plaintiff can still sue for $49 of defendant A's damages by suing defendant B. Defendant B will obtain contribution from defendant A if it loses at trial for the $49 in damages. Because defendant B has a 50% chance of losing at trial
to the plaintiff, and we are assuming defendant B is able to
obtain contribution from defendant A with certainty, defendant A will have a 50% chance of having to pay an additional
If defendant B settles with the plaintiff for the plaintiff's expected damage
award payment at trial of $50, then defendant B, as it is liable for $10 of the
damages, will be able to seek $40 in contribution from defendant A. Thus, defendant B's expected damage payment from settling with the plaintiff, and then
seeking contribution from defendant A, will be $10.
But if defendant B refuses to settle with the plaintiff, then there will be a
50% chance that defendant B will win at trial and will pay nothing and a 50%
chance that the plaintiff will win $100 in damages at trial. But if defendant B
loses at trial and pays the plaintiff its $100 in damages, defendant B can seek
contribution from defendant A for $90 of the damages. Thus, defendant B will
have a net payment from loss at trial of $10 and defendant B's expected damages will thus only be $5. Therefore, defendant B is better off going to trial with
the plaintiff than settling with the plaintiff.
151. $37.50 = $25 + [(0.5) x ($50.$25)].
152. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 362.
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$49 in damages. This will give defendant A an expected contribution payment of $24.50, for a total expected damage payment of $25.50. If defendant A had not settled with the plaintiff, then defendant A would have had a 50% chance of paying
$50 in damages, and a total expected damage payment of $25.
Since $25 is less than $25.50, defendant A is better off refusing to settle with the plaintiff than settling with the plaintiff
for $1 in damages.
It seems bothersome that even though all parties agree
about the expected outcome at trial, they remain unable to
reach an agreement and save litigation costs. Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, if parties are able to
reach multi-party agreements, or are able to condition agreements on the settlements of other defendants, then there may
to settle as when defendants settle
not be the disincentive
3
15
individually.
To see this in the above example, suppose defendant A
agrees to settle with the plaintiff for $25 conditioned on defendant B also settling. Defendant A has no disincentive to
sign such an agreement because if defendant B does settle,
defendant B will be unable to seek contribution from defendant A. If defendant B does not settle, then defendant A has
not settled and thus will be in no worse of a position than if
there is no agreement. Similarly, defendant B will have no
disincentive to sign such an agreement. The plaintiff will
conditionally settle with each defendant and the settlements
will take effect at the same time. Thus, through these contingent agreements and group settlement, litigation costs are
saved.
Where all parties have symmetric information and beliefs of the probabilities of loss at trial, there will be a disincentive for defendants to settle individually under the contribution with settlement reduction rule. If both defendants are
not willing to simultaneously settle, then neither defendant
will settle first and both defendants will go to trial. The result is that if just one defendant is unwilling to settle a case,

153. That contingent or group settlements will lead to settlement where parties have symmetric information regardless of which rule is being used is noted
by Easterbrook, Landes and Posner. Of course, these settlements may be more
costly to reach, as they are more complicated. See id.
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an incentive to remain parties
all of the defendants will have
154
plaintiff.
the
at trial against
B.

Complete Settlement Under the No Contribution and
Contribution with Claim Reduction Rules

Easterbrook, Landes and Posner showed that under the
no contribution rule the plaintiff will always settle with all
but one of the defendants. 155 They did not, however, examine
the likelihood of trial with the last outstanding defendant. It
may be that, for this last outstanding defendant, there will be
a trial under the no contribution rule where there would have
been settlement under the contribution with claim reduction
rule. Of course, the opposite may also be true. It is the last
outstanding defendant's characteristics that determine which
rule will be more likely to lead to complete settlement. This
has private
is shown by Yi for the case where the plaintiff
15 6
information concerning its amount of damage.
154. Courts have also noted that there will be no settlement if just one defendant is unable to reach an agreement with the plaintiff. In In re Nucorp
Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal. 1987), the court deduced that if
there was no bar against seeking contribution from a party that had settled,
then no partial settlements would occur. The court explained:
Any single defendant who refuses to settle, for whatever reason, forces
all other defendants to trial. Anyone foolish enough to settle without
barring contribution is courting disaster. They are allowing the total
damages from which their ultimate share will be derived to be determined in a trial where they are not even represented.
Id. at 1408.
155. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 356.
This is assuming that the probabilities of the plaintiff winning at trial
against the various defendants are positively (exactly) correlated. See infra
part V.A.2. (examining settlement when probabilities of the plaintiff winning at
trial are not correlated). The plaintiff may still settle with the last outstanding
defendant, but that will depend upon both the plaintiff's and the last outstanding defendant's beliefs about the outcome of the trial.
156. Yi, supra note 22, at 82-90. Yi shows that total settlement might be less
likely to occur under the no contribution rule than under the contribution with
claim reduction rule where defendants are unsure of the damages caused to the
plaintiff.
Yi sets up a situation where a plaintiff has private information concerning
its injury that can either be a high damage injury or a low damage injury. The
defendants form a probability assessment of whether the injury to the plaintiff
is high damage or low damage. The defendants then offer either a high or a low
settlement depending on their probability assessment of the plaintiff's level of
injury. If a defendant offers a high settlement, the plaintiff will accept it regardless of which type it is; while if a defendant offers a low settlement, then
there is a possibility of a trial.
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We will examine the case where defendants and the
plaintiff agree on the amount of the damage the plaintiff has
suffered, but disagree as to the chances of the plaintiff winning at trial. We can compare the no contribution rule with
the contribution with claim reduction rule by examining the
difference between the plaintiff's demands and the defendants' offers for settlement. The smaller the difference between the plaintiff's settlement demand and a defendant's
For defendants that are equally liable under the contribution with claim
reduction rule, Yi demonstrates that a defendant's probability belief that the
plaintiff suffered high damage, for which the defendant offers a high settlement, is lower for the contribution with claim reduction rule than for the no
contribution rule. That means for some probability assessments, the defendant
will make a high settlement offer under the contribution with claim reduction
rule where it might have made a low settlement offer under the no contribution
rule. Because a plaintiff will always accept the high settlement offer, while it
may or may not accept the low settlement offer, for a range of the defendant's
probability assessment of the plaintiff's type there is more likely to be settlement under the contribution with claim reduction rule than under the no contribution rule.
What drives this result is that the difference between the high and low
settlement offers under the no contribution rule is larger than the difference
between the high and low settlement offers under the contribution with claim
reduction rule. For the case where defendants are liable for the same proportion (or nearly the same proportion) of the damage, a defendant has more to
gain if a low settlement offer is accepted under the no contribution rule than if
it is accepted under the contribution with claim reduction rule. Because the
value of having a low settlement offer is greater under the no contribution rule,
the defendant is more likely to make a low settlement offer, even though making a low settlement offer will increase the risk of a trial and the litigation costs
associated with it.
Yi's analysis shows that if defendants are liable for (nearly) equal proportions of the damage, then the contribution with claim reduction rule will lead to
more settlement than the no contribution rule. He also shows that if the defendants are liable for different proportions of the damage, it is possible that
the difference between the high and low settlement offers are smaller under the
no contribution rule than under the contribution with claim reduction rule for
some defendants (defendants liable for a high proportion of the damage).
Therefore, trials may be more likely under the contribution with claim reduction rule than under the no contribution rule (as the defendants that caused a
high proportion of the plaintiff's damage will have more to gain from a low
settlement offer under the contribution with claim reduction rule than under
the no contribution rule).
My analysis above does not assume that defendants lack knowledge regarding the plaintiff's injury. Instead, the assumption I make is that the plaintiff and the defendants disagree on the probability of the plaintiff winning at
trial. My analysis more closely follows that of the typical one plaintiff, one defendant settlement models with asymmetric information as to the probability of
trial outcome, but common knowledge of what each party's beliefs are and the
amount of damages caused.
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settlement offer, the more likely there will be a settlement.1 57
Examples comparing the two rules will show how the different settlement outcomes depend on the characteristics of the
defendants.
Suppose there are two defendants, total damages are
$100, and each defendant believes the plaintiff will win the
trial with probability 0.5. However, assume the plaintiff believes it will win the trial with probability 0.6.
First, assume that each defendant is liable for 50% of the
damages under the contribution with claim reduction rule.
In this case, the contribution with claim reduction rule is
more likely to lead to more complete settlement than the no
contribution rule.
Under the no contribution rule, the defendants will offer
to settle for $33.33, as this is what they believe the equilibrium settlements will be (based on their beliefs of losing to
the plaintiff at trial with probability 0.5).158 The plaintiff will
initially demand that each of the defendants settle for $37.50,
as this is what the plaintiff believes the equilibrium settlements will be (based on its beliefs of winning at trial with
probability 0.6). 15 However, the plaintiff will settle with one
defendant based on the defendant's beliefs because the plaintiff is better off settling with one defendant, and suing the
other, than refusing to settle with either defendant and suing
both defendants. 6 '
After settling with the first defendant for $33.33, the
plaintiff will sue the outstanding defendant for $66.67. We
now have a single defendant case where at trial the plaintiff
157. Plaintiffs and defendants who disagree about the outcome of a trial may
still reach an agreement in order to save litigation costs. To the extent that the
difference in their disagreement is smaller, settlement is more likely to occur.
158. $33.33 = (0.5) x ($100 - $33.33).
159. $37.50 = (0.6) x ($100 - $37.50).
160. If the plaintiff refuses to settle with both defendants, it will have an
expected damage payment of $60 based on its beliefs of winning at trial with
probability 0.6.
Now suppose the plaintiff settles with one defendant for $33.33. Given the
plaintiff's beliefs, the plaintiff will have an additional expected damage payment at trial against the second defendant of $40. $40 = (0.6) x ($66.67). The
plaintiff will have a total expected damage award of $73.33. $73.33 = $33.33 +
$40.
Thus, the plaintiff is better off settling with the one defendant, as the plaintiff was able to receive $33.33 with certainty rather than $33.33 with a 0.6
probability, which leads to the increase of $13.33 in the total expected damage
payment.
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will expect to receive damages of $40,161 while the defendant
will expect to pay damages of $33.33. 162 The difference between the plaintiff's and the last outstanding defendant's expected outcome of the trial is $6.67.163
Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, each
defendant will offer to settle for $25. 164 The plaintiff will demand that each of the defendants settle for $30. 165 Under the
contribution with claim reduction rule, the difference between the plaintiff's demand and each defendant's offer is $5.
For the plaintiff and defendant to settle under the no
contribution rule, it must be that their total litigation costs
are greater than $6.67. However, under the contribution
with claim reduction rule, a defendant and plaintiff need only
have total litigation costs of $5 in order to settle. Since the
difference between the settlement demands and the offers of
the defendants under the contribution with claim reduction
rule is less than the settlement demand and offer of the last
outstanding defendant under the no contribution rule, comlikely under the contribution with
plete settlement is more
16 6
rule.
claim reduction
Now let us modify the example such that defendant A is
liable for 90% and defendant B is liable for 10% of the damages under the contribution with claim reduction rule. The
analysis under the no contribution rule will be the same as
where liability was equally allocated under the contribution
rules. The plaintiff will settle with one defendant for $33.33,
and sue the other defendant for $66.67. As before, the difference between the plaintiff's and the last outstanding defendbe $6.67.167
ant's expected outcomes at trial will
Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, the
proportion of damage a defendant is liable for affects the defendant's expected damage payment. Thus, we will have dif161. $40 = (0.6) x ($66.67).
162. $33.33 = (0.5) x ($66.67).
163. $6.67 = $40 - $33.33.
164. $25 = (0.5) x (0.5) x ($100).
165. $30 = (0.5) x (0.6) x ($100).
166. For example, if the total litigation costs of a defendant and the plaintiff
are $6, then settlement will occur under the contribution with claim reduction
rule, but there will be a trial under the no contribution rule.
167. The plaintiff will demand $40 and the defendant will offer $33.33. The
difference is $6.67.
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ferent results in this example than where damages are
equally allocated.
Defendant A is liable for $90 in damages and has a belief
that it will lose at trial with probability 0.5. Thus, defendant
A will make a settlement offer of $45, an amount equal to its
expected damages at trial. 16 The plaintiff, however, believes
that it will win at trial with probability 0.6. Thus, the plaintiff will demand that defendant A pay $54, the plaintiff's expected damage award from defendant A at trial. 169 The difference between defendant A's settlement offer and the
plaintiff's settlement demand is $9.
Defendant B is liable for $10 in damages and has a belief
that it will lose at trial with probability 0.5. Thus, defendant
B will make a settlement offer of $5 equal to its expected
damages at trial.1 70 The plaintiff believes that it will win at
trial with probability 0.6. Thus, the plaintiff will demand
that defendant B pay $6, the plaintiff's expected damage
award from defendant B at trial.171 The difference between

the defendant B's settlement offer and the plaintiff's settlement demand is $1.
In this case, complete settlement is more likely under the
no contribution rule. For the plaintiff and the last outstanding defendant to settle under the no contribution rule, they
must have total litigation costs greater than $6.67. However,
under the contribution with claim reduction rule, defendant
A and the plaintiff need to have total litigation costs of $9 in
order to settle. As the difference in the settlement demands
and offers of the last outstanding defendant under the no contribution rule is less than the settlement demand and offer of
defendant A under the contribution with claim reduction
rule, complete settlement is more likely under the no contribution rule.
Neither the no contribution rule nor the contribution
with claim reduction rule will always be more likely to lead to
complete settlement. What drives the result is the amount of
damage for which the last outstanding defendant is liable for
under the two rules. When the plaintiff and defendant disagree about the outcome of trial, the absolute amount of their
168. $45 = (0.5) x ($90).
169. $54 = (0.6) x ($90).
170. $5 = (0.5) x ($10).

171. $6 = (0.6) x ($10).
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disagreement will be larger when the defendant is liable for
more of the damages. If there is not a defendant that is liable
for a large proportion of the damages under the contribution
with claim reduction rule, then the contribution with claim
reduction rule is more likely to lead to complete settlement
than the no contribution rule. If liability is allocated per capita among the defendants, then the contribution with claim
reduction rule is more likely to lead to complete settlement
than the no contribution rule.
The advantage the no contribution rule holds over the
contribution with claim reduction rule is that there will tend
to be fewer defendants outstanding if a trial does actually
take place. When a trial does occur under the contribution
with claim reduction rule, there may be many non-settled
defendants.
V.

EXTENSIONS

A. Lifting of Model Assumptions
We have made many assumptions in order to more easily
show the differences among the rules. Most of these assumptions have not been necessary to the conclusions reached, and
will be lifted in this section.
1.

UncertainDetection

We have assumed thus far that the plaintiff has been
able to detect the conspirators with certainty. Thus, the
probability that a plaintiff would be able to obtain damages
from the defendants was the same as the plaintiff's
probability of success at trial. We now lift the assumption
that the plaintiff's detection of the conspiracy occurs with
certainty. In determining the probability that a plaintiff will
be able to collect its damages at trial from a conspirator, the
probability of detection can be separated from the probability
of the plaintiff winning at trial after detection has
occurred.

172

172. Previous authors have not explicitly separated the probability of detec-

tion from the probability of the plaintiff winning at trial. For example, Easter-

and the
brook, Landes and Posner combine both the probability of detection
et
Easterbrook
See
variable.
one
into
trial
at
winning
plaintiff
the
probability of

al., supra note 16.
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In the diagram above, q is the probability of detection of
the defendant by the plaintiff, and p is the probability of the
plaintiff winning at trial given the plaintiff has detected the
defendant. The probability of the plaintiff obtaining damages
from the defendant is thus (p x q).
If q is equal to 1, detection is assumed to occur with certainty, and the differences between the no contribution rule
and the contribution rules are extenuated. This is what we
have assumed above in comparing the rules. However, in
many, if not most, situations the probability of detection will
not be 1. If the probability of detection is uncertain, the different rules are closer in their results.
We can reexamine the example in subsection III.A.1
where there was certain detection. 173 In that example, we
had two defendants who were equally liable for the total damages of $100. Detection of the conspiracy occurred with certainty. Both defendants had beliefs that each defendant
would lose at trial to the plaintiff with probability 0.5. The
expected damage a defendant faced under the no contribution
rule was $33.33, while under the contribution rules the expected damage was $25. The difference in expected damages
of the rules, and thus deterrence, being $8.33.
Now suppose that each defendant believes that the
probability of detection is 0.7071 and the probability of losing
to the plaintiff at trial after detection is 0.7071. This also will
lead each defendant to believe that the probability of paying
damages is 0.5.174 Under the no contribution rule, if detection occurs, the defendants will have expected damages of
$41.42,175 while if detection does not occur, the defendants
will have zero in expected damages. Under the contribution
rules, if detection occurs, the defendants will have expected
173. See supra part III.A.1.
174. 0.5 = (0.7071) x (0.7071).

175. $41.42 = (0.7071) x ($100 - $41.42).
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damages of $35.36,176 while if detection does not occur, the
defendants will again have $0 in expected damages.
When detection does not occur, 29.29% of the time the
defendants will pay zero regardless of which rule is used.
The other 70.71% of the time, they will have expected damages of $41.42 under the no contribution rule and $35.36
under the contribution rules. Thus, the expected damages
1 77 and $25
will be $29.28 under the no contribution rule,
17 8
The difference between the
under the contribution rules.
expected damages under the rules is only $4.28, which is less
than the difference of $8.33 in expected damages when detection occurs with certainty. In both examples, the defendants
have a probability of paying damages to the plaintiff of 0.5.
But because the strategic bargaining under the no contribution rule only occurs after detection of the conspiracy, the differences between the no contribution rule and the contribution rules are greater when a defendant's uncertainty of
paying damages is due solely to its uncertainty of loss at trial
after detection.
We can look at one more example and observe that if all
of the uncertainty of the defendants having to pay damages
to the plaintiff is due to the uncertainty of detection, then the
no contribution rule and the contribution rules will lead to
the same results. Suppose that the probability that the conspiracy is detected is 0.5, and that if the conspiracy is detected the defendants will lose to the plaintiff. In this case,
both the no contribution rule and the contribution rules will
give the defendants expected damages of $25.
Under the no contribution rule, if the conspiracy is not
detected, then each defendant will have damages of $0. If the
conspiracy is detected, then each defendant will have expected damages of $50 (as each defendant will be just as
likely to have to pay more than its share of the damages). As
176. $35.36 = (0.7071) x (0.5) x ($100).
177. Under the no contribution rule, a defendant 29.29% of the time will expect to pay $0 and 70.71% of the time expect to pay $41.42. Thus, each defendant's expected damage payment from the conspiracy is $29.28. $29.28 =
[(0.2929) - ($0)] + [(0.7071) x ($41.42)].
178. Under the contribution rules, a defendant 29.29% of the time will expect
to pay $0 and 70.71% of the time expect to pay $35.36. Thus, each defendant's
expected damage payment from the conspiracy is $25. $25 = [(0.2929) x ($0)] +
[(0.7071) x ($35.36)].
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the probability of detection is 0.5, each defendant has expected damages of $25 under the no contribution rule.
Under the contribution rules, if the conspiracy is not detected, then each defendant will have damages of $0. If the
conspiracy is detected, then each defendant will have damages of $50 (as each defendant is equally liable for the total
damages of one-hundred). As the probability of detection is
0.5, each defendant has expected damages of $25 under the
contribution rules. Thus, where all of the uncertainty of a
defendant's paying damages is due to the uncertainty of the
conspiracy being detected, the contribution and the no contribution rules lead to the same outcomes.
The results of the three cases we have seen separating
the probability of detection from the probability of loss at
trial are summarized below.
Probability
of detection

Probability
of loss at
trial given
detection

Probability Defendant's Defendant's Difference
of detection
expected
expected
in expected
and loss at
damages
damages
damages
trial
under the
under the
under the
rules
contribution no contriburules
tion rule

Case 1

1

0.5

0.5

$25

$33.33

$8.33

Case 2

0.7071

0.7071

0.5

$25

$29.28

$4.28

Case 3

0.5

1

0.5

$25

$25

$0

Probability of Detection and Loss at Trial Equal to 0.5 Probability of Detection Varied

An additional question that should be addressed here is
whether the rule that is used affects the probability of detection. One could argue that, because the plaintiff's expected
damages under the no contribution rule will be greater than
its expected damages under the contribution rules, the plaintiff is more likely to extend resources in detecting conspiracies under the no contribution rule. 179 The defendants will
know that the plaintiff will have higher expected damages
under the no contribution rule than under the contribution
rules, and that the plaintiff may expend more resources in
detecting conspiracies; thus, the defendants may believe that
179. See supra part III.B.2, note 98, and accompanying text. Observe that
even if each defendant has beliefs that it will face less in damages under the no
contribution rule than under the contribution rules, the defendant will also
have the belief that the plaintiff will collect more in total damages.
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the conspiracy is more likely to be detected under the no contribution rule, and may be more deterred.180
2. Independent Trial Outcomes and Sequential
Settlement
The plaintiff's probabilities of winning at trial against
different defendants are more likely to be correlated in conspiracy cases than in non-conspiracy cases. For example, in a
two firm price-fixing conspiracy case, if the plaintiff is to win
at trial against the first defendant, it will be likely to win at
trial against the second defendant (since for the plaintiff to
win at trial against the first defendant for fixing prices with
the second defendant, the plaintiff will also be showing that
the second defendant is fixing prices with the first
defendant).
However, in some situations the defendants' probabilities of loss at trial may not be perfectly correlated and possibly even independent. We will briefly examine the situation
where the probabilities of the defendants' losing at trial are
independent.
Under the assumption of independent probabilities of
loss at trial, the expected damages under the no contribution
rule and contribution rules are the same. Under the no contribution and contribution rules, if the plaintiff negotiates simultaneously with defendants, then the plaintiff and the des
fendants will be unable to agree on individual settlements.,
Under the no contribution rule, however, if the plaintiff negotiates sequentially with the defendants, then settlements
may be reached.1 8 2 Where the defendants' probabilities of

loss at trial are independent, the plaintiff will have credibility
in sequentially bargaining with the defendants, although the
defendants will only be willing to settle under the no contri180. Even if under the no contribution rule the defendants believe that the
conspiracy is more likely to be detected, they will not necessarily face greater
deterrence ex ante the conspiracy. If the defendants have beliefs that they can
settle cheaply under the no contribution rule, then these beliefs might outweigh
the increase in probability of detection with regard to deterrence. See supra
part III.B.
181. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard R. Revesz, Multi-Defendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 41, 50-76
(1994).
182. Of course, where all parties have the same information and beliefs, as
assumed in the analysis of this subsection, conditional or group settlements are
also possible.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

bution rule.18 3 The following example where probabilities of
loss at trial are independent will demonstrate the settlement
and deterrence effects of the rules.
Suppose there are two identical defendants, each defendant equally contributing to the damage of the plaintiff, the
probability of each defendant losing at trial is 0.5 and the total damage caused is $100. Assume that the probabilities of
each defendant losing at trial to the plaintiff are independent.
First, note that if the plaintiff sues both defendants in a
joint trial, then under both the contribution rules and the no
contribution rule the plaintiff has an expected damage award
of $75, and each defendant has expected damages of 37.50.184
Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff can achieve
a total settlement of $75 through sequential negotiations and
settlements with the defendants. Under the contribution
rules, the defendants will not want to settle, as they would be
better off going to trial.
The settlement pattern under the no contribution rule is
as follows. Suppose the plaintiff decides to first negotiate
with defendant A and then with defendant B. The plaintiff
will first approach defendant A and threaten to sue it for the
entire $100 in damages. Defendant A will settle with the
plaintiff for the expected damage payment of $50.115 The
183. Credibility in that when the plaintiff is negotiating with a particular
defendant, the plaintiff is better off than if it was simultaneously negotiating
with the other defendants or jointly suing all the defendants.
This contrasts to the case where the probabilities of the defendants losing
at trial are not independent, where the plaintiff may not have credibility in
sequentially negotiating with the defendants because if the negotiations are not
going in the plaintiff's favor, then it will be better off entering into simultaneous negotiations with all defendants. See supra note 57.
184. The plaintiff has a 75% chance of receiving all of its damages because its
probabilities of winning at trial against each defendant are independent. 0.75 =
0.5 + 0.5 - [(0.5) x (0.5)].
For this case of identical defendants, the defendants have expected damages of $37.50, even if the defendants are unable to obtain contribution from
each other with certainty, as each defendant will be equally likely to pay more
than its share of the damages.
185. The plaintiff's threat to first sue defendant A alone and go to trial is
credible. Suppose defendant A refuses to settle with the plaintiff and there is a
trial. There is a 50% chance that the plaintiff will win at trial and receive $100
from defendant A There is also a 50% chance that the plaintiff will lose to
defendant A at trial and then sue defendant B, where the plaintiff will again
have a 50% chance of winning $100 in damages. This makes the plaintiff's
expected damage payment equal to $75. $75 = [(0.5) x ($100)] + [(0.5) x (0.5) x
($100)]. Thus, the plaintiff is just as well off suing defendant A as if it settles
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plaintiff will then approach defendant B and threaten suit for
the remaining $50 in damages. Defendant B will settle with
the plaintiff for the expected damage payment of $25. The
plaintiff's total expected damage award will be $75. If the
defendants do not know ex ante the conspiracy what the
plaintiff's sequential settlement order will be, then each defendant will have expected damages of $37.50.
Suppose that instead of negotiating with the defendants
sequentially, the plaintiff makes offers to settle with each defendant for $37.50. In this case, there will be no settlement
unless both defendants simultaneously or conditionally settle, because each defendant will prefer to let the other defendant settle first and then be sued by the plaintiff-while the
plaintiff will not be willing to settle with the first defendant
unless it settles for its full share of the damages. Suppose the
plaintiff first settles with defendant A for $37.50, then the
plaintiff can sue defendant B for $62.50. But then the plaintiff will only have an expected award of $31.25 at trial against
defendant B. Thus, the plaintiff will have an expected damage award of only $68.75, which is less than the $75 the
plaintiff can expect by suing both jointly at trial.1 8 6 Both defendants will prefer to settle second in such a situation, and
the plaintiff will prefer to take them both to trial rather than
settle with either individually.
with defendant A, and thus, the plaintiff's threat to sue defendant A first is
credible.
Under the no contribution rule, because the plaintiff can do better through
sequential settlement or group trials, the plaintiff will no longer have an incentive to settle with the defendants for the simultaneous negotiating equilibrium
amount of $33.33. However, if the probabilities are somewhat but not perfectly
correlated, then $33.33 will be the minimum that the plaintiff could obtain from
each of the defendants under the no contribution rule.
Under the contribution rules, defendant A will not want to settle for $50
since it will not be able to seek contribution from defendant B. If defendant A
loses at trial and pays the plaintiff damages of $100, then defendant A can seek
contribution of $50 from defendant B. This will make defendant A's net loss at
trial only $50. Even if defendant A wins at trial, there will still be a chance of
defendant B later losing at trial and seeking contribution from defendant A, but
defendant A's total expected damages will still only be $37.50, which is less
than the proposed settlement amount of $50.
186. The plaintiff will not individually settle with defendant A first unless
the settlement is for $50 (as the plaintiff would then have a total damage award
of $75). But if the plaintiff is not committed to a sequential settlement order,
then defendant A would rather take its chances at trial where it will have expected damages of $37.50.
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Professors Kornhauser and Revesz show that where the
plaintiff's probabilities of winning at trial against the defendants are independent, and the plaintiff makes a pair of settlement offers to both defendants concurrently, there will be no
pair of settlements that are agreeable to both defendants and
the plaintiff.18 7 Thus, where negotiations are simultaneous,

there will be a trial regardless of the rule applied to contribution.'-" Only where the plaintiff settles with the defendants
in a group, or under the no contribution rule sequentially,
will litigation be avoided.
The following table summarizes the outcomes of the
rules depending on the circumstances. Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff sequentially negotiates with the defendants and settles first with defendant A and then with defendant B. Under the contribution rules, the plaintiff sues
both defendants at trial.
Rule

Plaintiff settles with Plaintiff settles with
defendant B for
defendant A for

Plaintiff's total
expected award

No contribution rule

$50

$25

$75

Contribution with
claim reduction

Will Not Settle

Will Not Settle

$75

Contribution with
settlement reduction

Will Not Settle

Will Not Settle

$75

Plaintiff's Expected Damage Award, Sequential Settlements Defendant's Probabilities of
Loss at Trial Independent

3. Uncertain Contribution
In the analysis above we assumed that, if allowed to do
so under the rule, a defendant could obtain contribution from
another defendant with certainty. One can think of this as
contribution in its strongest form. The no contribution rule
can be seen as contribution with probability zero. Moving
from contribution with probability one to probability zero is
thus moving from this strong contribution to no contribution.
Uncertain contribution falls between these two extremes.1 8 9
Both deterrence and settlement will be affected by the
defendants' ability to obtain contribution. Under the contri187. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 181, at 50-76.
188. Id.
189. Some of the results -of this subsection are presented by Easterbrook,
Landes and Posner. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 362-64. They

more formally model the case where contribution is not obtained with certainty.
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bution with settlement reduction rule, expected damages will
be higher when contribution cannot be obtained with certainty than when contribution can be obtained with
certainty.
Settlement patterns will also be different where contribution cannot be obtained with certainty. Unlike the case
where contribution is certain, if contribution is uncertain
then under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, a
defendant may be willing to settle with the plaintiff.1 90 The
defendant will settle even though it may have to pay additional damages if a later losing defendant is able to obtain
contribution from it. The settlement amount will be less than
the defendant's expected damages, but the settlement will
put an upper bound on the defendant's potential liability at
its attributable share of the damages. An example will show
the affects of uncertain contribution on deterrence and
settlement.
Suppose there are two identical defendants, each defendant equally contributing to the damage of the plaintiff, the
probability of each defendant losing at trial is 0.5, and the
total damage caused is $100. Suppose that the probability of
one defendant obtaining contribution from another defendant
is 0.5.
First, we can examine the defendants' expected damage
payments under the contribution with claim reduction
rule. 191 Suppose defendant A settles for some amount s. The
plaintiff will then sue defendant B for $50 in damages, an
amount equal to the total damages of $100 less the $50 in
damages attributable to defendant A. Thus, defendant B will
have an expected damage payment of $25. Defendant A will
settle for $25, as it cannot do better by settling second, and
the plaintiff will not accept less than $25. Thus, under the
contribution with claim reduction rule, we have the same result as when contribution occurred with certainty: both defendants will have expected damages of $25 and the plaintiff
will have an expected award of $50.192
190. See supra part V.A for an analysis of the settlement pattern under the

contribution with settlement reduction rule where contribution can be obtained
with certainty.
191. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 363-64.
192. Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, it may be possible for
the plaintiff to achieve a higher damage award than $50 by committing to a
sequential settlement pattern. Suppose the plaintiff commits to suing defend-
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Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule,
we reach a different result when contribution cannot be obtained with certainty than when contribution can be obtained
with certainty.193 First, it should be noted that there is now
an advantage to settling. A defendant that settles removes
the chance that it might pay more than its share of the damages. After settlement, the most the defendant will ever have
to pay is its attributable share of the damages. A trial-losing
defendant may be liable for more than its share of damages if
it fails to obtain contribution from the other defendants.
Suppose defendant A is considering settling with the
plaintiff. If defendant A settles for the amount s, it will have
a total expected liability of its settlement, s, plus the expected
liability from possibly having to pay contribution to defendant B. Defendant A will only have to pay defendant B contribution if defendant B loses at trial to the plaintiff and defendant B successfully sues defendant A for contribution. These
are uncertain events, as the probability of each occurring is
0.5. The probability that defendant A will pay contribution is
0.25. The amount of contribution that defendant A would
have to pay defendant B would be $50 - s. Therefore, defendant A's total expected liability is s + [(0.25) x ($50 - s)].
ant A first and then defendant B. The plaintiff will have credibility in committing to this strategy as its expected damage award at trial against defendant A
of $50 is the same as its total expected damage award from negotiating and
settling with the defendants simultaneously (which we showed above is $50).
Defendant A will lose at trial to the plaintiff 50% of the time and have to
pay damages of $100. However, 50% of the time defendant A pays damages, it
will be able to obtain contribution of $50 from defendant B. Thus, defendant A
will have an expected damage payment from a loss at trial of $75. $75 = $100 [(0.5) x ($50)]. Since defendant A only will lose at trial 50% of the time, its
expected damages will be $37.50.
The plaintiff will be better off settling than going to trial for any settlement
above $25. Thus, the settlement reached between the plaintiff and defendant A
will be between $25 and $37.50. The actual settlement will depend on characteristics of the plaintiff and defendant such as risk preferences, time value of
money and other possible factors.
After settling with defendant A, the plaintiff will sue defendant B for $50,
which equals the total damages of $100 less defendant A's attributable share of
the damages of $50. The plaintiff and defendant B will settle for the expected
damages of $25. Thus, under the contribution with claim reduction rule, when
the plaintiff sequentially negotiates with the defendants, the plaintiff's total
damage award will be between $50 and $62.50. It is the uncertain contribution
that raises defendant A's expected damages (from the $25 in the certain contribution case to $37.50 in this uncertain contribution case) in a sequential trial
that drives the result.
193. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 362-64.
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We can now calculate defendant B's expected liability if
defendant A first settles with the plaintiff for s. The plaintiff
will sue defendant B for the total damages less defendant A's
settlement, $100 - s. However, if defendant B loses at trial
against the plaintiff, defendant B may be able to obtain contribution from defendant A for defendant A's attributable
share of the damages. In this case, defendant A will be liable
for $50 in damages, but has already paid s in damages
through its settlement with the plaintiff. Thus, defendant B
can seek contribution from defendant A of $50 - s. Now this
contribution is uncertain, as defendant B will only be able to
obtain it 50% of the time. Thus, defendant B's expected damages from losing at trial to the plaintiff are $100 - s - [(0.5) x

($50 - s)]. That is the damages the plaintiff sues defendant B
for less the expected contribution defendant B obtains from
defendant A. Of course, defendant B will only lose at trial to
the plaintiff 50% of the time. Thus, defendant B's total expected damages are (0.5) x [$100 - s - [(0.5) x ($50 - s).

Now we need to determine if defendant A will settle first.
Defendant A will only settle first if its expected damages from
settling are less than or equal to its expected damages from
not settling. In this case, if we set defendant A's expected
damages equal to defendant B's expected damages and solve
for s, we will find that s = $25.194 Defendant A will have total
expected damages of $31.25, equal to its settlement with the
plaintiff for $25, and the expected contribution it must pay to
defendant B. Given that defendant B will both lose at trial to
the plaintiff and obtain contribution of $25 from defendant A
only 25% of the time, defendant A's expected contribution
payment will be $6.25.
Defendant B will also have expected damages of $31.25.
The plaintiff will sue defendant B for $75 and win 50% of the
time. But if defendant B loses at trial to the plaintiff, then
50% of the time defendant B will be able to obtain contribution of $25 from defendant A. Thus, defendant B will have an
expected damage payment of (0.5) x [$75 - [(0.5) x ($25)]] =

194. If the plaintiff settles with defendant A for only $10, then defendant B
will have expected liability of $35 = (0.5) x [$100 - $10 - [(0.5) x ($40)]]. Defendant B will thus bid against defendant A to settle first with the plaintiff, as $10 <
$35. This bidding to settle first will continue until the plaintiff settles with a
defendant for $25. This is similar to the bidding up of settlement offers that
occurs under the no contribution rule. See supra part IIIA-1.
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$31.25. It should be noted that defendant B will not settle
with the plaintiff, even if they agree on the outcome of the
trial, because a settlement will keep defendant B from being
able to sue defendant A for contribution. 195 Thus, the contribution with settlement reduction rule will lead to at least one
trial.
We have shown that, while settlement may occur for the
first defendant under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, the last defendant facing trial will not settle. The
first defendant settles because settlement protects it from the
possibility of paying more than its attributable share of the
damages. The second defendant will not settle because if it
settles it will be unable to seek contribution from previous
settling defendants. The expected damages of both defendants are higher under the contribution with settlement reduction rule where contribution cannot be obtained with certainty than where contribution can be obtained with
certainty. 196 As in the case of the no contribution rule, under
the contribution with settlement reduction rule with uncertain contribution, the plaintiff can use the defendants' preferences for settlement to obtain a damage award that is higher
than if it sues both defendants at trial.
In this example, the expected damages of the defendant
are higher under the contribution with settlement reduction
97
rule than under the contribution with claim reduction rule. 1
But the example above did not analyze the incentives to reveal information. Even where contribution cannot be obtained with certainty, the contribution with settlement reduction rule will result in a disincentive for the defendants to
provide the plaintiff with information to be used against
other defendants, as those other defendants may later seek
contribution from the settling information-giving defend195. In this case, defendant B and the plaintiff will agree that the plaintiff
has an expected award of $37.50 at trial ($37.50 = (0.5) x ($75)). But if defendant B pays $37.50 to the plaintiff, then defendant B will be unable to seek contribution from defendant A because defendant B will have paid less than its
attributable share of the damages of $50. See supra note 150.
196. See supra part III.A. 1.
197. But see supra note 192 where I show that sequential settlements under
the contribution with claim reduction rule may lead to the same total expected
damage award for the plaintiff. Expected damages for the defendants may also
be the same if they do not know ex ante the conspiracy and the plaintiff's sequential settlement order.
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ant. 19 8 But information exchange may greatly affect the
plaintiff's probabilities of prevailing at trial against the defendants, and thus increase the expected damage award and
deterrence. 199 Thus, the expected damages in the example
should not be seen as necessarily a complete representation
of increased deterrence under the contribution with settlement reduction rule over the contribution with claim reduction rule when contribution is not obtained with certainty.
The chart below summarizes the results of this section,
when contribution cannot be obtained with certainty under
the contribution rules, and compares these outcomes with the
results when contribution can be obtained with certainty
under the contribution rules, and the results under the no
contribution rule.2 ° °

198. The incentive for a settling defendant not to provide information to the
plaintiff under the contribution with settlement reduction rule will be weaker
when contribution is uncertain than when contribution is certain because there
is a lesser likelihood that a settling defendant will have to pay contribution
when contribution is uncertain.

199. See supra part III.C.

200. The settlements in the table are those the defendants will individually
settle for with the plaintiff. In some cases, the defendant will not be able to
reach an individual settlement with the plaintiff, in which case I note that the
defendant will not settle. Whenever all defendants and the plaintiff have identical beliefs, group or contingent settlements are always possible.
See supra part III.A. 1 for the analysis of the no contribution and contribution rules where it is assumed that contribution can be obtained with certainty.
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Defendant A
Will Settle
for

Defendant
A's Total
Expected
Liability

Defendant B
Will Settle
for

Defendant
B's Total
Expected
Liability

Plaintiff's
Total
Expected
Damage
Award

No
contribution

$33.33

$33.33

$33.33

$33.33

$66.66

Contribution
with Claim
Reduction
Probability
0.5

$25

$25

$25

$25

$50

Contribution
with Claim
Reduction
Probability 1

$25

$25

$25

$25

$50

Contribution
with
Settlement
Reduction
Probability
0.5

$25

$31.25

Will Not
Settle

$31.25

$62.50

Contribution
with
Settlement
Reduction
Probability 1

Will Not
Settle

$25

Will Not
Settle

$25

$50

Defendants' Expected Damages and Plaintiff's Expected Award Comparison of No
Contribution, Uncertain Contribution and Certain Contribution

B.

Mary CarterAgreements

The term "Mary Carter Agreement" is used rather generally to apply to any agreement between a plaintiff and a settling defendant whereby the parties place limitations on the
financial responsibility of the settling defendant.2 °1 The
amount a settling defendant actually pays is sometimes on a
variable scale that decreases as the plaintiff's recovery
against the other defendants increases.
Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, a
settling defendant and plaintiff may enter into a Mary Carter
agreement to protect the settling defendant from having to
pay contribution to later trial losing defendants. Should the
settling defendant have to pay contribution to a later trial
losing defendant, the plaintiff "reimburses" the settling defendant for any amount of contribution that the settling defendant is forced to pay, limiting the settling defendant's to201. Mary Carter agreements are named after the case Booth v. Mary Carter
Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
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tal liability to the settlement amount. A Mary Carter
agreement can thus increase a defendant's incentive to settle
under the contribution with settlement reduction rule.
Proponents of Mary Carter agreements argue that they
encourage settlement,2 " 2 allow defendants to freely provide
sharing among the settling
information, °3 and allow for2risk
°4
defendants and the plaintiff.
Some have argued that Mary Carter Agreements are bad
in that they hurt non-settling defendants, undermine the eqapportionment of damages and contravene legal ethuitable
ics. 2 05 If information by a settling defendant is given to the
plaintiff, then the non-settling defendant may be more likely
to lose at trial. However, this is not necessarily bad, so long
as the information is truthful. In fact, this is one of the advantages shared by the contribution with claim reduction
rule and the no contribution rule. The Mary Carter Agreement, by limiting a settling defendant's liability, encourages
information exchange under the contribution with settlement
reduction rule.
Damages will be equitably apportioned where Mary
Carter Agreements are allowed. Each defendant will be liable for its share of the damages, and no defendant will have
to pay more than its share without being able to seek contribution from others who pay less than their shares. Of course,
the equitable apportionment of liability is not the same as
each defendant paying the same amount (or percentage of its
share) in damages. Any rule that allows for information exchange between the defendants and the plaintiff may lead to
earlier settling defendants settling for less than later settling
defendants.2 °6 But each defendant will not face potential
damages caused by others without the right to seek contribution (as is the case under the no contribution rule). The Mary
202. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 366. See supra part WY.A.
203. See supra part III.C.
204. Jeffrey Lange, Litigation Risk Exchange: An Economic Analysis of Sliding-Scale Settlements, (October, 1991) (unpublished paper on file with the University of Pennsylvania School of Law).
205. See John E. Benedict, Note, It's a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary Carter
Agreement, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 368 (1987). See also Abigail Carson, Note, Are
Gallagher Covenants Unethical?: An Analysis under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 863 (1977); Charles W. Lowe, Note, Gallagher
Covenants, Mary CarterAgreements and Loan Receipt Agreements: Unsettling
Contributionsto Conflict Resolution, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 117 (1977).
206. See supra part III.C.
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Carter Agreement will simply keep the plaintiff from collecting the full share of damages from an agreeing defendant; it
does not7 increase the damages that a non-agreeing defendant
faces.

20

The legal ethics question is somewhat more murky. Certainly if a settling defendant will receive a lower settlement
amount if the non-settling defendant pays more at trial, the
settling defendant will have an incentive to exaggerate or
even lie. However, a non-settling defendant at trial will also
have an incentive to exaggerate (or forget) or lie in order to
pay less in damages. The point is that as long as a party has
an interest in the outcome of the trial, the party will have an
incentive to be somewhat less than truthful. Countervailing
this incentive not to be truthful are penalties, such as perjury, and ethical rules. It seems odd that to think that a
Mary Carter Agreement will cause a settling defendant to be
more untruthful in situations where it helps the plaintiff, and
thus itself, than in situations where defendants are simply
representing their own interests at trial against the plaintiff.
If we want situations where defendants will have no incentive to lie at trial, we could allow only those Mary Carter
Agreements that fix the settling defendants' liability at a set
amount, and not allow agreements where the payment is on a
sliding scale that depends on the plaintiff's recovery against
other defendants. Thus, by receiving a payment from the settling defendant, the plaintiff will be reducing the amount it
can obtain from a non-settling defendant by the settling defendant's share of the damages. This results because if the
plaintiff wins at trial against a non-settling defendant, to the
extent that the non-settling defendant is able to obtain contribution from the settling defendant, the plaintiff will have
agreed not to collect the damages. This in effect allows the
parties to change the contribution with settlement reduction
20 8 By
rule into the contribution with claim reduction rule.
limiting its liability to a set amount regardless of the plain207. Of course, whenever contribution is uncertain a defendant may end up

paying more than its share of the damages, but uncertain contribution is not
caused by Mary Carter Agreements. See supra part V.A.3.
208. These parties could enter into Mary Carter agreements because they
save the agreeing defendant and the plaintiff litigation costs, regardless of cooperation and information transferred from the agreeing defendant to the plaintiff. If the agreement also increases the probability the plaintiff will win at trial
against the non-agreeing defendant, the plaintiff may give the agreeing defend-
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tiff's suit against other defendants, the settling defendant
will not have an incentive to be untruthful at trial, and can
freely give the plaintiff and the court information that will
allow the tribunal to make a correct decision.
C. Fairnessand Equity Among Defendants
The no contribution rule has been critiqued as unjust for
two reasons. First, defendants who cause little damage often
must pay more than their share of the damages. 20 9 A defendant may face more damages than its attributable share because under the no contribution rule a defendant may be liable for all of the damages. Because damages are not
apportioned under the no contribution rule, those defendants
who cause little damage face the same potential liability as
those who cause substantial damage. Second, defendants
who fail to settle early often face excessive damages at
trial.210 A defendant that fails to settle with the plaintiff may
face high damages at trial if the plaintiff settles with other
defendants cheaply because the plaintiff can seek damages
from non-settled defendants that are reduced only by a settling defendant's settlement, and not by the settling defend2 11 Both complaints
ant's attributable share of the damages.

with respect to the equity of the no contribution rule follow
from the plaintiff's ability to strategically apply the rule.
There are two questions regarding inequities under the
no contribution rule that need to be answered. First, should
we look for the inequities before or after the conspiracy? Second, even if inequities exists, who should remedy the situation, the courts or the conspirators themselves?
The issue of when to determine the equity was addressed
by Easterbrook, Landes and Posner.2 12 They noted that we
should look for inequities at the time the conspiracy is
ant a monetary incentive to provide the plaintiff with information. See supra

part III.C.2.
209. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: HearingsBefore the Comm. on the

Judiciaryof the United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 5 (1981-82)
(statement of Senator Max Baucus).
210. See Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation, supra
note 2, at 14-19.
211. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text for examples as to why a
plaintiff would settle cheaply with early settling defendants.
212. Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 342-43.
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formed, not after the conclusion of the settlements or trial.21 3
In focusing on ex ante equity, they stated "a no contribution
rule would be unfair only if one group of defendants were, for
inappropriate reasons, more likely than the other [group of
defendants] to be selected as the defendant[s] called on to pay
the full damages."2 14 Of course, even this might not lead to ex
ante unfairness if the conspirators know ex ante which
"group" of defendants are more likely to be sued.2 1 5 Prior to
the conspiracy each defendant should know that it is potentially liable for all of the damages, and will take into account
its beliefs about being sued by the plaintiff when entering
into the conspiracy. If a conspirator believes it will be held
liable for much of the damage, then it should ask for a greater
share of the conspiratorial benefit. Thus, if a conspirator
feels that it will be unable to settle quickly with the plaintiff
and will face higher damages than other conspirators, then it
should ask for a larger share of the conspiratorial benefit to
cover this increased expected liability.
Easterbrook, Landes and Posner explain: "A fairness argument from the mouth of the intentional wrongdoer is unappealing because the wrongdoer can avoid his 'predicament' by
conforming his conduct to the law's demands." 2 16 This seems
to be a reasonable response to a conspirator complaining
about inequities of the no contribution rule, since before entering into the conspiracy, each conspirator must have expected a net benefit; otherwise it would not have joined the
conspiracy.
Of course, there might be situations where a conspirator
joins the conspiracy because of coercion on the part of another

213. To look at the equity ex post would be like saying a lottery is unfair ex
ante because there are some winners and some losers. However, it is fair be-

cause ex ante the lottery drawing everyone has the same chance of winning.
214. Easterbrook, et al., supra note 16, at 342-43.
215. In addition, we might say the conspiracy is ex ante fair if all conspira-

tors do not know that the plaintiff will select certain members to be sued for the
total damages. If the plaintiff plans to choose to sue some defendants for an
inappropriatereason, but either all the conspirators know about it ex ante or
none of the conspirators know about it ex ante, then the conspiracy is ex ante
fair. Only if some conspirators know, while other conspirators do not know who

the plaintiff will choose to sue for damages, will the conspiracy be ex ante
unfair.
216. Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 340.

1994]

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

conspirator.2 1 7 In such cases, it may be unfair to impose additional liability on the coerced conspirator. In addition, a
conspirator's belief as to damages will depend upon the information it has when it enters into the conspiracy. It could be
that a conspirator enters into a conspiracy without realizing
the full extent of the activities or damage that the conspiracy
will cause.2 18 In this case, the conspirator's limited information may have led it to a bad decision. We might want to investigate the reason for the conspirator's inadequate information. If the reason involved a misrepresentation by another
conspirator, we might punish the conspirator that made the
misrepresentation.2 1 9 Indeed, if the conspirator realizes that
it might be liable for all of the damages, it will have an enhanced incentive to keep track of the activities of the
conspiracy.
Thus, while ex ante equity will be prevalent in most conspiratorial situations, there may be some situations where
the conspirators are treated unfairly prior to the conspiracy.
This unfairness does not result from the no contribution rule,
but rather from the actions of the other conspirators. In situations where a controlling conspirator unfairly controls the
actions of a controlled conspirator, we may wish to increase
the liability of the controlling conspirator, possibly by allowing contribution with liability allocated by comparative
fault. 2 20
This leads us to the question of whether the courts or the
conspirators should remedy the inequities of the no contribution rule. The costs for the courts to remedy the inequities
might not be higher than having the conspirators determine
the equity of the conspiracy. In many situations, we should
be able to expect the conspirators to reach agreements regarding the division of the conspiratorial benefits among
themselves.2 2 1
217. See infra part VI.G where I examine conspiracies where one conspirator

is able to control the actions of another conspirator through the use of bad
threats. See also cases cited supra note 123.
218. See supra notes 83-84.
219. See infra part VI.G.
220. See infra part VI.G.
221. See infra part VI, where the practice of conspirators allocating the division of the conspiratorial benefit and thus, obtaining ex ante conspiracy fairness
is further analyzed.
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Even if we believe there is too much inequity among conspirators under the no contribution rule, we will need to determine where we place the desire for equity for conspirators
among our other goals, such as deterrence, the plaintiff's recovery and the reduction of litigation costs. It would not be
difficult to argue that equity among the defendants should
probably come somewhere near the end of our list of desirable
attributes for the rule.2 2 2 When conspirators can make rational decisions to enter into a conspiracy, the inequity argument against the no contribution rule holds little weight.
However, in situations where a controlling conspirator controls the actions of a controlled conspirator, we may wish to
allow contribution in order to guard against the unfairness
among conspirators.
In addition, the actual application of the no contribution
rule may not be as unfair as it theoretically could be. There
may already be a thumb on the scale for fairness for defendants that cause a small proportion of the damage. A defendant's damage payment under the no contribution rule theoretically does not depend upon the proportion of damages
attributable to the defendant,2 2 3 as the damage payment
should only depend on the probabilities that the defendant
and other defendants will lose at trial to the plaintiff. However, there are situations where plaintiffs treat defendants
differently, depending on their size. The following example
illustrates some of these situations.
The settlement pattern in the CorrugatedContainerlitigation has been used to show the unfairness of the no contri2 2 4 We will use the
bution rule to later settling defendants.
222. A California appellate court explained:
We analyze the [California] Supreme Court decisions as creating a hierarchy of interests. First in the hierarchy is maximization of recovery
to the injured party for the amount of his injury to the extent fault of
others has contributed to it .... Second is encouragement of settlement of the injured party's claim ....Third is the equitable apportionment of liability among the tortfeasors.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264
(Ct. App. 1978). In addition, one may want to add deterrence to this list of
interests before "equitable apportionment of liability among the tortfeasors."
Id.
223. See supra part III.A.2.a.
224. This appears a valid complaint in that later settling defendants in each
group faced increased liability and thus settled for higher amounts. For example, The Mead Corporation, which had a 3% market share, settled for $45 million after it had been found liable at trial by a jury. Of course, The Mead Corpo-
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Corrugated Container settlement data to show that the actual application of the no contribution rule may not be unfair
to smaller defendants. 225 The settlement pattern is shown in

the following table.2 26

ration could have settled earlier for less, as it was offered the same market
share deals as the other defendants. See Contribution and Claim Reduction in
Antitrust Litigation, supra note 2, at 16.
225. We are showing here that small defendants are not being taken advantage of by the plaintiff under the no contribution rule. The data does support
that later settling defendants do face more potential liability than defendants
who settle early (if one normalizes for the fairness to smaller defendants).
226. The table was originally compiled by Benjamin Civiletti for testimony
before the House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law to show
the unfairness of the no contribution rule. See Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation,supra note 2, at 16 (citing Antitrust DamageAllocation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 330 (1981-82) (prepared statement of Benjamin Civiletti, an attorney with the Baltimore firm of
Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti)). The information in the table is also
found in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,114 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
This data has also been analyzed by others. See Contribution and Claim
Reduction, supra note 2, at 15-19; Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 1288-90.
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Company

Market
Share

Amount

Settlement
Date

Settlement
Amount
($ Million)

Per Point
($ Million)

8/24/78
12/18/78
1/06/79
1/12/79
1/12/79
1/16/79

8.30
24.12
39.15
32.70
7.35
27.43

1.0
4.5
5.0
6.0
6.0
6.5

12/18/78
1/06/79
1/18/79
1/18/79
118/79

9.89
34.24
34.63
14.49
12.47

3.5
4.0
4.75
4.75
4.75

7/21/78
12/13/78
12/14/78
12/14/78
12/18/78
12/18/78
12/18/78
12/18/78
12/18/78
1/25/79
1/25/79

1.98
7.40
1.00
.75
3.02
6.45
11.29
4.59
8.44
3.07
5.56

.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.4
2.5
2.7
2.75
4.0
4.0
3.25

FELONY INDICTEES

International Paper
Champion
Weyerhaeuser
Owens-Illinois
Olinkraft
Continental Group
MISDEMEANOR INDICTEES

Boise Cascade
Container Corp.
Inland Container
Stone Container

St. Joe Paper Co.
UNINDICTED COMPANIES

St. Regis Paper Co.
Union Camp
Diamond International
Dura Container
Chesapeake Corp.
Longview Fibre
Williamette Industries
Menasha Corp.

MacMillan-Bloedel
U.S. Corrugated
Green Bay Packaging

The above data shows that for defendants that are similarly situated (at the same level of federal indictment) the
settlement per market share point of earlier settling defendants is less than that of later settling defendants. The court
noted that the plaintiffs had engaged in a settlement pattern
that was meant to obtain "maximum aggregate recovery" for
the plaintiffs.22 7 However, it is not clear that this pattern of
settlement actually maximized the plaintiffs' total damage
award.
We need to ask why under the no contribution rule the
plaintiffs would base their settlement demands on a defendant's market share when damages are not allocated per market share and each defendant is potentially liable for all the
damages. The important numbers are the actual settlement
amounts (the bold numbers in the above table), as under the
no contribution rule, the settlement of each defendant should
be independent of the share of damages caused by the defend227. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,114, at 76,708 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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ant. That the plaintiffs' settlement offers are related to market share is indicative of plaintiffs bringing possibly unintentional fairness into the settlement negotiations for the
defendants causing smaller amounts of damage (or receiving
fewer benefits).
There seem to be four plausible explanations for the
plaintiffs' decisions to settle with smaller defendants for less
than larger defendants that were similarly situated in terms
of federal indictment status. First, some of the smaller defendants were judgment proof.2 28 The damages estimated in

the Corrugated Container litigation ranged from $200 million
to $1 billion and were subject to trebling. 229 For example,
Olinkraft, a smaller defendant, did not have enough assets to
cover the total damage the plaintiffs suffered. Because Olinkraft was judgment proof, it is not surprising that Olinkraft
23 °
settled for less in absolute terms than the larger firms.
Second, a firm's probability of loss at trial or the determination of damages at trial could be correlated with the defendant's market share.23 1 Juries may be more likely to empathize with smaller defendants. Smaller defendants thus
face lower expected damage payments and settlement costs.
However, neither judgment proofness nor jury empathy for
small defendants fully accounts for some of the settlements
observed. Not every firm with a small market share was
small in size. It seems unlikely that the plaintiffs would have
won less in damages at trial against a large federally indicted
firm such as Boise-Cascade than a smaller non-indicted firm
such as Williamette Industries.23 2 But, because the plaintiffs
228. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 343-44. See also Steven
Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).
229. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.
May 30, 1979), aff'd, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979).
230. Olinkraft's settlement of $7.35 million eliminated Olinkraft's net profits, before tax, for the entire period 1960-1977. Olinkraft was obviously incapable of paying the full amount of damages. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,114, at 76,715 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
231. Easterbrook, Landes and Posner, also note that a majority of the Judiciary Committee believed that the plaintiff would prefer to sue smaller defendants because of their inability to afford as good of legal services as larger defendants. Easterbrook et al., supra note 16, at 343 (citing S. Rep. No. 96-428,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979)). Easterbrook et al., argue that asset constrained
defendants, with a good case, could borrow (often from their own lawyers) to
pay for their defense.
232. The court said the following about the plaintiff's prospects of winning at
trial against Boise-Cascade and Willamette Industries:
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decided to base their settlement strategy on a particularmarket share, and though both firms settled on the same day,
Williamette Industries ended up settling for over $1,000,000
more than Boise-Cascade. Thus, firm size and culpability do
not seem to fully explain the plaintiffs' settlement demands.
Third, the plaintiffs may have been trying to lower their
transaction costs in the settlement negotiations. By asking
for a dollar amount per market share point, the plaintiffs
would not have to communicate to each defendant what the
other defendants were also being offered. But with the
amount of damages involved in this case, it would appear
that the plaintiffs could have come up with a better way to
save transaction costs.
Fourth, the plaintiffs simply may have thought that basing their settlement demands on market share was the correct way to maximize settlement.233 If this were the case,
then the plaintiffs did not truly understand how the no contribution rule works-as they could have gained millions in
potential settlement dollars by demanding more from smaller
market share defendants. Certainly, the plaintiffs could have
Willamette Industries negotiated a settlement for $11,286,000, or
$2.7 million per percentage point of its 4.18 percent share of the defendants' market.
Willamette was investigated by the Corrugated grand jury but
neither it nor any of its employees were indicted.
...Willamette's 1977 net working capital was $67 million and its
1977 after-tax income was $48 million.
... The class's chances of prevailing against Willamette [(had they
not settled) would not have been] very substantial.
Boise-Cascade negotiated a settlement for $9,891,000, or $3.5 million per point of its 2.8 percent share of defendants' market.
Boise-Cascade was indicted for pre-1975 violations of the Sherman
Act. The Government identified nineteen employees as co-conspirators, and two of them, both general managers, were also indicted at the
misdemeanor level. Boise and its two employees pled nolo contendere
and were sentenced ....
Boise is a large company. [Boise-Cascade's] 1977 net working capital was $275 million and its 1977 after-tax income $115.6 million. It is,
therefore, capable of responding in judgment for the whole range of
damages.
The class's chances of prevailing against Boise [(had they not settled) would have been] relatively good.
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,114,
at 76,710 to 76,711, (S.D. Tex. 1981).
233. See supra note 118.
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demanded more from Boise-Cascade than they did from Williamette Industries.
Giving the plaintiffs and their attorneys the benefit of
the doubt, we can assume that it was probably a combination
of all these reasons that led to the market percentage-based
settlement pattern. In this case, the plaintiffs were effectively being "fair" to the smaller defendants as compared with
the larger defendants. If any firm seems to be in a position to
complain about the unfairness of the no contribution rule, at
least as it was applied in this instance, it would be those
large unindicted defendants, such as Williamette Industries,
who ended up paying more in damages simply because they
were larger. Of course, one could argue that the plaintiffs
were fair to Williamette Industries and too easy on the other
defendants. The point, however, is that there may be some
forces of fairness that are outside the model of the no contribution rule.
VI.

ALLOCATING DAMAGES UNDER THE
CONTRIBUTION RULES

For most conspiracy situations, the allocation of damages

23
per capita 23 4 is preferable to a comparative fault . or a com-

parative benefit allocation. 236 The per capita liability allocation rule will allow for administrative cost savings, reduction
of influence costs (legal expenditures and information hiding
and collecting costs by the parties), increased certainty for
the plaintiff in settling, increased detection of conspiracies,
and ex ante conspiracy fairness. In certain contexts, however,
such as when one conspirator is able to control another conspirator, liability allocated by comparative fault will lead to
better results than per capita liability allocation.
A. Administrative Costs
Conserving judicial resources and efficiently resolving issues are current concerns of many courts. One benefit of a
234. Under a per capita liability allocation rule, each defendant is liable for
an equal proportion of the damage.

235. Under the comparative fault liability allocation rule, liability is allocated by the relative fault of the defendants.
236. Under the comparative benefit liability allocation rule, liability is allocated by the relative benefit received by each of the defendants. The benefit
received might be determined by a proxy such as market share.
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per capita allocation of liability is the ease with which it can
be administered.23 v Both the comparative fault and comparative benefit liability allocation rules require not just a determination of who the defendants are, but also a determination
of the fault or benefit of each defendant in the conspiracy.2 8
Certainly it will be easier for a court to determine only who
the conspirators are as opposed to determining both who the
conspirators are and the proportion of damages caused or
benefit received by each conspirator.
The comparative benefit liability allocation rule may be
simpler to administer than the comparative fault liability allocation rule in situations where the benefit of each defendant can be measured. Sometimes a proxy for benefit received,
such as market share, may be an appropriate measure.2 3 9
B.

Influence Costs

The per capita liability allocation rule is an objective rule
because it would be difficult to distort the number of defendants involved in the conspiracy. The clarity of the per capita
allocation rule will lead litigating parties to spend less trying
to influence the apportionment of liability. Conspirators may
237. The court in Professional Beauty Supply asserted that administrative
costs would be decreased by allocating damages using the per capita liability
allocation rule. The court explained: "Because of the administrative difficulties
of assessing exact percentages of fault in complicated antitrust actions ... we
adopt a rule of pro rata contribution except in unusual circumstances." Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182
n.4 (8th Cir. 1979).
238. Professor Easterbrook, in examining the problems of a comparative
benefit liability allocation approach, stated:
In order to apportion liability, it would be necessary to determine a
relevant market and calculate the market share of each firm. This is
no mean feat; the National Commission for the Reform of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures concluded in 1979 (Report Vol. II, at 95-96) that
in complex cases market determination takes some 55% of trial time,
averaging several months of trial per case. Market definition is complex because there is no "right" market. A market definition is just a
proxy for power over price, and in any given case there may be several
equally plausible market definitions.
Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary
of the United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 182, 201-02 (1981-82)
(statement of Frank H. Easterbrook, Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School).
239. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings on S995 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
11, 25-26 (1981-82) (statement of William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General).
But see supra note 238.
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also exert less wasteful effort to hide and gather information
and evidence during the conspiracy under the per capita liability allocation rule.2 4 °
Both the comparative fault and the comparative benefit
liability allocation rules may lead courts to make imprecise
allocations regarding liability. The imprecision in allocating
liability under these rules will lead defendants to exert effort
in order to obtain the "best allocation" for themselves, an allocation that leaves them with low liability for the damages.
Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, the
plaintiff will also be involved in exerting effort to show that a
defendant it has settled with caused little damage, thus
allowing the plaintiff to seek more from the other
defendants.2 4 1
Under the comparative fault liability allocation rule, conspirators may hide evidence of the amount of damage that
they have caused, while simultaneously trying to obtain evidence that can be used to show that other conspirators have
caused more damage. Similarly, under the comparative benefit liability allocation rule, conspirators may exert effort to
receive their share of the conspiratorial benefit in a form that
cannot easily be measured.
Of course, even the per capita liability allocation rule will
lead to some wasteful hiding costs, although less than under
the other two liability allocation rules. 24 2 Under the per capita allocation liability rule, the parties will attempt to hide
the conspiracy, but not to distort the allocation of liability.
The comparative benefit liability allocation rule would seem
to result in less wasteful hiding and collecting of allocation
evidence than the comparative fault liability allocation rule,
as the comparative benefit liability allocation rule appears to
be a more objective measure.
240. The effort spent on the illegal activity, such as setting up the conspiracy
or hiding and collecting information of the conspiracy, is a social waste. That
effort could be spent doing productive, socially beneficial activities. See Gordon
Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224
(1967). See generally C. CHARLES K. ROWLEY ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF RENT-SEEKING (1988).
241. The plaintiff will have the same incentives under the contribution with
settlement reduction rule where a Mary Carter agreement has been signed between the plaintiff and a settling defendant. See supra part V.B.
242. See Tullock, supra note 240.
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C. Plaintiff's Willingness to Settle

Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, the
plaintiff will want to determine the liability of a defendant
that it settles with, as it is the liability amount, not the settlement amount, that is subtracted from the amount of damages the plaintiff can seek from the other defendants. The
per capita liability allocation rule will make it easier for the
plaintiff to determine the allocation of damages attributable
to each defendant. The plaintiff will thus expend fewer resources in trying to determine the allocation of liability
among the defendants. The per capita liability allocation rule
will also lead to less uncertainty for the plaintiff in the settlement process, and may increase the likelihood of settlement
under the contribution with claim reduction rule. As former
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter noted:
If a plaintiff could calculate the [defendant's] share [of the

damages] accurately, it could then settle with a defendant
if the amount appeared adequate. But if a plaintiff cannot

calculate the share, it may shun settlements because of
the risk of giving up an unknown proportion of its total
claim.
Certainly, the plaintiff's certainty in this respect depends critically on the method chosen to calculate contribution shares. The most straightforward method is the
"pro rata" or equal shares method.... Comparative fault
is a slightly more sophisticated method of computing contribution shares .... Comparative Benefit is still another
method of computing contribution shares.2 43
In situations where the benefit of each party is easy to
determine, the comparative benefit liability allocation rule
may be preferred over the comparative fault liability allocation rule.
D. Deterrence
Professors Kornhauser and Revesz argued that the per
capita liability allocation rule could lead to over-deterrence in
joint and several liability cases for some defendants by exposing them to too much liability relative to the benefit they
243. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearingson S995 Before the Comm.
on the Judiciaryof the United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 11, 24
(1981-82) (statement of William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General).
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would receive in a worthwhile activity.2 4 4 But for most conspiracy situations, parties can bargain over the division of
benefits and, thus, the per capita liability allocation rule will
not overly deter conspirators. In cases where the allocation of
benefits can be negotiated by the conspirators, those conspiracies that produce more total benefit than total liability for
the conspirators will take place.2 4 5
The transaction costs in reaching an additional agree-

ment on the division of the benefit will have some deterrent
effect. Yet parties will already incur some transaction costs
in reaching the agreement on the conspiratorial act itself.
These costs will include finding other members with whom
the agreement can be made as well as the actual agreement
on the act. Because parties must already reach an agreement
on the act, the marginal costs of bargaining over the division
2 4 6 In addition,
of the benefit may be low in many situations.
if the parties know that they are to be held liable for the damage per capita, then the negotiations regarding the splitting
of the benefit should be even easier for the parties than in
situations where they must negotiate over the division of the
benefit but do not know what their precise proportions of liability will be.
There could be some situations where the additional
transaction costs are high or asset-constrained parties are
244. See Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 28. Kornhauser and Revesz do
not focus on the conspirator, non-conspirator dichotomy, and their analysis ignores bargaining among the conspirators over the division of benefits of a conspiracy. If the parties can bargain about the division of the benefit ex ante the
conspiracy, and the additional transaction costs of reaching agreement on the
division of damages are low, then their criticism of the per capita liability allocation rule for joint and several liability does not apply. Their analysis is applicable to situations where harm is caused by non-conspirators or where the ex
ante bargaining over division of the benefits is costly.
245. This is simply a Coasian analysis applied to the bargaining on the division of the benefit of the conspiracy. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
246. For a non-conspiracy case, the division of the benefit among the parties
would require the parties to find each other ex ante the conspiracy and to possibly agree on the extent of each party's participation in the act or acts as well as
the division of the benefits. This is unlikely in many joint and several liability
cases. For example, in automobile accidents it would be extremely unlikely that
the participants would be able to find each other and agree on their actions in
an upcoming accident. Thus, using the per capita allocation rule in non-conspiracy situations would seem ill-advised because of the much higher transaction costs of the parties reaching an agreement. Of course, if the parties
reached an agreement, they would have formed a conspiracy by definition.
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unable to make needed side payments such that a profitable
conspiracy will not take place. In these situations, we might
wish to use the comparative fault or comparative benefit liability allocation rules.2 4 7
A per capita contribution rule may also lead to more detectable conspiracies and lessen the likelihood that hidden
conspiracies will be able to operate indefinitely. Conspiracies
may be more detectable under a per capita liability allocation
rule because side payments to account for the per capita division of potential liability may make the conspiracy more
visible.
In addition, under the comparative fault liability allocation rule, parties are more likely to have asymmetric information as to who will be found at fault ex ante the conspiracy.
This could affect their decisions to enter into a conspiracy.2 4
If parties hide information about their own fault while collecting information about others' fault, then all parties might
believe that they will be liable for little of the damages, and
thus, they may be more likely to enter into a "non-beneficial"
conspiracy than if the damage allocation is known more precisely ex ante the conspiracy. 24 9 The per capita rule makes it
less likely that the parties will have. asymmetric information
regarding their liability.2 5 °
Finally, I recommend the comparative fault liability allocation rule for situations where deterring the conspirator

247. For example, besides the cost of the benefit division agreement itself,
parties may have monitoring costs to make sure that others are not cheating on
the agreement.
248. The court in ProfessionalBeauty Supply asserted that deterrence would
be increased by allocating damages using the per capita liability allocation rule.
The court explained: "[W]e believe a rule of pro rata contribution will serve as a
more effective deterrent to antitrust violations (i.e., under a comparative fault
rule some parties may feel they have little to lose in joining in an antitrust
violation in a minor capacity)." Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979).
249. See supra part III.B.1.
250. However, the per capita rule will not necessarily eliminate asymmetric
information as a conspirator may not know how many other conspirators are in
the conspiracy or the full amount of damage caused by the conspiracy. An actor
may become a co-conspirator without knowing every other conspirator, the full
extent of the conspiracy, or all activities undertaken pursuant to the conspiracy. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971).
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damage is necessary to deter the conthat causes much of25the
1
spiracy as a whole.
E. Fairness
Another argument against per capita contribution is that
and thus produce a form of
it may operate 25"inequitably"
"rough justice." 2 However, this is not true if the conspirators know that the per capita liability allocation rule will be
applied before they enter into a conspiracy. If each conspirator knows that all conspirators will be held equally liable for
the damages, then each conspirator will demand a share of
the benefits that covers its expected liability, or else it will
refuse to take part in the conspiracy.
Information regarding which conspirators are taking
risks or receiving a benefit, or how the benefit is being received may be difficult for the court or plaintiff to determine
after the conspiracy has been detected. A per capita liability
allocation rule may be more fair than the comparative fault
or comparative benefit liability allocation rules because it
places the conspirators, the parties with the most knowledge
of the risks and benefits of the conspiracy, in the position of
determining the fairness of their conspiracy.
Further, the per capita liability allocation rule will yield
the same results as the comparative fault rule in some situations. In circumstances where each defendant is essential to
the carrying out of the conspiracy, it can be argued that each
defendant should be equally liable for the damage. Of course,
this is simply a case where the results of the per capita and
the comparative fault liability allocation rules happen to
reach the same result. But explicitly stating that the per capita rule will be used in some situations may lead to quicker
resolution and cost-savings in determining the liability of
each defendant.
Allocating the damages by either the comparative fault
or comparative benefit liability allocation rules may allow the
conspirators to lower their transaction costs in forming the
251. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Of course, in situations
where deterrence is a priority, raising the total amount of damages the conspirators are liable for may also achieve the desired deterrent effect.
the
252. See The Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings on S995 Before
(state(1981-82)
25
11,
Sess.
2nd
and
1st
Cong.,
Comm. on the Judiciary,97th
ment of William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General).
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conspiracy, as the benefit each conspirator receives without
side payments may correspond to their expected damages. In
such cases, the comparative fault or comparative benefit liability allocation rules are not increasing fairness among the
conspirators but simply lowering the conspirators transaction
costs in forming the conspiracy (while increasing the administrative, influence and uncertainty costs at trial). There is
no reason to believe that as long as the conspirators know
that liability will be allocated among them per capita that the
conspiracy will be unfair, although the conspirators may have
higher transaction costs in allocating the benefit and making
any necessary side payments. The fairness argument against
the per capita liability allocation rule, as applied to conspiracies, really comes down to favoring the court's allocation of
liability after a trial has begun over the conspirators allocating the benefit when forming the conspiracy. The reasons we
should believe that courts will make fairer decisions at trial
than the conspirators make in entering into the conspiracy do
not seem at all clear.
F. The Per Capita Liability Allocation Rule and the Coase
Theorem, an Example
Suppose two conspirators, firm A and firm B, are contemplating entering into a conspiracy. Suppose that the expected
benefit of the conspiracy to both firms is $120, but the benefit
will flow to the firms such that firm A receives $80 and firm B
receives $40. Suppose that the total expected damages of the
conspiracy is $100,253 and that the expected liability is allo-

cated per capita such that each firm has an expected liability
of $50.
In this case, firm A will want to enter into the conspiracy,
as its expected benefit of $80 is greater than its expected liability of $50, while firm B will not want to enter into the con253. There is a difference between the conspirators' expected damages and
the real damages caused. The conspirators' expected damages could be $100
because the real damages are $100 and the conspirators expect to have to pay
these damages with certainty. However, the conspirators expected damages
could also be $100 because the real damages are $300 and the conspirators expect to have to pay those damages 1/3of the time.
Suppose the real damages were $300 and the conspirators expected to pay
the damages 1/3of the time. In order for the conspirators to have an expected
damage payment of $300, the damages the conspirators would need to face
would be $900.
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spiracy, as its expected benefit of $40 is less than its expected
liability of $50.
But firm A and firm B can reach an agreement, in addition to an agreement on the act of the conspiracy itself, on a
side payment from firm A to firm B. In this case, if firm A
agrees to make a side payment to firm B anywhere in the
range of $10 to $30, then the conspiracy will occur, as each
party will have an expected benefit that is greater than its
expected liability.2" 4
The example shows that if the conspirators are able to
reach an agreement on the division of the conspiratorial benefit, then those conspiracies that produce a net benefit to the
conspirators as a whole will take place.
Unfairness, Control and Bad Threats
In contrast to most situations where I recommend the
per capita liability allocation rule, I strongly recommend the
comparative fault liability rule for unfair conspiracies. Unfair conspiracies would include situations where one conspir2 55 For exator has effective control over another conspirator.
ample, an original supplier could have control over an agent.
If the original supplier wants the agent to boycott a new supplier, then the original supplier may threaten the agent with
cancellation of its status as an agent, effectively putting the
agent out of business if it fails to go along with the boycott. I
do not recommend, however, the comparative fault liability
allocation rule for situations where the conspirators merely
have disparities in culpability.
When examining the deterrence of liability a controlled
party faces, we must compare the penalty threatened by the
controlling party if the controlled party does not join the conspiracy with the penalty of potential damage liability from a
G.

254. If the firms find that per capita liability leads to a focal point of splitting
the benefits, then the parties might reach an agreement of $20 as the side payment. However, it is not necessary for the benefits to be divided per capita for
the conspiracy to take place under the per capita liability allocation rule. All
that is necessary is that each party receive more in expected benefits than expected liability.
Of course, the additional transaction costs for reaching this further agreement on the division of the benefit of the conspiracy must be less than the surplus benefit the conspiracy produces for the conspirators. In this case, the additional transaction costs must be less than the total conspiratorial benefit of $20
for the conspiracy to take place.
255. See supra note 123.
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plaintiff if the controlled party does join the conspiracy. If the
controlling party can threaten the controlled party with a
large penalty, then it is unlikely that the controlled party will
face much deterrence from being held accountable for some of
the damages in the conspiracy.
In such a case where there is control by one conspirator
over another, we will want to place more of the damage liability on the conspirator who has the control, as it is this party
that can be deterred.2 5 6 It is the additional fault that the controlling conspirator has by threatening the controlled conspirator into the conspiracy that can be used as the basis for
increased liability.
Control does not necessarily have to result from threats
by the controlling party. Control can also manifest itself in
the form of misrepresentation of fact. For example, a conspirator may have information that the conspiratorial act violates the law, but misrepresents its lawfulness to another
conspirator, preempting the information-receiving conspirator from obtaining legal advice regarding the act. In this
case, we might want the conspirator who made the misrepresentation to be liable for more of the damages than the other
conspirator because of its fault or control through
misrepresentation.
We need to separate good threats from bad threats. For
good threats, such as price competition, the comparative fault
liability allocation rule should not apply. We do not want a
conspirator to be able to claim that it joined a price-fixing
conspiracy because others threatened to compete with the
conspirator on price. We only want to use the comparative
fault liability allocation rule in the control situations where
we feel that one conspirator is unfairly controlling another
conspirator through a bad threat.
Of course, we do not want every conspirator to claim that
it has been controlled by another conspirator. Thus, the standard at which the comparative fault liability allocation rule is
used should be quite high. For example, we might want to
256. One might suggest that we increase the liability on the controlled conspirator because it needs a greater incentive not to enter into the conspiracy.
But if we did increase the penalty on controlled conspirators, then controlled
conspirators would simply claim they were not being controlled. Thus, it is
doubtful that such a step would increase deterrence.
By increasing the penalty on the controlling conspirator, we can get the
conspiracy as a whole to internalize the damages to the plaintiffs.
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use the requirement of economic ruin in antitrust cases. In
addition, a set rule could be used, such as allocating 50% of
the controlled conspirators liability to the controlling conspirator.25 7 While this would lead to some failures in the internalization of damage, the set rule would reduce the administrative and influence costs in determining the allocation of
fault.
The following table is a summary of my recommendations for liability allocation under the contribution with claim
reduction rule.
Per Capita Liability Allocation Rule

Comparative Fault Liability Allocation Rule

Comparative Benefit Liability Allocation Rule

Most conspiracies.
Default rule for conspiracies.

Unfair conspiracies
where one conspirator
has control over another
through use of a bad
threat.
Joint harm caused by
non-conspirators,

Costly for parties to bargain ex ante over the division benefits and easy to
measure the benefits ex
post.
Joint harm caused by
non-conspirators.

Recommendations for the Allocation of Liability for the Contribution With Claim
Reduction Rules

VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article examines the right to contribution and liability allocation in joint and several liability situations involving
conspiracies. Conspiratorial situations are special because
the conspirators will often have information about other conspirators' involvement in the illicit act and conspirators can
bargain over the division of the total conspiratorial benefit.
This inquiry differs from most previous discussions in that we
account for parties having asymmetric information and assess the resulting influences upon both deterrence and settle258
ment under the different rules.
257. Thus, suppose there are two conspirators and damages are ordinarily
allocated per capita. If the conspiracy involves one conspirator controlling an(its
other, then the controllingconspirator will be liable for 75% of the damages
per capita share plus 50% of the controlled conspirators per capita share) while
the controlled conspirator will be liable for only 25% of the damages (50% of its

per capita share).
258. Yi examined the likelihood of settlement where the defendants and the
plaintiff had asymmetric information about the plaintiff's damages. See Yi,
supra note 22, at 82-90.
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A. Deterrence
We first showed that where conspirators have the same
beliefs, some defendants may face less in expected damages,
and consequently face less deterrence, under the contribution
rules than under the no contribution rule. 25 9 However, at

least one defendant will have higher expected damages and
deterrence under the no contribution rule.26 °
We then showed that if defendants have different beliefs,
then depending on these beliefs, either the no contribution
rule or the contribution rules could lead to less, or more, deterrence for all defendants. 26 ' In some situations, all conspirators may enter into a conspiracy under the no contribution
rule because they believe they can escape liability. In other
situations, conspirators will be more deterred under the no
contribution rule because they fear being liable for more than
their share of the damages. What is important with regard to
deterrence is each defendant's belief of its own expected liability, not other defendants' beliefs of its liability. It is because defendants can have inconsistent beliefs that we cannot draw any general conclusions about which rule leads to
more deterrence. It was also noted that regardless of the beliefs of the defendants, the plaintiff will receive more compensation under the no contribution rule than under either of the
contribution rules.262
We showed that the different rules can influence a defendant's beliefs of its likelihood to settle cheaply. 263 Because
of the settlement-bar to contribution, a defendant will be willing to supply the plaintiff with information to be used against
other defendants under either the no contribution rule or the
contribution with claim reduction rule. The plaintiff might
settle cheaply with an information providing defendant. Information exchange is important because it will allow a plaintiff to break up a conspiracy's united negotiating front, receive a higher damage award, and lead to increased
deterrence for the conspirators. Yet under the contribution
259. See supra part III.A.2.
260. See supra part III.A.2.
261. See supra part III.B.
For some sets of beliefs, some defendants could face more deterrence under
the no contribution rule while other defendants would face more deterrence
under the contribution rules.
262. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
263. See supra part III.C.1.
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with claim reduction rule, a plaintiff will have a disincentive
to settle cheaply with a defendant that is liable for a large
proportion of the damages, regardless of the value of the de264 Thus, a defendant
fendant's information to the plaintiff.
that is liable for a large proportion of the damage will be
more deterred under the contribution with claim reduction
rule than under the no contribution rule.
We showed that the more culpable defendants will have
the greater incentive to collect and hide information to be
2 6 5 Beused against others than less culpable defendants.
cause the more culpable defendants may have better information to provide the plaintiff on other defendants' participation
in the conspiracy, the more culpable defendants may be able
to settle more cheaply than less culpable defendants.
We also noted that higher risk costs and higher litigation
2 66 Risk costs will be higher
costs will increase deterrence.
under the no contribution rule than under the contribution
rules because of the defendants' greater uncertainty of their
damage payment. Litigation costs will be higher under the
contribution rules because damages must be apportioned.
Yet if liability is allocated per capita, these apportionment
costs may be minimal. Litigation costs will also be higher
under the contribution rules because there will tend to be
more defendants outstanding at trial and defendants will duplicate some litigation expenditures. Litigation costs will be
highest under the contribution with settlement reduction
rule because defendants will have a disincentive to settle individually and thus, there are likely to be many outstanding
defendants in the event of a trial. The contribution with
claim reduction rule will neither encourage the plaintiff to
settle, nor discourage the defendants from settling. The no
contribution rule will give the plaintiff an incentive to settle
with most of the defendants. Risk costs and litigation costs
are a social waste, and while these costs may increase deterrence, they should be minimized because there are more efficient ways to increase deterrence, such as increasing liability
on the defendants.
Finally, in an extension to the model, we showed that if
detection is uncertain, the differences among the rules re264. See supra part III.C.2.
265. See supra part III.C.3.
266. See supra parts II.D, III.E.
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garding deterrence may not be as great.2 6 7 Where the
probability of detection of the conspiracy is low, the rules converge toward the same expected damages and thus, the same
deterrence.
B.

Settlement

With regard to settlement, we first noted what previous
authors had shown: that the contribution with settlement reduction rule will give defendants a disincentive to settle individually.2 68 Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, just one non-settling defendant could conceivably
keep all defendants from settling. Because of this disincentive to settle, contribution with settlement reduction is not a
desirable rule. In an extension to the model, we observed
that if contribution is uncertain, then under the contribution
with settlement reduction rule, a defendant might settle with
the plaintiff in order to limit its potential liability to its attributable share, even though the settling defendant would
still face the possibility of having to pay contribution.2 6 9
We then modified the analysis of Yi and showed that
neither the contribution with claim reduction rule, nor the no
contribution rule will always be more likely to lead to complete settlement.2 7 ° Where liability is allocated per capita,
complete settlement is more likely under the contribution
with claim reduction rule than under the no contribution
rule.
C. Allocation of Damages Under the ContributionRules
I recommend that in general, liability be allocated per
capita under the contribution with claim reduction rule for
conspiracy cases. The per capita liability allocation rule has
been attacked as unfair because it forces each defendant to
face the same liability regardless of its share of the damages.
However, if conspirators can agree on the act, then they
should also be able to agree on a fair division of the conspiratorial benefits. Thus, the fairness argument against the per
capita liability allocation rule seems misguided.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See
See
See
See

supra part
supra part
supra part
supra part

V.A.1.
IV.A.
V.A.3.
IV.B; Yi, supra note 22, at 82-90.
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Allocating liability per capita will be simpler for courts to
administer, and fewer resources will be wasted trying to influence the allocation of liability than allocating liability by
either the comparative fault or comparative benefit rules. We
can expect conspirators to have better information regarding
the conspiracy than can later be obtained by judges or other
third party decisionmakers. Thus, it should be less costly
and more fair to have conspirators allocate the benefit among
themselves than to have a third party decisionmaker allocate
the liability by comparative fault or comparative benefit for
71
those conspiracies that are detected.2
There are some exceptions I would make to the per capallocation rule. I recommend the comparative
liability
ita
fault liability allocation rule for cases of unfair conspiracies,
where one conspirator has effective control over another conspirator through the use of a bad threat. However, I would
not apply the comparative fault liability allocation rule just
because one conspirator is more culpable than another. The
key factor is control of one conspirator by another, not the
relative depravity of the conspirators. The comparative benefit liability allocation rule may be of use for situations where
conspirators face high transaction costs to bargaining or are
272
asset-constrained ex ante the conspiracy.
D.

Recommendations

The contribution with claim reduction rule and the no
contribution rule each have strengths and weaknesses that
make a clear cut choice impossible. However, if liability is
allocated per capita for most conspiracies, then I favor the
2 73
contribution with claim reduction rule.
271. Third party decisionmakers will not have to allocate the liability when
detection does not occur. Thus, these ex post detection liability allocation conspiracy costs should be discounted by the probability of detection. But even
when ex post liability allocation costs are discounted, it is probably still cheaper
to have the conspirators allocate the benefit ex ante the conspiracy.
272. As for cases involving non-conspirators, the analysis of Kornhauser and
Revesz showed that either the comparative fault or comparative benefit liability
allocation approaches would be appropriate for most cases. See Kornhauser &
Revesz, supra note 28. Only if the costs of applying the comparative fault or
comparative benefit liability allocation rules were very high, would the per capita rule be better for non-conspirators. Id.
273. I also recommend the contribution with settlement reduction rule if
Mary Carter Agreements are allowed. Simplified Mary Carter Agreements that
merely set a defendant's damage payment at a fixed amount would not give the
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We showed that neither the contribution with claim reduction rule nor the no contribution rule will always lead to
more deterrence or complete settlement.2 74 The contribution
with claim reduction rule will increase deterrence for those
conspirators who are liable for larger proportions of the damage. In addition, when liability is allocated per capita, the
contribution with claim reduction rule is less likely to lead to
situations where conspirators believe they will face little liability when entering into a conspiracy.
Another advantage of the contribution with claim reduction rule is that its expected damages are a constant function
of the damage caused per conspirator, regardless of the
number of conspirators. Under the no contribution rule, conspirators in large conspiracies are likely to face increased expected damage payments per damages actually caused.275
Having damages that are consistent across conspiracy size
should make it easier to determine the correct multiplier on
damages in many cases. I favor the contribution with claim
reduction rule because of its consistency and its deterrence on
defendants liable for a large proportion of the damages.
Both the contribution with claim reduction rule and the
no contribution rule will lead to some wasteful costs. The no
contribution rule will lead to more risk costs, while the contribution with claim reduction rule will likely lead to more litigation costs. But if liability is allocated per capita, then at
least the liability allocation costs will be minimized. Both
risk costs and litigation costs are a social waste and a rule
which minimizes these costs is desirable. The contribution
with claim reduction rule, where liability is allocated per capita, seems to meet this requirement.
Although the no contribution rule will lead to fewer outstanding defendants in the event of trial, the contribution
with claim reduction rule is more likely to lead to complete
settlement when liability is allocated per capita. If there are
many conspirators, then the no contribution rule may be fasettling defendant an incentive to provide untruthful information or testimony
either for or against the plaintiff or the non-settled defendants, as the settling
defendant will not have a stake in the outcome of the trial. In allowing these
simplified Mary Carter Agreements, the plaintiff and the settling defendant are
able to transform the contribution with settlement reduction rule into the contribution with claim reduction rule.
274. See supra parts III.B, 1V.B.
275. See supra note 59.
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vored, but for conspiracies involving a small number of conspirators, the contribution with claim reduction rule will be
favored. Since most conspiracies are likely to involve only a
few conspirators, the settlement analysis also seems to favor
the contribution with claim reduction rule.
Equity among defendants has also been argued as a reason for the contribution rules. Critics have complained that
both the no contribution rule and the contribution rules,
when liability is allocated per capita, are "unfair." However,
there are forces of equity, such as juries and judgment proof
defendants, that operate regardless of the rule chosen. In addition, conspirators can take the potential liability of each defendant into account when making their conspiratorial benefit division. I do not give the fairness argument much weight
for cases involving conspirators.
The one undisputed advantage of the no contribution
rule is that it will more fully compensate the plaintiff once a
conspiracy has been detected. This will be true even if the no
contribution rule leads to less deterrence than the contribution rules. However, we could increase liability under the
contribution rules such that a plaintiff would be able to receive a higher damage award.
For many laws, such as tort laws, legislatures should
move away from only using a negligent-intentional act dichotomy and focus more on whether a joint act was caused by
conspirators or non-conspirators. Conspiracy situations will
allow for simpler rules, such as per capita liability allocation,
as conspirators can solve fairness and liability allocation
problems through their negotiation over the division of the
conspiratorial benefit. It seems odd that legislatures apply
different rules for intentional and negligent joint-torts and
yet apply the same rules for joint tortfeasors regardless of
whether they are acting in concert or causing joint harm by a
simple chance accident.
For conspiracy situations, I favor the contribution with
claim reduction rule, with liability to be allocated per capita,
because of the deterrence and settlement effects the rule will
have on conspiracies. For situations involving a controlling
conspirator that manipulates the actions of a controlled conspirator, I recommend that liability be allocated by comparative fault, with additional liability placed on the controlling
conspirator. The no contribution rule, if it is modified to exert
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extra penalties in control conspiracies on controlling conspirators, would be my second choice. I definitely disfavor the
contribution with settlement reduction rule for conspiracy
cases as it will discourage settlement and lead to more trials.
My recommendations apply to conspiracies that cause any
type of injury, whether the harm is a negligent tort, intentional tort, securities violation, vertical antitrust violation,
horizontal antitrust violation, aviation collision or some other
damage caused by a conspiracy.

VIII.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

We will now formally define the model and notation.2 7 6
We will then show some of the results of the deterrence and
settlement sections in the article. The same assumptions
that were made in Section II will be made.2 7 7 Let there be N
conspiratorial defendants jointly and severally liable for the
damages caused to one plaintiff. We will use the following
notation:

276. The model and notation follow those of Easterbrook, Landes and Posner. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 16.
277. These assumptions are: (1) all defendants and the plaintiff are risk neutral, (2) detection of the conspiracy occurs with certainty, (3) the plaintiff negotiates with all defendants simultaneously, (4) if there is a failure of the plaintiff
to settle with any or all of the defendants, then the plaintiff will randomly
choose one of the non-settling defendants to sue, (5) the defendants are unable
to form an enforceable sharing agreement regarding settlement for damage
payments, or an agreement that no individual defendant will settle without all
of the defendants settling as a group, (6) if a defendant loses at trial against the
plaintiff, the defendant is able to obtain contribution from the other defendants
with certainty and (7) the plaintiff's probabilities of winning at trial against
different defendants are perfectly correlated such that if two defendants have
probabilities of losing at trial to the plaintiff of Ph and p, and ph 2!pl, then (a) if
the plaintiff first loses at trial against the pi-defendant, then the plaintiff's
probability of later winning against the ph-defendant will be
ph-pI
1-p,

and (b) if the plaintiff loses at trial against the pi-defendant, then the plaintiff's
probability of later winning against the Ph-defendant will be 0.
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n

X Aggregate damages caused by the defendants, X
xi

=

xi

Damages attributable to defendant i.
xi

r, Proportion of the damage attributable to defendant i, ri =
si Expected settlement payment of defendant i.
ei

Expected damage payment of defendant i.

A

Plaintiff's aggregate expected award, A

pi

Probability of the plaintiff winning at trial against defendant i.

=

n

e,.

A. Deterrence
27

1. Symmetric Information, Identical Defendants
Assume the defendants have the same beliefs regarding
the probabilities of the plaintiff winning at trial against each
defendant and the damages attributable to each defendant.
Assume that there are n defendants, each liable for the same
amount of damage xi = x, such that
n
i=1

xi = nx = X,

and that each defendant has the same probability of losing at
trial to the plaintiff pi = p. We can then use the symmetry of
the defendants to let their expected damages before entering
into the conspiracy be ej = e.
We will first compute the expected damages under the no
contribution rule where the defendants will reach equilibrium expected damages of e = e-w. The plaintiff will want to

settle with all but one defendant. Those defendants that settle will have expected damages equal to their settlement
amount, as the settlement bar to contribution will keep other
defendants from being able to seek contribution from them.
Following the analysis of Easterbrook, Landes and Posner,
let en be the expected loss of a lawsuit of the nth defendant
27 9 Each of the
after the n-1 other defendants have settled.
other defendants will have an expected settlement of sw, and
278. See supra part III.A. 1. The case of identical defendants with symmetric
information is analyzed by Easterbrook, Landes and Posner. See Easterbrook
et al., supra note 16.
279. See id. at 359.

112

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

thus, the expected loss for the last outstanding defendant will
be: e,, = p(X-(n-1)s-').
Since each defendant is equally likely to be the "nth" defendant, the only stable equilibrium will lead to en = sn'. Solving for snc, we have:
8nc

p
1 +p(n-1)

Under the no contribution rule, the aggregate damage award
received by the plaintiff will be
A,=ne = nsn' =

npX
1 +p(n-1)

We will now compute the expected damages under the
contribution rules. Each defendant is liable for
X

=

Xn

under both contribution rules. Under the contribution with
claim reduction rule, each defendant will have expected damages equal to its expected settlement of
= pX
ec = ccr
n
Under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, each
defendant will have a disincentive to settle individually, but
the expected damages of each defendant will also be
e_

px
n

Under both contribution rules, the plaintiff will have an expected total damage award of the lawsuit A, = nec = pX.
We can now compare the expected damages, and thus deterrence of identical defendants, under the rules of contribution and no contribution. Under the no contribution rule,
each defendant will have expected damages of
e_

e

-=

pX
P

1+p(n-1)

while under the contribution rules each defendant will have
expected damages of
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LX-.

ec

n

Ifp = 1 orn = 1, thene- =ec. However, ifp <1 andn>2,
then the defendants will have greater expected damages
under the no contribution rule, that is en' > e'. This is proved
below.
p(n-1) < n-1
1 +p(n-1)< n
1
1 +p(n-1)

1
n

> pX
pX
1 +p(n-1) n
- .-enc > e.

The plaintiff will also receive a higher total damage
award under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules, An, > A,, as
> npX =pX.
npX
1 +p(n-1)
2.

-

n

Symmetric Information, Different Damage
Responsibility"

We will again assume the defendants have the same beliefs regarding the probabilities of the plaintiff winning at
trial against each defendant and the damages attributable to
each defendant. Assume that each defendant has the same
probability of losing at trial to the plaintiff pi = p, but that
each defendant is liable for a different proportion of the damages under the contribution rules.
Under the no contribution rule, the expected settlement
is independent of the allocation of liability for the damages
among the defendants. The expected damages for defendants
who have caused different amounts of damage but have the
same probability of losing to the plaintiff at trial remains
enW

280. See supra part III.A.2.a.

__ PX
S1+p(n-1)
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This is the same expected damage payment for each defendant as when damages are equally attributable to each
defendant.
Under the contribution rules, the expected damages
faced by each defendant are dependent on the division of liability for the damages among the defendants. Expected damages for each defendant i will be eq = px, = pri X. Under the
contribution with claim reduction rule, defendants will settle
for Sr =eq, while under the contribution with settlement reduction rule, defendants will have a disincentive to settle individually. Whether a defendant faces a higher expected
damage payment, and thus, increased deterrence, under
either the no contribution rule or the contribution rules, depends on the proportion of damages the defendant is liable for
under the contribution rules.
If the proportion of damages that a defendant is liable for
is
1
r > 1+p(n-1)
then the defendant will face greater expected damages under
the contribution rules than under the no contribution rule.
While if
1
r < 1+p(n-1)
then expected damages will be greater under the no contribution rule. This is proved below:
1
rj > 1 +p(n-1)
prpX>

pX
1 +p(n-1)

1
rj < 1 +p(n-1)
pX
pri <
1 +p(n-1)
p

px

pX
pxi> 1 +p(n-1)

px < +p(n-1)

...e'>e '

...eC <e,

Under the no contribution rule and contribution rules,
the total damage award received by the plaintiff where the
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defendants have caused different shares of the damages will
be the same as where each defendant caused the same
amount of damage. Only the division of damages among the
defendants under the contribution rules changes. Under the
contribution rules, the plaintiff's total damage award will be
i=1

n

n

n

A=

e,

i=1

pxi=

i=1

prX=pX.

Under the no contribution rule, the plaintiff's total damage
award will again be
An, = new= ne

=

npX
1 +p(n-1)

These are the same total damage awards as when the defendants caused equal shares of the damage, and thus, A, > A,.
3.

Different Probabilitiesof
Symmetric Information,
28 '
Trial
at
Loss

Assume the defendants have the same beliefs regarding
the probabilities of the plaintiff winning at trial against each
defendant and the damages attributable to each defendant.
Assume the defendants are each liable for the same amount
of damage, xi = x, such that
n

xi=nx=X.
Assume the defendants have different probabilities of loss at
trial to the plaintiff. Whether a defendant faces higher expected damages under the no contribution rule or the contribution rules will depend upon the probabilities of the different defendants losing at trial to the plaintiff.

281. See supra part III.A.2.b.

[Vol. 35

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

116

Given total damages of X caused by the defendants,
under the no contribution rule, the aggregate settlement received by the plaintiff will be

Pi
A" =Ae- vj l-pjX X
p j

1

1+

vj l-Pj

If a defendant has a probability of losing at trial to the plaintiffofpi, then the defendant's expected damages and expected
settlement will be
ei = s,n = 1Pi (X-A,.).
-pi

This is shown below.
Each defendant will offer to settle for what it expects to
lose at trial if all of the other defendants settle for their equilibrium amount. We define
An= I ej" =

.sin'
Vi

Vj

as the aggregate settlement and damage award to the plaintiff. This gives us the following:

X

Sjnw

pi ~

7

,nc =pA

e~ne =

)

V-i
1-pi

vj

1-pi

Sj-+ sjne

pi xX

Solving for A,:
A

.n

"

j

(X-An)

j

I
IV

j

-ip

EPi

Pi X_
vj l-pj

AncVj

-Pj

A

=

1Pj-x

+

P

vj 1-P

X

1994]

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

117

and thus, the expected damages and expected settlement for
defendant i is:
i-plpi
St

. n

1

Pj
1+ E PJ

1-Sn=
A
1-pi

X

v 1-pi
A,

1
Vj l-Pj

Under the contribution rules, we will assume that each
defendant is able to obtain contribution from another defendant with certainty. Thus, the expected damages of each defendant will be
eic = (Mjax [Pi]) xi

The aggregate damage award to the plaintiff under the contribution rule will be
A =(Mqx [p])X.
Although the expected damages of any particular defendant may be higher or lower under the no contribution rule
than under the contribution rules, the aggregate damage
award received by the plaintiff under the no contribution rule
will always be as great as that under the contribution rules.
Thus, for at least one defendant the expected settlement payment and deterrence will not decrease.
The total damage award received by the plaintiff under
the no contribution rule is
Pi
1-P
Ap

1+
vj

X

1 -Pj

while under the contribution rules it is
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A,= (Mx [p 1) X.
If there is only one defendant, then A, = A, = pX .

[pj= 1, then A, = A, = X.
If Max
J
If there is more than one defendant and Max [Pi] < 1,
then A,, > A,. This is shown below.
Choose any pj. We then have the following:
--

> -1 = pj

l+z

Let z=

(1-p)

for allpj <land allz>0.

A

pj+z

>0 then

>

=pj

1

l+z

#j l-pi

pj

\1_pi Pi
1j

:P

>~~

P
>P

l-pi

i4

1

-pJ
>-P~j

::

Ij

>PjPj

1

(i+(

;+

1-p__

(1-pj)

p

P

)i

ii 1 -

Since pj was arbitrary, this is true for all pj and in particular the maximum pj. Thus, we can conclude the following:
'
z A
i

1+

1

-pi

Pi

i1-pi

> Max pj
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pi
1+

Pi

i 1 -pi

Thus, we have shown that where defendants have symmetric information, when defendants are liable for different
proportions of the damage or defendants have different
probabilities of loss at trial, the expected damages of.any particular defendant may be higher or lower. However, the total
damage award to the plaintiff is higher under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules.
4. Asymmetric Information2" 2
Under asymmetric information, if the defendants disagree about either their proportion of the liability under the
contribution rules or their probabilities of loss at trial to the
plaintiff, then the expected damages, and thus deterrence,
could be less (or more) for all defendants (or for some defendants) under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules. What determines the deterrence faced by a defendant is the defendant's beliefs of the liability allocation
and the different defendants' probabilities of loss at trial to
the plaintiff. As was illustrated above, some defendants
could have lower expected damages under the no contribution
rule than under the contribution rules. Where defendants
have asymmetric information, each defendant could have beliefs that lead it to face lower deterrence under the no contribution rule than under the contribution rules; however, no
defendant would have to face more deterrence under the no
28 3
contribution rule.

282. See supra part III.B.
283. In modeling the asymmetric information case, we can simply index each
defendant's beliefs and then look at the deterrence that the defendant faces
given its beliefs. I will not do so here because it is quite repetitive of the symmetric information analysis, but one should easily see how inconsistent beliefs
can lead to each defendant facing less deterrence.
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B. Settlement
Contribution
1. Defendants' Disincentive Under2 the
4
with Settlement Reduction Rule

Assume that each defendant has probability p of losing to
the plaintiff at trial. We can compare the defendant's expected damages if it does settle, with its expected damages if
it does not settle. If a defendant does settle for si, then it will
have expected damages equal to the settlement plus a possible contribution payment equal to its share of the damages
less its settlement amount, xi - si. The settling defendant will
have to pay this contribution with probability p. This will
give the defendant total expected damages of eULe = si + p(xi -

sj. If the defendant does not settle, then it will have expected damages of eirial = pxi. Thus, the defendant will have
lower expected damages by refusing to settle than by settling
for any amount si. This is shown below:
(1-p)s > 0

>pxi
(1-p)si +pxi>!
pxi
Si + p (xi-si)
i

eisettle >_ eitr l.

2.

Complete Settlement Under the Contribution with
Claim5Reduction Rule and the No Contribution
28

Rule

We will examine the likelihood of complete settlement
where the plaintiff and the defendants disagree about the
plaintiff's probabilities of winning at trial. Suppose the
plaintiff believes that it will win at trial with probability p,,
and the defendants believe that the plaintiff will win at trial
with probability p, such that p >p .286 We can compare the
difference in the plaintiff's settlement demands and the defendants' settlement offers.'
We will first examine the case under the no contribution
rule. The plaintiff will settle with all but one defendant for
the equilibrium settlement of
284. See supra part NV.A.
285. See supra part IV.B.
286. If the defendant believes that the probability of the plaintiff winning at
trial is greater than the plaintiffs belief of the probability of the plaintiff winning at trial, then settlement will occur, as the plaintiff will demand less than
the defendant will offer.
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Pax

1 +pA(n-1)

based on the defendants' beliefs of p,. This is because the
plaintiff is not better off having more than one defendant outstanding at trial, and the defendants will be unwilling to settle for more than this amount. The last outstanding defendant will believe it will lose at trial with probability PA, while
the plaintiff will believe that it will win at trial with
probability p,,. The amount that will be at stake at trial will
be
X- [(n-1)(

PtX
1l+p,,(n-1))]

The difference between the plaintiff's demand and the defendant's offer will be
1
(p -p){X-[(n-1)(

)}
1+p,(n-1)
1+pA X l)

Under the contribution with claim reduction rule, the
damages that a defendant is liable for will effect the likelihood of settlement, as the more a defendant is liable for the
greater the absolute difference between the plaintiff's demands and the defendant's offer. The defendant that will be
the least likely to settle under the contribution with claim reduction rule will be the defendant that is liable for the greatest proportion of the damages, which we will call fiX. The
difference between the plaintiffs demand and the defendant's
offer will be (p,,-pA)fLX.

First, we can note that if liability is allocated per capita
under the contribution with claim reduction rule, then the
contribution with claim reduction rule will lead to a smaller
difference in the plaintiff's settlement demand and the defendant's settlement offer for the last outstanding defendant
than under the no contribution rule.
If liability is allocated per capita under the contribution
with claim reduction rule then
(p-P)X
(P.-P") r-=

The following shows this:
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n-l>p,(n-1)
n>l+p,(n-1)
1
1
n

1+p,(n-1)

1+p,(n-1)-pA(n-1)

1
1
n

p(n-1)
<1-l

X <Xn X

l+p,(n-1)
X(n-1)p,,
(nX-n-1)
-1)
1 +p,,(n

~-lp,
<(P.-, ) X- 1+p(n-1)
.'. ") X
n
In the general case, if the proportion of liability faced by
the largest damage causing defendant under the no contribution rule is such that
1
ri <

(n-1)'
~ep
l<

then the contribution with claim reduction rule is more likely
to lead to complete settlement. However, if the proportion of
the largest damage causing defendant under the no contribution rule is such that
1
1+p(n-1)

then the no contribution rule is more likely to lead to complete settlement.

